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BURGESS, SUE F., Ed.D. The Legal Aspects of Home 
Instruction. (1985) Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. 
293 pp. 
This study is designed to identify and discuss major 
legal aspects of home instruction for school-aged children 
in the United States. Based on the review of the literature 
and on an examination of state statutes and case law, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Courts generally uphold compulsory attendance laws. 
2. Courts rule in favor of parents if fundamental 
rights are violated. 
3. Courts have not recognized a constitutional right 
to home instruction. 
4. Parents find very little protection from compulsory 
attendance laws based on the First Amendment's freedom of 
religion. 
5. Parents seldom find relief from attendance laws 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection of 
the laws. 
6. An effective legal strategy for parents in states 
where home instruction is legal is to claim they were 
denied due process. 
7. A current judicial trend is to declare that terms 
in attendance laws such as "private school" are unconsti-
tutionally vague. 
8. Courts uphold reasonable regulations for home 
instruction. 
9. Courts will help clarify the meaning of the 
statutory terms "otherwise" and "equivalent." 
10. In assessing equivalence of horne instruction to 
school attendance, judges focus on curriculum, competence 
of instructors, adequacy of materials, and regularity of 
instruction. 
11. The burden of proof may be placed on the state, 
the parents, or be split between the two parties. 
12. Future court strategies by horne-schoolers are 
likely to concentrate on the right to privacy, procedural 
due process rights, and challenges of vagueness against 
statutory wording. 
13. Horne instruction lobbyists will actively seek 
changes in compulsory attendance laws in these eleven states 
(which did not permit home instruction as of January, 1985): 
Arkansas, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming. 
14. In the thirty-nine states where horne instruction 
is permitted by statutory law, case law, attorney general 
opinion, state department of education policy, or by state 
or local school board policy, horne instruction lobbyists 
will seek relaxation of any strict regulations, such as 
the requiTernent for a certified teacher. 
15. Public school administrators will increasingly 
come into contact with horne-schoolers throughout the 1980's. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of teaching children at home rather than send-
ing them to a school may sound like an unprecedented experi-
ment in the history of American education, but it is not. 1 
Until compulsory school attendance laws were passed in every 
state between 1852 and 1918, 2 home instruction was the rule 
rather than the exception. As if in the "closing of a 
circle,"3 a growing number of parents in the 1980's are re-
turning to the practice of educating their own offspring. 
A variety of possible reasons have been advanced to 
explain why some parents select home instruction instead of 
school attendance for their children. In what Lines has called 
"a rejection of the idea of the United States public school 
as a melting pot," some parents feel that public and nonpublic 
1Francis Roberts, "The Home-Schooling Question," Parents, 
July 1984, p. 112. 
2Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School 
(New York: Random House, 1964), p. 127. 
3A. Beshoner, "Home Instruction in America: Parental 
Rights Reasserted," University of Missouri at Kansas City 
Law Review, vol. 49, (Winter, 1981), p. 191, cited by M. 
Chester Nolte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of Public School 
Attendance," School Law in Changing Times, ed. M. A. McGhehey 
(Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems 
of Education, 1982), p. 3. 
2 
schools are too conservative in approach, while other parents 
(including fundamentalist Christians) find the schools to 
be too libera1. 4 There are assertions that the public 
schools promote 11 secular humanism 11 5 and that attendance at 
schools can result in a 11 social cancer 11 called 11 peer depen-
dency.116 A tide of discontent with public schools followed 
publicity about falling scores on standardized tests, lead-
ing some parents to the conclusion that attendance at any 
school (including a home school) would produce an 
education at least equal in quality to that available in 
the public schools.7 In Megatrends: Ten New Directions 
Transforming Our Ljves, John Naisbitt wrote that the wide-
spread interest in home schools is part of a movement fea-
turing increased reliance on oneself and less dependency 
on social institutions. 8 
4Patricia M. Lines, 11 State Regulation of Private Educa-
tion, .. Phi Delta Kappan, vol. 64, October, 1982, p. 119. 
5charles E. Rice, 11 Conscientious Objection to Public 
Education: The Grievance and the Remedies, .. Brigham Young 
Law Review, vol. 18, 1978, p. 848. 
6Raymond S. Moore, Amerlca's.Greatest Educational System, 
U.S. Educational Resources Information Center, ERIC Document 
ED 192 873, 1979, p. 9. 
7Rice, 11 Conscientious Objectiun to Public Education, 11 
p. 888. 
8John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New.Directions 
Transform l ng Our L i ve-s--:;:(""N,_e-w---.;Y..-o_r __ k_: -w..-a_r_n_e_r----.=B~o-o-;'k_s_,___,I""'n-c . 198 2 ) , 
pp. 131, 142-143. 
3 
The increasing popularity of home schools is evident. 
A 1976 study of compulsory attendance laws found that twenty-
six states permitted home instruction.9 Studies in 198210 
and 198311 revealed that ten more states had condoned home 
instruction as an alternative learning arrangement. A state-
ment in a 1984 newspaper article that North Carolina is one 
of only twelve states which bars home instruction12 suggested 
that two more states have made concessions for home-schoolers 
since 1983. The issue of equivalence of education outside 
the aegis of compulsory school attendance was litigated 
twenty-five times during the first seventy years of this cen-
tury, but the next twenty-eight cases occurred in a time span 
of only ten years. In 1980 to 1981 alone, the issue was liti-
gated ten times. 13 
9William F. Aikman and Lawrence Kotin, Legal Implications 
of Compulsory Education- Final Report, U. S., Educational 
Resources Information Center, ERIC Document ED 130 387, 1976, 
pp. 110-113. 
10 
James W. Tobak and Perry A. Zirkel, "Home Instruction: 
An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law," University of Dayton 
Law Review, vol. 8, Fall 1982, pp. 6-10. 
11Patricia M. Lines, "Private Education Alternatives 
and State Regulation," Journal of Law and Education, vol. 
12, April 1953, pp. 220-226. 
12Associated Press Dispatch, The Winston-Salem [North 
Carolina] Journal, April 29, 1984, p. B7, col. 4. 
l3Martha M. McCarthy and Paul T. Deignan, What Legally 
Constitutes an Adequate Public Education? A Review of Consti-
tutional, Legislative, and Judicial Mandates, U.S., Educational 
Resources Information Center, ERIC Document ED 226 518, 
1982, pp. 111-112. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In fifty-three cases involving the issue of home instruc-
tion between 1893 and 1981, M. Chester Nolte found that 
parents lost twenty-nine cases, but won twenty-four cases. 14 
However, Ritter found that due to determined, "imaginative" 
legal tactics employed by parents, there is a tendency for 
some judges to find in favor of the parents. 15 Advice for 
home-schoolers is readily available in books like No More 
Public School (1972) by Harold Bennett, Better Than School: 
One Family's Declaration of Independence (1983) by Nancy 
Wallace, and Teach Your Own: A Hopeful Path for Education 
(1981) by John Holt, whose fourteenth chapter is entitled 
"Legal Strategies." Holt also publishes a newsletter called 
"Growing Without Schooling," which features home-school sue-
cess stories and current legal tips. With the advent of advo-
cacy and support groups for home-schoolers, it is even more 
important for supporters of public education to become informed, 
interested, and involved in the issue of home instruction. 
One purpose of this study is to call to the attention of 
administrators the importance of becoming aware of developments 
14 M. Chester Nolte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of Public 
School Attendance," School Law in Changing Times, ed. M. A. 
McGhehey (Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on Legal 
Problems of Education, 1982), pp. 14-15. 
l5Marion Ritter, "Read This Before You Veto Home-educa-
tion Requests," American School Board Journal, vol. 166, 
October, 1979, p. 
5 
in the legality of home instruction. Those administrators 
who have never before had to deal with home instruction 
should be prepared to handle requests for exemption from 
or· cases of noncompliance with compulsory attendance laws. 
Marion Ritter has warned that some school officials "learned 
too late that it takes only one hasty uninformed decision 
to create a lengthy, aggravating, costly controversy." 16 
John Holt's advice to prospective home schoolers who fear 
legal clashes includes .a statement of encouragement to the 
effect that many public school administrators are not aware 
of the laws regarding home instruction. 17 
In the 1982 Monnig case in Missouri, parents who were 
operating a home school won an appeal because the local 
public school principal had not familiarized himself with 
the home study program the parents were using. Therefore, 
the principal could not testify as to whether or not the 
student in question was receiving an equivalent education, 
as required by Missouri statutes. 18 Heightened awareness 
on the part of administrators of legal requirements such 
as the·burden of proof is necessary to increase their 
success ratio in litigation concerning home instruction. 
16Ibid. 
l7John Holt, Teach Your Own: A Hopeful Path for 
Education (New York: Delacorte Press/Seymour Lawrence, 
1981), p. 271. 
18 -8 In re Monnig, b 3 S.W. 2d 782 (Mo. App. 1982). 
6 
QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
The purpose of the study is to examine and analyze legal 
issues related to home instruction, so that public school 
administrators may prepare themselves to address this growing 
area of concern. Following are key questions that are 
answered in an attempt to develop practical, legal guidelines 
for dealing with home-schoolers. 
1. What are the major legal issues regarding home in-
struction? 
2. Which of these issues are likely to be included in 
court cases related to the legality of home instruction? 
3. Does an analysis of court cases reveal any specific 
trends? 
4. According to current statutory and case law, which 
states permit home instruction? 
5. Based on the established legal precedents, what are 
the legally acceptable criteria for home instruction? 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This is a study of the legal aspects of home instruc-
tion. It examines current statutory provisions and the 
history of litigation involving home instruction since 1893. 
Special emphasis is placed on recent trends as they are 
revealed from an analysis of court decisions. The relative 
merits or deficiencies of home instruction in lieu of 
compulsory school attendance are not discussed, although 
opinions of participants in the judicial process regarding 
same are reported in summaries of legal proceedings. 
METHODS, PROCEDURES, AND SOURCES 
OF INFORMATION 
7 
In order to determine if a need existed for the study, 
the researcher obtained a computer search of recent disser-
tation topics related to home instruction, compulsory 
attendance, and state regulation of nonpublic schools. 
Summaries of the dissertations so located were read in 
Dissertation Abstracts. Complete copies of pertinent 
dissertations were borrowed and read. 
Journal articles and other literature relevant to the 
subject being studied were located by using research tools 
such as the Index to Legal Periodicals, the Education Index, 
Current Law Index, Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 
Current Index to Journals in Education, and Resources in 
Education. The investigator also received a list of 
related sources through a computer search from the 
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC). 
In order to locate federal and state home instruction 
court cases, the researcher reviewed copies of the NOLPE 
School Law Reporter, School Law News, School Law Bulletin, 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Shepard's Citations, West's Education 
Law Reporter, the National Reporter System, and the American 
Digest System. Cases were read and categorized according 
to which legal issues of home instruction were involved. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
8 
For the purposes of this study, the following selected 
terms are defined: 
Parent: Any person having responsibility for a school-
aged child. 
Home instruction: A program of learning for a school-
aged child offered by one or both of his or her parents in 
place of public or nonpublic school attendance. Students 
so enrolled are physically capable of attending a public 
or nonpublic school. 
Home school: A residence where parents are undertaking 
a program of home instruction. 
Home-schooler: An operator of a home school. 
Compulsory attendance laws: Statutes that compel 
parents or guardians to send their children of certain ages 
to a public or nonpublic school. 
Public school: An educational institution established 
by state law and open to the children of all residents of 
a particular area. 
Nonpublic school: An educational institution featuring 
facilities, materials, and personnel of sufficient magnitude 
to serve a student population that is not limited to members 
of a single family or several families. The term is used 
9 
by the researcher to indicate all of the follow~ng ~ypes 
of schools, as they may be designated in statutes, court 
decisions, or professional literature: private schools, 
parochial schools, independent schools, church schools, 
private Christian academies, fundamentalist Christian 
schools, and schools of religious charter. The researcher 
does not refer to a home school as a nonpublic school. 
Fundamentalist Christian school: A nonpublic school 
operated by persons who believe in a literal interpretation 
of the Bible. 
Religious home school: A home school which is estab-
lished because of the religious convictions of its operator(s). 
Private tutor: A person employed by a parent for the 
purpose of instructing his child or children who are not 
otherwise in attendance at a school. 
Certified teacher: An instructor who has been endorsed 
to teach in the public schools of a certain state. 
Competent teacher: As associated with the state statutes, 
an instructor, who may or may not be certified, who is deemed 
to possess sufficient knowledge and skills concerning a 
particular field or fields of study. 
Police power: The right of the state (derived from the 
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution) to make 
ana enforce regulations necessary for the general welfare 
of the state and its citizens. 
10 
Parens patriae: The state•s power to protect minors 
and others who cannot take care of themselves. 
Burden of proof: The requirement of presenting suf-
ficient evidence to persuade a court to make a favorable 
ruling. 
Compelling state interest: A reason for which a state 
may limit a person•s constitutional rights. 
Vagueness: An invalidating quality ·or a law which is 
written so imprecisely that a citizen must guess as to its 
meaning. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
As previously noted, there has been a dramatic increase 
in the frequency of litigation about home instruction, yet 
Lines has asserted that judicial opinion rendered thus far 
on the subject is merely 11 the tip of the iceberg. 1119 One 
issue that has yet to be resolved by the courts is whether 
or not a home school is a nonpublic schoo1. 20 In 1925, in 
the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that attendance at a nonpublic school 
l9Patricia M. Lines, 11 State Regulation of Private 
Education, 11 p. 122. 
2°Kern Alexander and K. Forbis Jordan, Legal Aspects 
of Educational Choice: Compulsory Attendance and Student 
Assignment, U.S. Educational Resources Information Center, 
ERIC Document ED 082 273, 1973, p. 26. 
11 
was a legally acceptable alternative to compulsory attendance 
at a public schoo1. 21 Therefore, there is a tremendous in-
centive for home-schoolers to attempt to have their home 
declared to be.a nonpublic school. Even in states that ex-
plicitly permit home instruction, ~ometimes there are more 
stringent regulations of home schools than of nonpublic schools, 
again providing a motive for parents to seek recognition of 
their home as a nonpublic schoo1. 22 Attempts to have the 
statutory term "private school" dec~ared unconstitutionally 
vague have sometimes met with defeat, 23 but in a 1983 case, 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin agreed with the plaintiffs 
that the term "private school" was not sufficiently defined 
by the state legislature or by published rules and regula-
tions of the state department of public education. The 
Popanz case suggests the need for preparing for further chal-
lenges of state laws on the issue of vagueness. 24 
Some public school systems are voluntarily cooperating 
with home-schoolers by providing them with textbooks or other 
materials. 25 Lines has predicted that if the school systems 
21 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
22Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 51. 
23state v. Bowman, 653 P. 2d 254 (Ore. Ct.App. 1982). 
24state v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983). 
25Diane Divoky, "The New Pioneers of the Home-Schooling 
Movement," Phi Delta Kappan, vol. 64, February, 1983, p. 395. 
12 
are to be reimbursed for such services, local officials will 
have to be ready to assume responsibility for approving home 
instruction programs. 26 An implication of material support 
and official approval of home instruction by public school 
officials is the eventual issuance of high school diplomas 
to home-schoolers, suggested Tanya Magers. 27 
Whether through litigation or cooperation, the contact 
between public school administrators and home-schoolers is 
likely to increase. Administrators need to recognize the 
importance of keeping abreast of the rapidly changing case 
law and statutory law in the area of home instruction. This 
study will provide public school educators with an up-to-date 
account of the legal aspects of home instruction, including 
the rights of home-schoolers and the obligations of 
administrators. 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
The remainder of the study is divided into four major 
parts. Chapter II contains a review of related literature 
that traces the development of compulsory school attendance 
26Patricia M. Lines, Private Education Alternatives 
and.State Regulatj.on, U.S. Educational Resources Information 
Center, ERIC Document ED 218 801, 1983, p. 2. 
27Tanya A. Magers, "Problems Associated With Unaccredited 
Private Schools and Home Instruction Programs and Solutions 
To The Problems As Perceived By State Education Officials," 
(Doctoral dissertation, Ball State University, 1983), p. 206. 
13 
laws and examines the history of litigation concerning home 
instruction that followed the adoption of compulsory atten-
dance laws. The review of the literature also serves to 
reveal the legal issues that are examined in depth later 
in the study. · 
Chapter III presents a summary of the statutes (cur-
rent as of September, 1984) of the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia pertaining to home instruction vis-a-
vis compulsory school attendance. State statutes are grouped 
according to similarities of wording and requirements for 
fulfilling the compulsory attendance laws. The chapter re-
veals which states permit home instruction by statutes, ex-
plicitly or implicitly. Existing statutory requirements 
for home instruction are summarized. Appropriate excerpts 
from the statutes of each state and the District of Columbia 
are included in the Appendix. 
Chapter IV contains a narrative discussion of the legal 
aspects of home instruction. The history of major legal 
issues that surfaced during the review of the literature 
is presented. Highlights of relevant case law through 
November, 1984, are included in the narrative. 
Chapter V is a review and analysis of selected land-
mark and recent court decisions discovered in Chapters II 
and IV. For each case included in Chapter V, there is a 
14 
description of the facts of the case, a summary of the deci-
sion of the court, and a discussion of the effects of the 
decision. 
The concluding chapter of the study summarizes infor-
mation gleaned through a review of the literature and through 
the examination of statutory and case law. The questions 
that were posed in Chapter I are reviewed and answered. 
Findings are reported and recommended guidelines are offered 
for public school administrators who come into contact with 
home-schoolers. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
We, the people of the United States, in order 
to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, 
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the . 
common defense, promote the ge11eral welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity, do ordain and establish thiy 
Constitution for the United States of America. 
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Even though the topic of education is not specifically 
mentioned in the United States Constitution, "[a] need for 
education ... can be implied to achieve each of the six pre-
cepts--unity, justice,_~ranquility, defense, welfare, and 
liberty--of the Preamble of the Constitution."2 Thomas 
Jefferson wrote in a letter to Charles Yancey in 1816, "If 
a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of 
civilization, it expects what never was and never will 
be. u3 
In the nineteenth century, the controversy raged over 
whether or not the state should control education. John 
1u.s. Constitution, Preamble, 1787. 
2Douglas R. Pierce, "Satisfying the State Interest 
in Education with Private Schools," Tennessee Law Review, 
49(1982), p. 956. 
3John P. Foley, ed., The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia (New 
York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1900), p. 274. 
Stuart Mill, writing in his famous essay On Liberty, had 
this to say: 
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An education, established and controlled by the State 
should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among 
many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose 
of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a 
certain standard of excellence.4 
At the root of the controversy surrounding compulsory 
school attendance was the conflict betweer. the desirability 
of educating the populace and deferring to individual rights. 
This troubling dilemma posed an intricate problem. In a 
democratic society, are individuals completely free to edu-
cate their children in whatever manner they choose, or not 
to educate them at all? Sta~e legislators had to grapple 
with this difficult question during the latter nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the time period in which com-
pulsory education laws were passed. If it were not for the 
existence of compulsory school attendance laws, there would 
be few, if any, legal issues surrounding the topic of home 
instruction. Therefore, it is appropriate to trace the de-
velopment of compulsory school attendance laws in the United 
,.-........ 
States. Even though the idea of compulsion was extremely 
controversial, increased interest in social reforms tipped 
the scales in favor of those who sought the passage or' 
4 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Alburey Castell 
(1859); rpt. (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, Inc. 
194 7) ' p. 108. 
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compulsory attendance laws. Two related issues were the 
assimilation of large numbers of immigrants who arrived in 
America in the latter half of the nineteenth century and 
the movement to abolish child labor. 
Massachusetts, the first state to enact a compulsory 
attendance law,5 was also the site of the first court case 
concerning home instruction. 6 Early instances of litigation 
tended to focus on judicial interpretations of the legisla-
tive intent behind compulsory attendance laws. When judges 
felt that the lawmakers designed such laws so that youths 
could merely escape ignorance, they were likely to rule 
in favor of home instruction programs. On the other hand, 
when judges felt that legislators had also endorsed sociali-
zation through group education, they were likely to rule 
against home-schoolers. As the frequency of home instruc-
tion cases began to increase steadily, starting in the 1950•s, 
the issues of academic proficiency and socialization were 
joined by challenges based on an ever-widening range of 
issues such as statutory construction, procedural due process 
rights, religious freedom, and impermissible vagueness of 
statutes. 
5Forest Chester Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance 
and Child Labor (Iowa City: The Athens Press, 1921), p. 52. 
6commonwealth v. Roberts, 38 N.E. 402 (Mass. 1893). 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPULSORY 
ATTENDANCE LAWS 
The Movement Toward Universal Education 
In primitive societies, education of the young was 
accomplished without schools. Adults passed group organi-
zation, customs, and tools to the next generation. Weapon-
making, hunting, and fishing were taught through ''accultura-
tion, imitative learning, and incidental apprenticeship." 7 
Formal education was reserved for learning about taboos 
(disapproved actions considered unsafe or harmful to unity) 
and totems (action conducive to survival). 8 With the 
development of complex societies featuring competing groups 
and their vnJuP systems, education became less casual and 
was increasingly relied upon for social control .. Education 
emerged as" ... the institution which developed out of man's 
need to control his world and his recognition that intel-
ligence is indispensable to such control."9 Formal educa-
tion developed when informal education was no longer suf-
ficient to meet the demands of socialization. "This [was] 
7Daniel H. Kulp, II, Educational Sociology (New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1932), p. 30. 
Sibid., p. 31. 
9aeorge Barnett and Jack Otis, Corporate Soc1.ety and 
Education: The Philosophy of EJ.ijah Jordan (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1961), p; 120. 
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the case when it [was] necessary for an individual to learn 
to act in ways that [were] not natural or that [might] be 
unpleasant." 1° Formal education became a way to shape per-
sons to fit the social order and to develop restraints so 
that people would conform to culture patterns. As education 
assumed some of the tasks that the church in the Middle 
Ages had performed (such as preparing for the state a loyal 
group of subjects), 11 it became more universal and eventually 
compulsory. 
William C. Bagley identified three movements that led 
to universal education: 1) Luther's insistence that indi-
viduals should be able to read and interpret the Bible for 
themselves; 2) the first Industrial Revolution; and 3) 
12 extension of suffrage by political democracy. The pro-
blem of vagrancy in England during the reign of Edward III 
(1327-1377) led to a law mandating compulsory employment 
(with no mention of age limits), but during Henry IV's 
reign, youngsters' attendance at school was made a legally 
10John A. Bartky, Social Issues in Public Education 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p. 20. 
11Paul H. Landis, Social Control: Social Organization 
and Disorganization in Process (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 1939), pp. 256-261. 
12William C. Bagley, A Century of the Universal School 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 3. 
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acceptable alternative to employment. 13 England's Poor Laws 
of 1597 and 1601 called for the mandatory apprenticing of 
pauper children. The principles of public control that were 
then being developed in England were ideas that would be 
taken to America by the early English colonists. These princi-
ples were the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
The state may control the movements and employment 
of the poor. 
The state may compel the local community to care 
for its poor, and may require that funds for 
these purposes be raised by general tax. 
The state recognizes the value of employment 
of youth for economic independence and moral 
development of the individual. 
The state can require all children to be em-
ployed and may specify the kind of employment. 
Attendance at school is a satisfactory substitute 
for employment. 
The state can require industrial education. 
The state can remove pauper children from their 
parents' care and apprentice them. 
The state can require local communities to tax 
their members to support industrial education.l4 
Colonial Background 
Between 1628 and 1640, around 20,000 English people 
settled at the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Most were ·Puritans 
who were progressives or liberals by English standards. 
They extended the idea of compulsion " .•. so as to bring the 
entire population under various forms of control formerly 
13Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance and Child Labor, 
pp. 8-10. 
14Ibid., p. 16. 
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reserved for certain [lower] classes." 15 The year 1642 
was a famous landmark in the history of American compulsory 
education. It was the first time that literary (as opposed 
to vocational) education had been required for children 
of English heritage. Five years later, the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony set another precedent with the passage of the 
Old Deluder Satan Act, which required all communities of 
fifty or more families to employ a master to teach reading 
and writing. Communities of more than 100 families were 
required to establish grammar schools to be financed by 
local taxes. l6 Thus the Massachusetts Bay Colony set forth 
these principles upon which modern school systems are in 
part based: 1) universal education is essential to the 
well-being of the state; 2) parents are obligated to educate 
their children; 3) the state can enforce the parental obli-
gation; 4) the state can fix educational standards; 5) the 
state can levy a tax for education; and 6) the state can 
supply education above the elementary level. 17 
Two pertinent ideas that were not yet established in 
1647 were the ideas of requiring attendance at the schools 
and eliminating child labor. 18 It has been observed that 
15Ibid., p. 19. 
16Ibid., pp. 20-23. 
17Ibid., p. 23. 
lBibid. 
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throughout history, there is a " ... very remarkable paral-
lelism between periods of grave national crises and the 
beginning of major educational advances." 19 Cases in point 
are the development of German universal schools after the 
disasters of the Napoleonic wars, the establishment of land-
grant colleges after the Civil War, the appointment of 
Horace Mann as Secretary of the Massachusetts State Board 
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of Education after the economic panic of 1837, and the 
attention given to the study of science after the launching 
of Sputnik in 1957. The "disasters" that precipitated the 
adoption of compulsory attendance laws were two by-products 
of America's industrialization period: massive immigration 
and child labor·. Social reformers gradually began to sup-
port compulsory school attendance as a means of combatting 
both problems. 
Social Reforms: Dealing with Immigration 
and Child Labor 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, large 
numbers of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe 
arrived in the United States. They brought with them their 
unique languages, customs, and traditions, which were very 
quickly subjected to criticisms by members of the dominant 
l9Bagley, A Century of the Universal School, p. 30. 
20 Ibid., p. 31. 
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culture in America. Lawrence Cremin's book, The Trans-
formation of the School, attributed to a Stanford University 
professor the assertion that the first task of American 
education was to implant in immigrant children " ... the Anglo-
Saxon conception of righteousness, law and order, and popular 
government, and to awaken in them a reference for our demo-
cratic institutions and for those things in our national 
21 
life which we as a people hold to be of abiding worth." 
Indeed, Americanization of the immigrants by the schools 
was favored by Progressives, who expected schooling to up-
lift and to develop the immigrants morally; by industrialists, 
who desired increased stability; and by Russian Jewish 
immigrants, who expected to receive greater social mobi-
lity. 
22 
After every state in the Union had passed compul-
sory attendance laws between 1852 and 1918, 23 two zealous 
reformers of 1917 hailed the new law's merits, "The impor-
tance of the compulsory attendance law as a means of help 
211awrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School 
(New York: Random House, 1964), p. 68. 
22Ann Parker Parelius and Robert J. Parelius, The 
Sociol.ogy of Education (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 1978), pp. 58-59. 
23cremin, The Transformation of the School, p. 127. 
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and protection to the immigrant families cannot be over-
estimated." 24 Reiterating that the public school, more 
than any other institution, has a better opportunity for 
success in the mammoth task of Americanization, Edith Abbott 
and Sophonisba Breckinridge recommended through their book 
Truancy and Non-Attendance in the Chicago Schools: A Study 
of the Social Aspects of the Compulsory Education and Child 
Labor Legislation in Illinois, that the state must make 
an effort to get the immigrants' children to public schools 
at the "earliest possible moment and [compel] them to 
attend with regularity ... [for] ... the future welfare of 
the state." 25 It is interesting to note the urgency 
of Abbott's and Breckinridge's recommendations in light 
of the fact that in Chicago, the "vast majority" 
of the inhabitants were immigrants or the children of 
immigrants, causing the authors to claim that the 
"compulsory education law is indispensable as a means 
of safeguarding the state." 26 
24Edith Abbott and Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, 
Truancy and Non-Attendance in the Chicago Schools: A 
ttudy of the Social Aspects of the Compulsory Education 
Law and Child Labor Legislation of Illinois (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1917), p. 164. 
25Ibid., p. 266. 
26Ibid., p. 164. 
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For the reformers, promoting the cause of Americaniza-
tion of the immigrants proved to be an easier task than 
promoting the idea that children should not be allowed to 
hold jobs in factories. The utilization of child labor 
was a foregone conclusion in America even before industriali-
zation was fully accomplished. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton's 
report to the House of Representatives concerning the 
feasibility of operating textile mills specified that the 
mills could be operated by women and children, thereby 
rendering those two groups more "useful" to society. ·27 
Samuel Slater, a cotton manufacturer in Rhode Island, some-
times known as "the father of American manufacturing," once 
manned an entire factory with children between the ages 
of seven and twelve. 28 From a businessman's point of view, 
there were certain profitable advantages to employing 
children, who were cheaper, more "tractable, reliable and 
industrious, quicker, neater, and more careful, and as labor 
2Q 
unions developed, less likely to strike." ~ Industrialists 
were not alone in their propensity toward child labor. 
27Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance and Child Labor, 
pp. 31-32. 
28walter I. Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A 
History of the National Child Labor Committee and Child 
Labor Reform in America {Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1970) ' p. 26. 
29Ibid., p. 27. 
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Poor families desired the extra income brought in by working 
children, and religious families believed that keeping 
children busy would give them less opportunity to stray 
from parental religious beliefs and practices.3° 
F. C. Ensign (who studied child labor and compulsory 
school attendance in the states of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) stated 
that child labor was more of a problem in the highly indus-
tralized northern part of the United States, but with the 
cotton mills that developed after the Civil War, child labor 
plagued the southern part of the nation as well. By 1900, 
25,000 children below the age of fifteen were working in 
textile mills. Ninety percent of them worked in North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, or Alabama where there 
were no child labor or compulsory education laws. The 
illiteracy rates of children between the ages of ten and 
fifteen were three times as high in mill districts as in 
the rest of the country. Seventy-five percent of all 
persons who worked as spinners in the state of North 
Carolina were under the age of fourteen.3l 
The first widespread attention to the disadvantages 
or "evils" of child labor practices occurred at the same 
3°Parelius and Parelius, The Sociology of Education~ 
p. 58. 
31Trattner, Crusade for the Children, p. 40. 
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time that many other social ills were being exposed. The 
Progressive Era movements for social welfare legislation 
gained momentum partly through a new journalistic fad called 
muckraking. Following the lead of the attack by McClure's 
magazine on Standard Oil and urban political machines, "a 
small army of professional writers was soon flooding the 
periodical press with denunciations of the insurance busi-
ness, the drug qusiness, college athletics, prostitution, 
sweatshop labor, political corruption, and dozens of other 
subjects,"32 such as child labor. Reformers of the period 
tended to use emotional rhetoric that would appeal to middle 
class self-righteousness. Progressives believed that women, 
children, paupers, and seriously ill persons must be 
protected from corruption in government and big business. 
"The 'people,' by which the progressives usually meant the 
comfortable middle class, must assume new responsibilities 
toward the unfortunate."33 
In the book Children in Bondage: A Complete and Careful 
Presentation of the Anxious Problem of Child Labor--Its 
Causes, Its Crime, and Its Cure, Edwin Markham and others 
offered some sound arguments against the practice of child 
~ 2John A. Garraty, The American Nation: A History 
of the United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 
pp. 646-647. 
33 Ibid., p. 648. 
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labor but laced the book heavily with sensationalism. In 
one particularly emotional chapter, the authors repeated 
a "rumor" that in Delaware, dogs were afraid to leave their 
kennels at night for fear that during their absence a child 
laborer from a local cannery might covet and take over their 
shelter.34 The authors used as an illustration a reproduc-
tion of a 1913 newspaper advertisement from Choctaw County, 
Alabama, that was recruiting for the town's new cotton mill. 
The advertisement asked for families with children around 
the age 0f twelve to move to their town for employment.35 
p,~t.l ic at tent ion was also being attracted to the physi-
cal abuses of child labor including tuberculosis, heart 
strain, anemia, curvature of the spine, permanent bone and 
muscular damage, stifled moral and physical growth, and 
a higher probability for a life plagued by infirmity, de-
pendency, and delinquency. 36 Trattner attributed the in-
creased interest in the welfare of children to the fact 
that the child ls the key to social control. He listed 
34Edwin Markham, Benjamin B. Lindsey, and George Creel, 
Children in Bondage: A Complete and Careftll Presentation 
of the Anxious Prob le·m of ChU.d Labor--Its Causes, Its 
Crime, and Its Cure (New York: Hearst's International 
Library Company, 1914), p. 351. 
35Ibid., p. 39. 
36Trattner, Crusade for the Children, p. 49. 
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these programs as part of the resulting child-saving campaign: 
children's aid societies; concern for the infant mortality 
rate; correction houses; juvenile courts; probation systems; 
parks, playgrounds, and public baths; widow's pensions; 
improved schools; compulsory attendance; and the crusade 
against child labor.37 
In 1903, the American Federation of Labor formed a 
committee to study the questions of apprenticeship and child 
38 labor. . By 1909, Charles Horton Cooley wrote in Social 
Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind that "labor unions 
have pr:-bably done more than all other agencies together 
to combat child-labor, excessive hours, and other inhumane 
and degrading kinds of work ..... 39 Along with child labor 
laws, unions began to see compulsory education in a favorable 
light. Union leaders began to think that access to public 
education could build a less stratified society. 40 According 
to Howard S. Patterson and others, organized labor began 
37Ibid., p. 47. 
38walter Robinson Smith, An Introduction to Educational 
Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), 
p. 117. 
39charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: . A Study 
of the Larger.Mind (New York: Schocken Books, 1909), p. 
286. 
40Parelius and Parelius, The Sociology of.Education, 
p. 57. 
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to favor the enforcement of compulsory attendance laws and 
the raising of the age at which one could legally leave 
school in order to reduce unemployment of the adult workers. 
Compulsory school attendance was seen as an alternative 
preferable to keeping surplus workers in large standing 
·armies as was done in Europe. 41 
The first child labor law was passed in Alabama in 
1887, partly due to the efforts of Edgar Gardner Murphy, 
an Episcopal clergyman who became a champion of child-labor 
legislation in the South. 42 The National Child Labor Com-
mittee was organized in 1904 to work for national solutions 
to the problem. 43 When the United States Children's Bureau 
became a reality in 1912, President Taft gave the pen he 
used to sign the bill to Alexander McKelway, a leader of 
the cause from Charlotte, North Carolina. 44 By 1914, re-
formers in nearly every state had obtained laws "banning 
the employment of young children (the minimum age varied 
from twelv~ tc1 sixteen) and limiting the hours of older 
4lHoward s. Patterson, Ernest A. Choate, and Edmund 
de S. Brunner, The School in American Society (Scranton: 
International Textbook Crimpany, 1936). pp. 294-295· 
42 . 
Trattner, Crusade for the .Children, pp. 50-51. 
43aarraty, The American Nation, p. 652. 
44Trattner, Crusade for.the Children, p. 119. 
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children to eight or ten per day.•• 45 Dangerous jobs and 
nighttime jobs were also outlawed in many states, but the 
laws were far from uniform and were weakly enforced. In 
1916, Congress passed a federal chiJd labor law, but the 
Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional, saying that 
only the individual states have the right to regulate their 
business or trade. 46 In 1919, Congress tried to regulate 
child labor again by putting a tax on employers who hired 
young laborers, but the Supreme Court found such a tax uncon-
stitutional.47 In 1924, a movement to make a prohibition 
against child labor into the Twentieth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution was begun, but it failed to achieve rati-
fication by the necessary three-quarters of the states. 48 Its 
opponents argued that adopting an amendment to the constitution 
against child labor was nothing less than a communist plot, 
and that the amendment would prevent parents from getting 
their children to help with the chores at home. 49 The 
latter argument prompted the National Child Labor Committee 
45 Garraty, The American Nation, p. 652. 
46Ibid., p. 653. 
47Rhoda Cahn and William Cahn, No Time For School, 
No Time For Play: The Study of Child Labor in America 
(New York: Julian Messner, 1972), p. 52. 
48 Garraty, The American Nation, p. 653. 
49Trattner, Crusade for the Children, pp. 170-171. 
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to publish a pamphlet delineating the distinction between 
child labor and child work. While child work was described 
as the normal chores (having educational value) done around 
a home or farm by a child, child labor was defined as: 
The work of children [on the farm as well as in 
the factory) under conditions that interfere 
with the physical development, education and 
opportunities for recreation that children re-
quire. It is the working of children at unfit 
ages, or unreasonable hours, or under unhealthy 
conditions ,?0. 
Nevertheless, many reformers slowly changed strategies 
by turning their zeal toward obtaining well-enforced compul-
sory attendance laws, which would preclude the absolute 
necessity (but not the desirability) of a national child 
labor law. 51 
The Influence of EducaU onal P~.oueers 
In addition to the social reformers who looked to 
education to improve the lot of the immigrants and the poor, 
there was a band of zealous educational pioneers who saw 
a free universal education as a means of assuring the con-
tinuation of the young nation's democratic system of govern-
ment. According to Lawrence Cremin, the "great pre-Civil 
War architects of universal schooling" were "Horace Mann 
5°Kulp, Educational Socj.ology, p. 456. 
5lAbbott and Breckinridge, Truancy and Non-Attendance 
in the Chicago .. Schools, p. 74. 
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in Massachusetts, Henry Bernard in Connecticut, John Pierce 
in Michigan, and Samuel Lewis in Ohio. 11 52 Advocates of uni-
versal schooling reiterated the advice of statesmen such· 
as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Francis Marion, John 
Jay, James Madison, John Hancock, and John Adams.53 
In his first address to Congress in 1790, President 
George Washington said, "Knowledge is in every country the 
surest basis of public happiness.n54 Later, in his farewell 
address of 1796, Washington said, 
Promote then, as an object of primary importance, 
institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. 
In proportion as the structure of a government 
gives force to public opinion, it is e~sential that 
public opinion should be enlightened.~~ 
President James Madison also maintained that an educated 
citizenry was necessary for the survival of a democracy. 
He said that 
[a] popular government without popular information or 
the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a 
farce or a tragedy, or, perhaps both. Knowledge 
will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean 
to be their own governors must ar~ themselves with 
the power which knowledge gives.5 
52 8 Cremin, The .. Tr.anst'ormation.-of .. the .. School, p. . 
53 Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public .. Education .. in .. the .. United 
States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), pp. 89-90. 
54Ibid., p. 89. 
55 Ibid. 
56Kern Alexander and K. Forbis Jordan, Legal .. Implica-
tions .. of.Compulsory .. Education-F1nal .. Report, U.S., Educational 
Resources Information Center, ERIC Document ED 130 837, 
May, 1976, p. 1. 
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John Jay and John Adams both stressed the value of a 
free public education to the nation's poor. Jay wrote to 
a friend that " ... nothing should be left undone to afford 
all ranks of people the means of obtaining a proper degree 
[ ] 57 of education... Adams said, 
The education here intended is not merely that of the 
children of the rich and noble, but of every rank and 
class of people, down to the lowest and poorest ..• 
Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially 
of the lower classes of people, are so extremely wise 
and useful that, to a humane and generous mind, no 
expense Bor this purpose would be thought extra-
vagant.5 
The ideas of these famous statesmen were adopted by 
Horace Mann, Secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of 
Education. Mann felt that a free public education could 
serve as the "great equalizer" of society.59 Mann advanced 
a free public education as a solution to poverty, social 
60 conflict between classes, crime, and sickness. Mann also 
praised education in groups, in opposition to Rousseau's 
contention in Emile that the ideal teaching and learning 
57 Cubberley, Public .. Educati.on .. in .. the United .. States, 
p. 90. 
5Bibid. 
59cremin, The Transformation of the .. School, p. 9. 
60rbid. 
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situation was the or.e-to-one relationship shared by a child 
and his tutor. 61 Mann felt that group education in common 
schools would produce a much greater unifying result. 62 
After Mann died in 1859, William T. Harris became a 
leading spokesman for universal education. 63 Harris was 
joined by Barnas Sears, J. L. M. Curry, Edward Sheldon, and 
John Eaton as the "crusading pioneers" of the post-Civil 
War Era. 64 Harris served as the United States Commissioner 
of Education from 1889 to 1906. 65 Representative of Harris' 
views is his assertion that "[a]n ignorant people can be 
governed, but only a wise people can govern itself."66 
A third group of educational pioneers, leaders of pro-
gressive education, featured members such as Francis W. 
Parker and John Dewey. 67 Dewey felt that democracy and 
education were naturally attracting ingredients in an idea 
of progress that would make society more "worthy, lovely 
61 Ibid., p. 11. 
62Ibid. 
63Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
64rbid., p. 14. 
65Ibid. 
66seventeenth.Annual. Report of the.Board.of Directors 
of.the St. Louis Public Schools (St. Louis, 1872), p. 58, 
cited by Cremin, The Transformation of the School, p. 16. 
67cremin, The Transformation of.the School, p. 21. 
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and harmonious."68 Dewey wrote that 
[t]he devotion of democracy to education is a familiar 
fact. The superficial explanation is that a govern-
ment resting upon popular suffrage cannot be success-
ful unless those who elect and who obey these governors 
are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates 
the principal of external authority, it must find a 
substitute in voluntary disposition and6~nterest; these can be created only by education. ~ 
Later, historians Charles and Mary Beard wrote that the 
same concept of progress that Dewey and other educational 
pioneers had espoused was the 
... most dynamic social theory ever shaped in the 
history of thought - the idea of progress or the con-
tinual improvement in the lot of mankind by the 
attainment of knowledge ... 70 
The .. Adoption of-Compulsory Attendance Laws 
Despite the favorable image of free universal education 
that was promoted by educational pioneers, compulsory school 
attendance for the children of all classes of citizens was 
an issue loaded with emotional beliefs over whether or not 
the government could tell parents how to raise their children. 
Edward Searing, a Wisconsin state superintendent of educa-
tion, felt that compulsory attendance was "un-American and 
68John Dewey, The School .and Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1899), p. 44. 
69John Dewey, Democracy and.Education (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1916), pp. 101-102. 
7°charles Beard and Mary Beard, The .. Rise .. of.American 
Civilization (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1927), 
p. 443. 
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intolerable." He stated his indignation for any law that 
would mandate how he was to clothe, dress, feed, or educate 
his children.71 A group of manufacturers was opposed to 
the age of sixteen as the minimum requirement for compulsory 
attendance, claiming that using age sixteen (instead of a 
lower age, such as fourteen) ignored the individual interests 
and aptitudes of students and would contribute to higher 
rates of delinquency.72 If left to their own devices, in 
spite of parental mandates or desires, it was found that 
"nine out of ten child workers prefer their toil to school 
attendance," saying they preferred "hard drudgery" to "dull 
monotony."73 Helen Todd, a factory inspector in Chicago, 
found that 412 out of 500 child workers she studied would 
rather remain in a factory than attend school. The reasons 
they gave to her included being paid for work, having jobs 
that were easier to learn than school tasks, not being 
ridiculed for not knowing something, not having corporal 
punishment, not liking learning, not being called names by 
the other school children, being liked by parents for 
bringing money home, and not having any homework. Two 
71Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance and Child Labor, 
p. 207. 
72Raymond G. Fuller, Fourteen Is Too Early: Some 
Psychological Aspects of School-Leaving and Child Labor 
(New York: National Child Labor Committee, 1927), p. 2, 
p. 36. 
73Markham et al., Children in Bondage, p. 372. 
other reasons often given were that things learned in school 
were of no practical use and that children who had been to 
school did not receive any more pay than those who had 
not. 74 Although the children in Todd's study mentioned lack 
of corporal punishment as an advantage of work over school, 
Samuel Slater's plant in Rhode Island had a "whipping 
room" to help reduce discipline problems among its young 
employees.75 Also, Raymond G. Fuller found a higher inci-
dence of delinquents among working children than school 
.6 
children.7 
With the development of the child advocacy movement 
(and with the influx of immigrants sorely in need of 
Americanization), middle class resistance to compulsory 
attendance weakened. Since compulsory attendance laws fared 
better with the Supreme Court than did child labor laws, 
they were more effective at dealing with the ills that social 
reformers sought to conquer. In 1852, Massachusetts, which 
had been the first state to require communities to establish 
schools, became the first state to adopt a compulsory at-
tendance law. The law required that all children between 
74Ibid., pp. 373-374. 
75Ens1'gn, C 1 S h 1 Att d d Chjld L b ompu sory c oo. .. .en ance an . . . . a or, 
p. 27. 
76Fuller, Fourteen is Too Early, p. 36. 
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the ages of eight and fourteen attend a public school twelve 
weeks a year, with at least six weeks being consecutive. 
Exceptions were made for those already enrolled in other 
schools, for those who could prove they were "already edu-
cated," for the handicapped, and for those whose poverty 
required them to work. It was left for the city treasurers 
to prosecute offenders for the fine, which was not to exceed 
twenty dollars.77 Like most early attendance laws, it was 
poorly enforced and exempted those who needed it most, 
i.e., the poverty stricken. 
In 1872, Connecticut adopted a compulsory attendance 
law. The state secretary of the Board of Education there 
publicly changed his stance on compulsory attendance laws, 
declaring them to be "the legal expression of the public 
will" rather than an undemocratic violation of parents' 
rights. 78 New York's 1874 law required public school at-
tendance for fourteen weeks a year unless the child was 
taught at home for the same amount of time. The law re-
quired employers to check for a "certificate of schooling" 
before hiring a person under fourteen years of· age.79 
Pennsylvania's 1901 revision of an 1895 law required children 
77Ensign, Compulsory SchoolAttendance and Child.Labor, 
p. 52 0 
78 Ibid., p. 97. 
79Ibid., p. 120. 
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between the ages of eight and thirteen to attend school 
for the entire term rather than for sixteen weeks a year, 
but an exemption was made for anyone living farther than 
80 
two miles away from a school. Wisconsin's first compul-
sory attendance law was "unenforceable," but it increased 
public school enrollment by 10,000 students, or two percent 
of Wisconsin's previous enrollment.
81 
Efforts to enforce 
the early laws were meager. In the first year of compulsory 
attendance in Illinois, not one arrest was made in Chicago 
for violation of the law. The Board of Education prided 
itself for not interfering with parental authority.82 
The Chicago School Board also recognized the fact that the 
acquisition of more school buildings would have to precede 
the enforcement of compulsory attendance, since there was 
not enough space to accommodate the students if all of them 
actually attended. 83 With the enforcement of compulsory 
attendance laws came two new problems, truancy and disci-
pline problems caused by those who did not want to be in 
attendance. Despite the management problems caused by en-
forcement of compulsory attendance laws, all states had 
8oibid., pp. 181-183. 
81 Ibid., p. 208. 
82Abbott and Breckinridge, Truancy and Non-Attendance 
in the Chicago Schools, p. 61. 
S3Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
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passed at least one attendance law by 1918.84 The machinery 
for creating a 11 homogenous citizenry 11 through compulsory 
attendance at schools was thus.established. 85 
Introduction 
CONTINUING CONFLICTS OVER 
COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE LAWS 
The controversy surrounding the state's right to compel 
attendance at schools did not end with the adoption of com-
pulsory attendance laws. The original question of whether 
or not compulsory attendance laws should be adopted was 
transformed into a new debate over whether or not compulsory 
attendance laws should be repealed. A major disagreement 
exists over whether or not the state unnecessarily infringes 
upon the rights of parents to control their children. On 
one side of this argument, wrote E. C. Bolmeier, are those 
who maintain that because of the importance of education 
to the welfare of individuals and of society, the state 
has the right and is obligated 11 to take such action as is 
reasonable and necessary to provide every child with adequate 
84c . T remln, he.Transformation.of.thA School, p. 127. 
85 
.Do~ald A. H~nsen.and Joel E. Gerstl, eds., 
0~ Edur.atlon - Soc1ologJ.caJ PerspecU ves (New York: John 
Wlley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 86. 
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educational opportunity." 86 On the other side are those 
who believe that parents "have a natural and constitutional· 
right to determine the manner and place of their children's 
education." 87 
State's Interest v. Parents' Rights 
A 1973 study by Alexander and Jordan outlined these 
three separate areas of state interest in education: social 
equality, cultural equality, and economic equality. Bene-
fits obtained from compulsory education for the cause of 
social equality include increased social mobility, a low 
illiteracy rate, and a relatively high per capita income. 
Class barriers, though not eradicated, are partly broken 
down through a common educational experience. 88 Among the 
cultural benefits derived from required education are the 
promotion of citizenship, moral and ethical character, an 
appreciation of civilization and of organized society, and 
a knowledge of the accumulated culture of man. 89 Economic 
86Edward 
(Cincinnati: 
S7Ibid. 
D. Bolmeier, School in the Legal Structure 
TheW. H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 232. 
88Alexander and Jordan, Legal Implications of Com-
pulsory Education, p. 3. 
B9Ibid., p. 2. 
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dividends to society would include a better-educated labor 
force, increased demand for consumer goods, lower crime 
and delinquency rates, and lower welfare costs.9° 
The conflict between the state and parents concerning 
who should direct the education of children has been de-
scribed by a 1976 study as a contest between collectivist 
and plu~alistic values. The Michigan Law Review project 
report, entitled, "Education and the Law: State Interests 
and Individual Rights," stated that the "collectivist func-
tion" of public education is one of "promoting equality 
of attitude and of experience, thus advancing social uni-
formity and cohesion." 91 Pluralistic values revolve around 
individuals' interests in "being free from the standardizing 
effects of state-imposed educational requirements."92 
In all cases involving state-individual conflicts 
over compulsory education and access to education, 
the courts must accommodate the collectivist' 
interest of achieving academic and socializa-
tion goals and the pluralistic interest of pre-
serving autonomous spheres free from t~3 uni-
formity of universal public education. 
90ibid. 
9lRobin Ellsberg Neuman, ed., "Project: Education and 
the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights - Part II: 
The State's Requirement of Compulsory Education and the 
Individual's Right of Access to Education," Michigan Law 
Review, 74 (June, 1976), p. 1384. 
92_rbid.' p. 1386. 
93Ibid., pp. 1385-1386. 
The tenet that parents have "primary authority" over 
their children's education is a principle upheld by early 
legal precedents.94 For example, in a 1719 dispute over 
whether a student would attend Oxford (as he wished) or 
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Cambridge (as his guardian wished), the court ruled in favor 
of the guardian.95 In the modern era of compulsory educa-
tion, three examples of Supreme Court decisions that affirm 
parents' rights in the education of their children are 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,96 Meyer v. Nebraska,97 and 
Yoder v. Wisconsin.98 The Pierce case established that 
parents may elect to educate their children at a nonpublic, 
rather than a public, school. In Meyer v. Nebraska, a 
Nebraska law that forbade the teaching of the German language 
prior to the eighth grade was deemed an intrusion into 
94Alexander and Jordan, Legal Implications of 
Compulsory Education, p. 6. 
95Tremain's Case, l Strange 167 (1719), cited by 
Alexander and Jordan, Legal Implications of Compulsory 
Education, p. 6. 
96Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 
571 (1925). 
97Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 
L.Ed. 1042 (1923). 
9SWisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 
32 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1972). 
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parents' rights to educate their children.99 The 1972 case 
of Wisconsin v. Yoder established that Amish parents had 
the right to withdraw their children from school at the com-
pletion of the eighth grade (age fourteen), rather than 
at age sixteen. 
Parents' rights are not unrestrained, however. "Police 
power," parens patriae, and "state's compelling interest" 
are three legal phrases that illustrate governmental author-
ity to intercede on behalf of the child or of society as a 
whole. O'Hara has defined "police power" as the "sovereign 
prerogative of ... the state to impose restrictions upon pri-
vate rights which are reasonably related to the public 
welfare." 100 Similarly, according to the doctrine of parens 
patriae, the state has authority to protect the rights of 
minors or other persons who cannot protect themselves. 
Also, the government's legitimate interest in providing 
for the education of its next generation of voting citizens 
is said to be a "compelling state interest," meaning that 
99Joseph E. Bryson and Elizabeth W. Detty, The Legal 
Aspects of Censorship of Public School Library and 
Instructional Materials (Charlottesville: The Michie 
Company, 1982), p. 85. 
100Julia Underwood O'Hara, "State Accreditation of Non-
Public Schools: Quality Regulations and the First Amend-
ment," West's Education Law Reporter, 1 (1982), p. 5. 
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the state may override the constitutional rights of individ-
uals in some instances where conflicts arise over children's 
education. 
"[T]he earliest judicial expression of the collectivist 
precept that education is a societal rather than a parental 
function" 
101 
came, from the 1839 Crouse 102 case. Another 
illustration of the concept of parens patriae is provided 
by the 1944 declaration of the United States Supreme Court 
that "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves ... " 
but they are not free "to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the full and legal discretion when 
103 they can make that choice for themselves. The West 
Virginia Supreme Court, in State v .. Riddle, also referred 
to the limitations on parents' rignts. 
If we are to accept their reasoning, our holding 
would imply that parents have the right to keep 
their children in medieval ignorance, quarter 
them in Dickensian squalor beyond the 
101 Robert P. Baker, "Statute Law and Judicial Interpre-
tation," Legal Aspects.of compulsory Schooltng (Menlo Park, 
California: The Institute of Human Studies, Inc., 1975), 
p. 70, cited in Ralph 0. Lyons, "Compulsory School 
Attendance Laws and Their Application to Students in 
Christian Schools" (Doctoral Dissertation, Northern Arizona 
University, (1983), p. 95. 
102crouse, ex parte (54 Pennsylvania - 4 Whart. - 9, 
11), 1839, cited by Lyons, "Compulsory School Attendance 
Laws and Their Applications to Students in Christian 
Schools," p. 95. 
l03Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158 at 170 (1944). 
reach of the ameliorating influence of the 
social welfare agencies, and so to separate 
their children from organized society in an 
· environment of indoctrination and deprivation 
that the children become mindless automatons 
incapable of coping with life outside their 
own families.lOZj. 
Thus, even though parents may exercise considerable 
discretion in directing the education of their children, 
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the state may invoke its authority to provide for an educated 
citizenry and to protect children from negligent parents. 
Overview of Home Instruction Cases 
After compulsory attendance laws were adopted, parents 
who did not accept the state's role in determining the 
education of their children sought relief in the courts. 
The first judicial challenge dealing specifically with home 
instruction was Commonwealth v. Roberts. 105 In a decision 
that established a liberal constructionist view, the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts ruled that since the child in question 
was receiving an education (albeit at home rather than at 
a school), that the spirit and aim of the compulsory atten-
dance laws were being fulfilled. 106 "The great object of 
provisions of the statutes has been that all children 
104state v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d 359 at 367 (W.Va. 1981). 
105commonwealth v. Roberts, 38 N.E. 402 (Mass. 1893). 
106M. Chester Nolte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of 
Public School Attendance," School Law in Changing Times, 
ed. M. A. McGhehey (Topeka, Kansas: National Organization 
on Legal Problems of Education, 1982), p. 4. 
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be educated, not that they be educated in any particular 
way, .. ·l07was the court's phrase that emphasized the importance 
of the ends over the means. 
Another related landmark case previously mentioned 
is that of Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
108 Althougn Pierce 
was not a case that dealt with home instruction per se, 
it was "one of the most influential decisions in perpetuating 
nonpublic schools.~09 The part of Oregon's 1922 compulsory 
attendance statute that required all children between the 
ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools was over-
turned by the United States Supreme Court, thereby upholding 
parents' rights to send their children to nonpublic schools. 110 
Three famous New Jersey cases decided over a time span 
of thirty years yielded one victory and two defeats for 
home-schoolers. In the 1937 case of Stephens v. Bongart,111 
the court was faced with the question of whether or not 
an education received at home amounted to "equivalent" 
instruction "elsewhere" as required by New Jersey law. In 
an explanation of why he thought home instruction could 
107commonwea1th v. Roberts, p. 403. 
l08Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
109Bolmeier, Education in .. the. Legal. .. Structure, p. 62. 
110Ibid. 
111 stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937). 
not be "equal in worth or value, force, power, effect, 
import and the like,"112 Judge Siegler wrote: 
I incline to the opinion that education is no 
longer concerned merely with the acquisition of 
facts; the instilling of worthy habits, attitudes, 
appreciations, and skills is far more important 
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than mere imparting subject matter .... This brings me 
to the belief that, in a cosmopolitan area such as we 
live in, with all the complexities of life, and 
our reliance upon others to carry out the functions 
of education, it is almost impossible for a child to 
be taught adequately in his home. I cannot conceive 
how a child can receive ln the home instruction and 
experiences in g~oup activity and in social outlook 
in any manner or f~f~ comparable to that provided in 
the publi~ school. 
Also denying the possibility that home instruction could 
be equivalent to that received in a school, Judge Tenenbaum 
wrote in the 1950 decision of Knox v. O'Brien: 
Cloister and shelter have its place, but 
not in the every day give and take of life. 
Research discloses that even the siblings 
of royalty were encouraged under super-
vision to have contact with the commoner .... 
The entire lack of free association being 
denied to [the two children involved in 
the case], by design or otherwise, which 
is afforded them at public school, leads 
me to the conclusion that they are not re-
ceiving education equivalent to1fRat pro-vided in the public schools .... 
115 In the case of State v. Massa, however, the court departed 
from the precedents of Stephens v. Bongart and Knox v. O'Brien. 
112 Arval A. Morris, The. Constituticm. and .. Amer.ican 
Education (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1980), p. 109. 
113stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131 at 137 (1937). 
114Knox v. O'Brien, 72 A. 2d 389 at 392 (1950). 
115state v. Massa, 231 A. 2d 252 (N.J. 1967). 
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In the words of Kotin and Aikman, the New Jersey court "finally 
decided to pay more attention to the words in the statute 
than to explicating some philosophy of child development. 11116 
Recognizing that the New Jersey law specifically provided 
for children to receive an equivalent education "elsewhere 
than at school," the court ruled that the mere absence of 
a large group of other students would always make the alter-
natives of tutoring or home instruction impermissible. 
The decision in State v. Massa returned to the concept of 
academic equivalency from Commonwealth v. Roberts. 117 
Ralph Mawdsley and Steven Permuth have elaborated on 
the confusing web of conflicting legal precedents surround-
ing the issue of state regulation of nonpublic (and espe-
cially religious) schools. The authors postulated that many 
controversies concerning religious schools could be avoided 
if the Supreme Court clarified its "elastic guidelines. 11118 
Indeed, an examination of recent literature reveals an 
array of contradictory decisions. William D. Valente 
has called the Whisner119 case the "strongest modern 
116Kotin and Aikman, Legal Foundations of Compulsory 
School Attendance, p. 148. 
ll7Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
118Ralph D. Mawdsley and Steven Permuth, "State 
Regulation of Religious Schools: A Need for Direction," 
NOLPE School Law Journal, 11 (1983), p. 55. 
119state v. Whisner, 351 N.E. 2d 750 (Ohio 1976). 
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judicial statement applying the natural rights theory of 
[Pierce v. Society of Sisters] as a limitation on state regu-
lation of private schools. 1112° Kotin and Aikman identified 
the New Hampshire case of State v. Hoyt 121 as the "most 
decidedly state-oriented" case in the area of state approval 
of private home instruction. 122 
A Supreme Court decision that prompted many observers 
to predict the end of compulsory attendance laws was made 
in the Yoder 123 case. In the years after the 1972 decision 
exempted Amish children from compulsory school attendance 
after age fourteen (because of the burden of their freedom 
of religion), many other plaintiffs have attempted to ob-
tain exemptions on religious grounds. Patricia M. Lines 
wrote that if only Amish children were to be excused from 
compulsory attendance on religious grounds that clearly such 
favoritism would constitute an establishment of religion, 
which is forbidden in the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. Lines felt that the Supreme Court's 
120william D. Valente, Overview of Constitutional 
Developments Affecting Individual and Parental Liberty 
Interests in Elementary and Secondary Education, U.S., 
Educational Resources Information Center, ERIC Document 
ED 168 174, December, 1978, p. 25. 
121state v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929). 
122Kotin and Aikman, Legal Foundations of Compulsory 
School Attendance, p. 157. 
123wisconsin v. Yoder. 
exemption could be extended to other religions, "perhaps 
even to non-theistic, non-traditional •religions• ." 124 
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However, John Elson, writing about the topic of state regu-
lation of nonpublic schools, declared that it was very 
unlikely that state regulation could be avoided on religious 
grounds, unless the plaintiffs were "Amish or Amish-like." 125 
Wisconsin v. Yoder was hailed as a victory for parents• 
rights, but Marc Folladori called the decision "regressive" 
in that "children may be subjected to a life chosen for 
them by another." 126 
A decision which is frequently extolled by home-schoolers 
is Perchemlides v. Frizzle. 127 Judge Greaney of the 
Hampshire County Superior Court in Massachusetts provided 
guidelines along which applications for home instruction 
approval requests could be processed. Judge Greaney's 
124Patricia M. Lines, Private Education Alternatives 
and State Regulation, U.S., Educational Resources Informa-
tion Center, ERIC Document ED 218 801, 1981, p. 5. 
125John Elson, "Legal Dimension of State Regulation 
of Nonpublic Schools," Super-Parent: An Analysis of State 
Educational Controls, ed. Donald A. Erickson, U.S., 
Educational Resources Information Center, ERIC Document 
ED 096 770, October, 1983, pp. 24-25. 
126Marc H. Folladori, "The Amish Prevail Over Compulsory 
Education Laws: Wisconsin v. Yoder," Southwestern Law 
Journal, 26 (December, 1972), p. 919. 
127Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641 (Mass. Hampshire 
Cty. Super Ct. 1978). 
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decision invalidated these reasons for denying approval of 
a home instruction program: improper reasons for wanting 
to teach children at home, a lack of a curriculum identical 
to that of the public schools, and the creation of a prece-
dent by approva1. 128 Regardless of the publicity the case 
has received, Tobak and Zirkel cautioned that the ·"signi-
ficance of the Perchemlides [v. Frizzle] decision shouldn't 
be overstated," since it was an unreported Massachusetts 
lower court decision with extremely limited application as 
a binding precedent, and because it lends itself to many 
different interpretations. As Tobak and Zirkel pointed 
out, both sides claimed victory. 129 
From the abundant samples of recent home instruction 
court challenges, Neal Devins cited two North Carolina 
cases as being particularly significant. "The most important 
of these cases, Duro v. District Attorney,l30 was the first 
home-schooling case to be heard in a federal court of 
128Nolte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of Compulsory 
Attendance," pp. 8-9. 
129James w. Tobak and Perry A. Zirkel, "Home 
Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law," 
University of Dayton Law Review, 8 (Fall, 1982), p. 27. 
13°Duro v. District Attorney, Second Jud.Dist. of N.C., 
712 F.2d 96 (Fourth Cir., 1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 
998 ( 1984). 
appeals.ul3l The second case, Delconte v. State, 132 sought 
recognition of the Delconte home as a private school. Two 
reasons that make the North Carolina cases pivotal, 
according to Devins, are that North Carolina is a state that 
prohibits rather than regulates home instruction, and that 
since the case of Duro v. District Attorney 
has gone as far as the federal appeals-court level, 
it will serve as a strong precedent even though 
the Supreme Court decided not to hear it. Thus, 
the North Carolina lawsuits will help establish 
the parameters of legitimate state authority 
over home instruction. The Supreme Court's 
refusal to hear the Duro case means that, for 
now, any state in the fourth circuit clearly can 
prohibit home instruction. The fact that a ---
federal appeals court upheld North Carolina's 
absolute prohibition of home instruction 
suggests that states that do permit home instruc-
tion have absolute authority to regulate it.l33 
Additional Issues of Home Instruction 
The legal issues surrounding home instruction are varied 
and complex. Issues previously alluded to in this chapter 
include parents• rights to direct the education and upbring-
ing of their children, the state's authority to compel and 
regulate education, strict constructionist v. liberal 
131Neal Devins, 11 The Limits of •compelling Interest• 
In The Education of Young Citizens, .. Education Week, 
3 (February 1, 1984), p. 20. 
l32Delconte v. State, 308 S.E.2d 898 (N.C.Ct.App. 1983). 
l33nevins, 11 The Limits of •compelling Interest' In 
The Education of Young Citizens," p. 20. 
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constructionist interpretation of statutes, permissibility 
of attendance at nonpublic schools, equivalency of alterna-
tive learning situations, socialization, academic pro-
ficiency, ~tate regulation of nonpublic schools, burden on 
freedom of religion, whether or not a home can be considered 
a nonpublic school, and the problem of contradictory pre-
cedents. Other issues that surfaced during the review of 
the literature are constitutional prot~ction, due process, 
equal protection of the laws, fundamental right to privacy, 
the burden of proof, children's rights, unconstitutional 
vagueness of statutes, and wide discrepancies among the 
states' statutes with regard to permissibility of home 
instruction and the regulation of nonpublic schools. 
In the history of litigation over home instruction, 
parents have often tried to claim protection by the United 
States Constitution. As seen earlier in this chapter, 
parents have frequently relied upon the First Amendment's 
guarantee of religious freedom. Other constitutional 
issues that have been raised include substantive and pro-
cedural due pro~ess (based upon the Fourteenth Amendment) 
and a fundamental right to privacy (based upon the Ninth 
Amendment). Mawdsley and Permuth described the 
5~ 
134 constitutional status of home instruction as "uncertain." 
Zirkel and Gluckman found that most courts rejected argu-
ments of a constitutional, nonreligious right to educate 
children at home. 135 Nolte's opinion was that "[o]n a 
constitutional level, parents who choose home instruction 
in lieu of public or private school attendance should.be 
advised their choice does not rise above a personal or phi-
losophical preference and, therefore, is not within the 
13b ambit of constitutional protection." Schimmel and Fischer 
proclaimed that the answer to the question of whether or 
not parents have the right to educate their children at 
home depended on state laws and on the local court's inter-
pretation of the word "school." 137 
Wording of state compulsory attendance statutes has 
become the crucial factor in home instruction cases. Tobak 
134Ralph D. Mawdsley and Steven Permuth, "Home Instruc-
tion for Religious Reasons: Parental Right or State Option?" 
West's Education Law Reporter, 1 (1982), p. ·951. 
l35Perry A. Zirkel and Ivan B. Gluckman, "It's the 
Law: Home Instruction: When It's Legal," Principal, 
62 (January, 1983), p. 38. 
J,36.~olte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of Compulsory 
Attendance," p. 12. 
l37David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Rights of 
Parents In The Education of Their Children (Columbia, MD: 
The National Committee for Citizens in Education, 1977), 
p. 83. 
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and Zirkel have outlined three types of state laws pertaining 
to home instruction: 1) statutes that forbid home instruc-
tion; 2) statutes that explicitly provide for home instruc-
tion; and 3) statutes that implicitly allow home instruction 
through provision for "equivalent" or "comparable" in-
struction received "elsewhere" or "otherwise." 138 
The type of statute prevalent in a particular state will 
shape the nature of home instruction litigation. In states 
that prohibit home instruction, cases likely will concern 
whether or not a home school is a nonpublic school. The 
largest amount of litigation originates in states that im-
plicitly allow home instruction by broad language in com-
pulsory attendance statute exemptions. Among the many issues 
typical of such debates are whether or not ~ducation can be 
equivalent without extensive social contacts and whether the 
burden of proof of equivalence rests on the parents or the 
state. 139 Harold Funke's article, "Home Instruction and 
Compulsory School Attendance," 140 is devoted almost entirely 
to explicating where lies the burden of proof in home 
instruction cases. In states that explicitly permit 
l38Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 11. 
139 8 Ibid., pp. 57-5 • 
140Harold H. Funke, "Home Instruction and Compulsory 
School Attendance," NOLFE School Law Journal, 5 (1975), 
pp. 77-109. 
home instruction, court challenges may revolve upon the 
regulatory devices and procedures adopted by the state. 
Supporters of nonpublic schools object to state regula-
tion because excessive regulations may prevent them from 
141 
achieving their "distinctive goals." Courts have con-
sistently held, however, that while parents have the right 
to choose alternative means of educating their children, 
they do not have a right to education unregulated by the 
state. John F. Walther's study of state regulation of non-
public schools found a wide range of state regulatory 
policies. According to Walther's 1982 study, Nebraska and 
Michigan had the most stringent regulations (of the six 
states he studied), while Indiana and Illinois had the most 
142 lenient requirements. North Carolina's 1979 deregulation 
of religi2us nonp~blic schools has been condemned as an example 
of "legislative laxity"l~3 by Benjamin Sender. But Evenson 
141o•Hara, "State Accreditation of Non-Public Schools," 
p. 5. 
142John F. Walther, "State Regulation of Nonpublic 
Schools" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign, 1982), p. 99. 
14~enjamin Sender, "Advice for Lawsuit-Weary Board 
Members: Learn These Lessons About Labor Relations, Liquor, 
and Legislative Laxity," American.School Board Journal, 
170 (January, 1983), p. ·35. 
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hailed the state's action as a model for other states to 
follow. 144 Walther identified the issue of teacher certifi-
cation as the most controversial aspect of state regulation 
of nonpublic schools. 145 In Walther's opinion, states should 
refrain from regulating accreditation, teacher certification, 
and curriculum of nonpublic schools, but should regulate 
admission requirements, school calendar, and ages of children 
required to attend. 146 Mawdsley and Permuth wrote that the 
"state's selection of a few mandated requirements, such as 
teacher certification or high cost curriculum offerings, 
while far short of a substantial and suffocating number 
of state standards, may render home instruction not only 
impractical, but impossible."l47 
The "developing constitutional right of privacy" may 
become a popular defense against compulsory attendance 
statutes. 148 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. 
144J. Eric Evenson, II, "State Regulation of Private 
Religious Schools in North Carolina- A Model Approach," 
Wake Forest Law Review, 16 (1980}, pp. 405-437· 
145walther, "State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools," 
p. 96. 
146Ibid., pp. 99-107. 
147Mawdsley and Permuth, "Home Instruction for Religious 
Reasons," pp. 950-951. 
148 Neuman, ed., Michigan Law Review, p. 1395. 
oo 
'149 
Connecticut,· · "Justice Goldberg argued that the integrity 
1§0 
of the family is protected by the ninth amendment. 11 .. Two 
abortion cases of 1973 l5l further extended the idea that 
the education of children, along with other decisions re-
garding childbearing and child rearing, is a parental 
activity protected by the fundamental right to 
privacy. 152 
Another increasingly popular method of attack on com-
pulsory attendance laws or state regulations is to assert 
that the statutes are impermissibly vague. Vague laws are 
prohibited because they "may trap the innocent by not pro-
viding fair warning."l53 Two terms from compulsory atten-
dance statutes that have been challenged on the grounds 
of vagueness are "certified teacher" and "private school. 11 
In the case of State-v.-Riddle, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court ruled that the phrase of the West Virginia statutes that 
required teachers to be "qualified to give instruction in sub-
jects required to be taught in free elementary schools" 
149Griswold v. Connecticut, 3.81 U.S. 479 at 495-496 ( 1965). 
15°stephen T. Knudsen, "The Education of the Amish 
Child," California Law Review, 62 (December, 1974), p. 1529. 
l5lRoe v. Wade, 510 U.S. 113(1973), Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179, 211(1973), cited in Neuman, ed., Michigan 
Law Review, p. 1395. 
152Neuman, ed., Michigan Law Review, p. 1395. 
l53Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 at 108, 
92 S. Ct. 2294 ~t 2298, 33 L.Ed. 2d 222_(1972). 
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was not unconstitutionally vague. 154 Most challenges to 
the clarity of the term "private school" have ended in de-
feat for home-schoolers. For example, in the 1982 case 
of Grigg v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
ruled that the state's compulsory attendance law was not 
void by virtue of its lack of a definition of "private 
school."l55 However, in a 1983 ruling by the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin, Justice Abrahamson agreed with the plaintiffs 
that there was no adequate definition of the term "private 
school" to be found in state statutes, administrative rules 
and regulations, or official publications of the state's 
department of public instruction. In reversing the convic-
tion of the home-schooler, Justice Abrahamson advised that 
the legislature should define the term "private school" 
so that citizens and courts would not have to speculate 
as to the legislature's intent. 156 
In addition to the major recurring legal themes of 
home instruction litigation previously identified in this 
chapter, a number of minor related issues were discussed 
in the 1981-82 issue of the NOLPE Case Citation 
Series that dealt with home instruction. These 
154state v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d 359 (W.Va. 1981). 
l55Grigg v. Commonwealth, 297 S.E. 2d 799 (Va. 1982). 
156state v. Popanz, 332 N.W. 2d 750 (Wis. 1983). 
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topics included the admissibility of attendance records in 
court, assessing the monetary value of damages sustained 
by plaintiffs, disorderly persons charges, handicapped 
children, juvenile court jurisdiction, race-mixing as an 
excuse for truancy, and suspension.157 
SUMMARY 
A review of pertinent literature demonstrates that 
the issue of compulsory school attendance has been shrouded 
in controversy since its inception. Although not mandated 
throughout the entire land until 1918, the beginnings of 
the compulsory education movement can be traced back at 
least as early as fourteenth-century England. 
Forcing American citizens to send their children to 
school was an idea that was not readily embraced. The 
writings of respected statesmen, philosophers, and even some 
educational pioneers reflect the inflammatory nature of com-
pulsion. The compulsory school attendance movement received 
a boost from reactions to eighteenth-century immigration 
patterns, the spreading problem of child labor, and from 
the growing belief that universal education was a prerequi-
site for the continued existence of a democratic nation. 
l57National Organization on the Legal Problems of 
Education, "Cases on Home Instruction," Case Citation 
Series (Topeka, KS: NOLPE, 1981-82), pp. 1-20. 
The debate over compulsory school attendance has per-
sisted to the present day. The first home instruction 
case, Commonwealth .. v.-Roberts, was tried in Massachusetts 
in 1893. A recent and dramatic increase in the rate of 
home instruction cases has revealed a labyrinth of legal 
issues, at the center of which is the ever-present contest 
between the parents' right to direct the education of their 
children and the state's right to provide for the welfare 
of its citizens. 
CHAPTER III 
STATUTORY PROVISION FOR 
HOME INSTRUCTION 
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As interest in the home education movement grows, so does 
the number of states specifically permitting home instruction 
as an alternative to compulsory school attendance. Since 
1976, when the statutes of eight states referred to home 
i~2truction, 1 the number of states making explicit exemptions 
for home-schoolers has grown by six states. Currently, fourteen 
states explicitly list home instruction as an alternative to 
compulsory attendance. Six other states and the District 
of Columbia permit instruction by private tutor. Fifteen 
other states implicitly permit home instruction, bringing 
the total number of states whose statutes allow home instruc-
tion to thirty-five. The statutes of the remaining fifteen 
states require attendance at public or nonpublic schools. 
Table I lists the fifty states and indicates whether or not 
their statutes allow home instruction. (The texts of the per-
tinent statutes of all fifty states appear in the Appendix.) 
1Barry Dean Walker, Sr., ''Compulsory School Attendance: 
Alternatives and Exemptions Provided by Statutory and Case 
Law in Each of the Fifty States," (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Cincinnati, 1976), p. 101. 
TABLE I 
Statutes Permitting Home Instruction 
States Yes No 
Alabama X 
Alaska X 
Arizona X 
Arkansas X 
California X 
Colorado X 
Connecticut X 
Delaware X 
Florida X 
Georgia X 
Hawaii X 
Idaho X 
Illinois X 
Indiana X 
Iowa X 
Kansas X 
Kentucky X 
Louisiana X 
Maine X 
Maryland X 
Massachusetts X 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X 
Mississippi X 
Missouri X 
Montana X 
Nebraska X 
Nevada X 
New Hampshire X 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico X 
New York X 
North Carolina X 
North Dakota X 
Ohio X 
Oklahoma X 
Oregon X 
Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
States Yes No 
Tennessee X 
Texas X 
Utah X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X 
Washington X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Wyoming X 
Totals 35 15 
STATE THAT PERMIT HOME 
INSTRUCTION BY STATUTE 
As previously stated, thirty-five states have statutes 
that condone home instruction as a learning arrangement. 
The following three categories of such statutory provisions 
are discernible: 1) states which explicitly authorize home 
instruction; 2) states not included in the first category 
but which approve instruction by a private tutor; and 
3) states which implicitly allow home instruction through 
the authorization of learning situations described in broad 
terms such as "equivalent," "comparable," "elsewhere" and 
"otherwise." Table II lists the thirty-five states with 
statutes allowing home instruction and shows into which of 
the three categories each state falls. 
Explicit Provisions for Home Instruction 
States selected for this category are those states that 
specifically sanction home instruction under phrases in-
cluding: "home instruction," "home school," "home study," 
"at home," "in the home," or "taught .•• by a parent." The 
fourteen states in this category are Arizona, Colorado, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
~ 
States 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
TABLE II 
Three Categories of Statutes That 
Permit Home Instruction 
Private 
Explicit Tutor Implicit 
Provision Allowed Provision 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X 
Utah X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X 
West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Totals I? 
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Table III reveals which of the key phrases above were used 
by each state that makes explicit statutory provisions for 
home instruction. 
Mississippi, Virginia, and Vermont are three states 
that utilize the phrase "home instruction." 2 Mississippi 
specifies that the term "nonpublic school" includes "home 
instruction programs."3 Six other states, including Arizona, 
Colorado, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia, use 
a form of the word "instruct" in the same phrase with the 
word "home." 4 The state of Utah uses the phrase "taught 
at home."5 
In Montana, statutes direct parents to enroll a child 
in a public school unless the child is "enrolled in a non-
public or home school ••. "6 Furthermore, the Montana legis-
lature has provided this definition of a home school: "the 
2Virginia, Code of Virginia, Sec. 22.1-254 {1984); 
Vermont, Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 16, Sec. 1121 
{1984); Mississippi, Mississippi Code Annotated, Sec. 
37-13-91(1984). 
3Mississippi, Mississippi Code Annotated, Sec. 37-13-91 
(1984). 
4Arizona, Arizona Revised Statutes, Sec. 15-802 (1983); 
Colorado, Colorado Revised Statutes, Sec. 22-33-103 (1983); 
Missouri, Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes, Sec. 392.070 
(1981); Ohio, Page's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, 3321.04 
(1983); West Virginia, West Virginia Code, Sec. 18-8-1 (1984). 
5utah, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 53-24-1 (1983). 
6Montana, Montana Code Annotated, Sec. 20-5-102 {1984). 
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TABLE III 
States That Explicitly Permit Home 
Instruction: Key Phrases 
in Statutes 
Home Home Home At Home or Taught By 
States Instruction School Study In the Home A Parent 
Arizona X 
Colorado X 
Georgia X 
Louisiana X 
Mississippi X 
Missouri X 
Montana X 
Nevada X 
Ohio X 
Oregon X 
Utah X 
Vermont X 
Virginia X 
West Virginia X 
Totals 3 1 2 7 1 
instruction by a parent of his child, stepchild, or ward 
in his residence ..... 7 Two states, Georgia and Louisiana, 
use.the phrase 11 horne study. 118 
The state of Oregon includes among those exempt from 
compulsory attendance 11 children being taught for a period 
equivalent to that required of children attending public 
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schools by a parent or private teacher the courses of study 
usually taught in grades 1 through 12 in the public 
school. .. 9 
Horne Instruction by Private Tutor 
Six states and the District of Columbia were placed 
into this category because their statutes did not explicitly 
permit horne instruction but did allow for private instruc-
tion or instruction by a private tutor. States that permit 
horne instruction by some other means than instruction by 
private tutor were not included in this category. The 
six states are Alabama, California, Florida, Hawaii, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. In these six states and 
in the District of Columbia, horne instruction would be 
legal if it met the requirements for private instruction 
or if a parent could be declared a tutor. 
7Ibid. 
8Georgia, Official Code of Georgia, Annotated, 
Vol. 17, Title 20, Sec. 20-2-690 (1984); Louisiana, West's 
Louisiana Revised Statutes, Annotated, Title 17, Sec. 236 
( 1982). 
9oregon, Oregon Revised Statutes, Sec. 339.010 (1983). 
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Two states, Alabama and Hawaii, specify that the tutor 
must be "competent ... In Alabama, the compulsory attendance 
statute requires that 11 every child between the ages of seven 
and sixteen years shall be required to attend a public school, 
private school, church school, or be instructed by a compe-
tent private tutor ... ulO However, this private tutor must 
hold "a certificate issued by the state superintendent.of 
instruction." 11 The state of Hawaii makes an exception to 
the compulsory school attendance law "where a competent per-
son is employed as a tutor in the family wherein the child 
resides and proper instruction is thereby imparted as approved 
by the superintendent.nl2 
Pennsylvania's statutes state that 11 regular daily in-
struction ... by a properly qualified private tutor 11 is a form 
of compliance with compulsory attendance laws, so long as 
the instruction is 11 satisfactory to the ... superintendent of 
schools.n 13 California allows instruction by a 11 private 
tutor or other person" but requires the instructor to hold 
"a valid state credential for the grade taught."-14 
10Alabama, Alabama Code, Sec. 16-28-3 (1984). 
11Alabama, Alabama Code, Sec. 16-28-5 (1984). 
12Hawaii, Hawaii Revised Statutes, Sec. 298-9 (1983). 
l3Pennsylvania, Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes 
Annotated, Title 24, Sec. 13-1327 (1984). 
14california, Deering's California Codes, Sec. 48224-
(1984). 
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In Florida's compulsory attendance laws, it is stated 
that compliance with the statutes may be achieved by atten-
dance at a public school, at a parochial or denominational 
school, at a private school, or "at home with a private tutor 
who meets all requirements ... for private tutors." 15 
All five states selected for this category place re-
strictions on the tutoring situation. Hawaii, Pennsylvania, 
and Alabama require approval by a superintendent. Alabama, 
California, Florida, and Pennsylvania require credentials 
for tutors. Parents in these five states, however, who 
could meet the requirements for private tutors, could 
implement programs of home instruction. 
In Rhode Island and the District of Columbi~the school 
term of private instruction must coincide with or be equal 
to that of the public schools and attendance records must 
be kept. In the District of Columbia, curriculum specifica-
tions are that private instruction be equivalent to that 
given in the public schools, while in Rhode Island, a list 
of required subjects is provided in the statutes. Rhode 
Island's statutes also state that private instruction must 
be given in the English language. 
l5Florida, West's Florida Statutes Annotated, Sec. 232.02 
(1984). 
Implicit Provisions for Home Instruction 
Table IV shows that, in addition to the nineteen 
states which permit home instruction by explicit provisions 
for home instruction and by the legalization of private 
tutoring, there are fifteen states whose statutes allow home 
·· instruction implicitly, through the use of broad terms such 
as "equivalent," "comparable," "substantially equal," 
"elsewhere," "other," or "otherwise." These fifteen states 
are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Oklahoma, So.uth Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
Table IV shows which of the key words mentioned above are 
used in the statutes of each of the fifteen states in this 
category. 
The broad language used in the statutes of these states 
frequently leads to litigation. According to Tobak and 
Zirkel, states where home instruction is permitted im-
plicitly have more issues to contest and therefore experience 
the highest amount of litigation over home instruction. 16 
For example, the statutes of Indiana declare that "it is 
unlawful for a parent to fail ... to send his child to a public 
16James W. Tobak and Perry A. Zirkel, "Home Instruction: 
An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law," University of 
Dayton Law Review, 8 (Fall, 1982), pp. 57-58. 
States 
Alaska 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
New Jersey 
New York 
Oklahoma 
TABLE IV 
States That Implicitly Permit 
Home Instruction: Key Words 
in Statutes 
"EquJ.valent" 
"Comparable," or 
"Substantt.ally 
equal' 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
"Otherwise" 
or 
"Other" 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
South Carolina X X 
South Dakota X 
Wisconsin X 
Totals 8 8 
75 
"Elsewhere" 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
5 
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school ••• unles~ the child is ~eing provided with instruction 
equivalent to that given in the public schools ••. ul7 Legal 
issues that arise from such wording of statutes include the 
questions of whether or not home schools can provide equi-
valent instruction without the socialization experience of 
larger schools and who will determine equivalence.l8 In 
all ,eight· states allow for alternate instruction that· is 
"equivalent," "comparable," or "substantially equal." In 
addition to Indiana, the other states are Alaska, Connecticut, 
Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. 
Eight state::; either pertnit "other" instruction or in-
struction l~i1at is "otherwise" imparted. In South Dakota, 
for example, the law 9tates that "a child shall be excused 
from school attendance ... because the child is otherwise pro-
vided ,.;ith competent alternative instruction ... n 19 The 
remaining states using the words "otherwise" or "other" are 
Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, 
and South Carolina. 
l7Indiana, Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated, 
Sec. 20-8.1-3-34 (1984). 
18Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 58. 
19south Dakota, South Dakota Codified Laws, 
Sec. 13-27-3 (1983). 
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The word "elsewhere" is a key word in the statutes of 
five states that implicitly permit home instruction. The 
statutes of Delaware stipulate that the compulsory school 
attendance law will not apply if a "child is elsewhere re-
ceiving regular and thorough instruction ... n20 Other states 
using the word "elsewhere" to permit alternate instruction 
are Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. 
STATES THAT DO NOT PERMIT HOME 
INSTRUCTION BY STATUTE 
In fifteen states, there are no statutory provisions 
for home instruction. These states are Arkansas, Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. The statutes of these 
states require attendance either at public schools or at 
nonpublic schools which may be called "private, 11 "parochial," 
"denominational," "church," "prlvate church," "nonpublic" 
schools or schools "of religious charter," depending on the 
terminology chosen by the legislatures of the individual 
states involved. Table V lists the statutory names for 
20Delaware, Delaware Code Annotated. Title 14, 
Sec. 2703 (1982). 
TABLE V 
Statutory Names of Schools Which May Be Attended to Satisfy Attenaance Laws in 
States Which Do Not Make Statutory Provisions for Home Instruction 
"Private "Of' 
"Denomi- Church" or "Non- religious 
States "Public" "Private" "Parochial" national" "Church" public" charter" 
Arkansas X X X 
Illinois X X X 
Kansas X X X X 
Kentucky X X X X X 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X X 
Nebraska X X X X 
New Hampshire X X 
New Mexico X X 
North Carolina X X X X 
North Dakota X X X 
Tennessee X X 
Texas X X X 
Washington X X X 
Wyoming X X X 
- - - -
Totals 15 13 9 2 2 2 1 --..:] 
CP 
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schools which may be attended to satisfy attendance laws 
in states which do not make statutory provisions for home 
instruction. 
The compulsory attendance statute of New Mexico is 
unique in two ways. First of all, it requires students to 
attend "a public school, a private school or a state insti-
tution.1121 No other state mentions being in a state institu-
tion as a means of satisfying the compulsory attendance re-
quirement. More significantly, the statute defines "public 
school, 11 "private school, 11 and "state institution." The 
definition of the term "private school" reads: "a school 
offering programs of instruction not under the control, 
supervision, or management of a local school board exclusive 
of home instruction offered by the parent, guardian or one 
having custody of the student. 1122 (Emphasis added.) Although 
some other states include a definition of "private school" 
in their statutes, New Mexico is the only state which uses 
a statutory definition to forbid home instruction. The 
existence of a definition of the term "private school" in 
the statutes is important in that it could preclude litiga-
tion over whether or.not a home school cor.stitutes a private 
21New Mexico, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 
Sec. 22-12-2 (1984). 
22New Mexico, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 
Sec. 22-1-2 (1984). 
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school, as occurred in the 1983 Popanz 23 case in Wisconsin. 
In that case, Justice Abrahamson ruled in favor of the home-
schooler and suggested that the legislature define the term 
"private school. n 24 
Statutory Requirements for Home Instruction 
For the purpose of examining statutory requirements 
of home instruction, all thirty-five of the states which 
permit home instruction are discussed together, regardless 
of whether their statutes permit home instruction explicitly, 
implicitly, or by the sanctioning of instruction received 
from private tutors. In the statutes of these thirty-five 
states, a variety of statutory requirements may be found. 
Six major areas that are regulated are curriculum; qualifi-
cations of the instructor; approval or permission to operate; 
attendance or enrollment records; length of school day or 
term; and testing or other evaluation o~ student progress. 
Table VI shows which states have statutory requirements 
for home school curriculum and instructors. Nineteen 
states• statutes stipulate that the curriculum of home 
schools must be equivalent to that of the local public 
schools. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, 
23state v. Popanz, 332 N.W. 2d 750 (1983}. 
24Ibid. 
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TABLE VI 
States With Statutory Curriculum Requirements 
or Instructor Qualifications for 
Home Instruction 
Curriculum Instructor 
Equivalent Quali-
to Pre- fied; 
Public scribed Certi- Coll. H.S. Pass Compe-
States Schools Subjects fied Grad. Grad. Test tent 
Alabama X X 
Alaska X X 
Arizona X 
California X 
Colorado X 
Connecticut X 
Delaware X 
Florida X 
Georgia X X 
Hawaii X 
Idaho X 
Indiana X 
Iowa X 
Louisiana X 
Maryland X 
Missouri X 
Montana X 
Nevada X 
New Jersey X 
New York X X 
Ohio X X 
Oregon X 
Pennsylvania X 
Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota X X 
Utah X 
Virginia X 
West Virginia X X 
Wisconsin X 
19 l l 1 5 
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Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The District of Columbia 
also requires that the curriculum be equivalent to that of 
the public schools. 
The statutes of four states list certain subjects that 
must be offered. Connecticut requires that these subjects 
be taught: reading, writing, spelling, English grammar, 
geography, arithmetic, United States history, citizenship, 
and government. 25 Georgia requires coverage of reading, 
language arts, mathematics, social studies, and science. 26 
In Rhode Island, these subjects must be taught: reading, 
writing, geography, mathematics, United States history, 
Rhode Island history, and American government. 27 South 
Dakota simply requires that language arts and mathematics 
be taught. 28 
Fourteen states' statutes mention qualifications for 
instructors. In these six states, the teacher or tutor 
25connecticut, Connecticut General Statutes, Sec. 10-
184(1983). 
26Georgia, Official Code of Georgia, Annotated, 
Sec. 20-2-690 (1984). 
27Rhode Island, General Laws of Rhode Island, 
Sec. 16-9-2 (1983). 
28south Dakota, South Dakota Codified Laws, Sec. 
13-27-3 (1983). 
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must be certified: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Florida, and Pennsylvania. Virginia requires that the 
person hold a baccalaureate degree. 29 Georgia permits home 
instruction by a high school graduate or a person who passes 
a high school equivalency test.3° Arizona's statutes require 
that the teacher must pass a proficiency examination in 
reading, grammar, and mathematics.3l These five states re-
quire that the teacher or tutor be "qualified" or "competent": 
Hawaii, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and West Virginia. 
Table VII shows which states have statutory regulations 
for home instruction approval, attendance or enrollment 
records, length of school day or term, and testing or other 
evaluation. These thirteen states require the approval 
or permission of local superintendents, school boards, or 
school committees: California, Georgia, Louisiana., Maine, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. Atten-
dance or enrollment reports must be made in these eight 
states and in the District of Columbia: Alabama, Delaware, 
Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode Island, and 
29virginia, Code of Virginia, Sec. 22.1-254.1 (1984). 
3°Georgia, Official Code of Georgia, Annotated, 
Sec. 20-2-690 (1984). 
31Arizona, Arizona Revised Statutes, Sec. 15-802 (1983). 
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TABLE VII 
States With Statutory Regulations of Home Instruction 
Approval, Attendance Records, Length of 
School Day or Term, and Testing 
Length Length 
Attend. of of 
States Approval Records Term bay Testing 
Alabama X X X 
Arizona X 
California X X X 
Delaware X 
Georgia X X X X 
Iowa X 
Louisiana X 
l-1aine X 
Maryland X 
Massachusetts X 
Mississippi X 
Missouri X 
Montana X X X 
Ohio X 
Oklahoma X 
Oregon X X X 
Pennsylvania X X 
Rhode Island X X X 
South Dakota X X X 
Utah X X 
Virginia X X 
West Virginia X X 
Wisconsin X 
Totals 13 8 10 6 5 
West Virginia. The length of the school term is specified 
by the statutes of the District of Columbia and these ten 
states: Alabama, California, Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
The regularity of instruction or the length of the school 
day is regulated in these six states: Alabama, California, 
Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Testing or 
other means of evaluation of student progress is required 
by Arizona, Georgia, Oregon, South Dakota, and Virginia. 
In addition to the information shown in Tables VI and 
VII, five states require that the instruction be in English. 
They are Alabama, California, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Rhode Island. Additionally, Montana has immunization 
requirements and building safety codes for home-schoolers.32 
Virginia's laws require that correspondence courses used 
in conjunction with home instruction be approved by the 
state board of education.33 
SUMMARY 
An examination of compulsory attendance laws reveals 
that the statutes of thirty-five states anq the District 
of Columbia permit home instruction, while the statutes of 
32Montana, Montana Code Annotated, Sec. 20-5-109. 
33virginia, Code of Virginia, Sec. 22.1-254.1. 
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fifteen states do not. According to statutory law, home 
instruction is permissible in states with.explicit provisions 
for home instruction, in states with provisions for instruc-
tion by private tutor (where the parent could meet require-
ments for becoming a tutor), and in states with implicit 
provisions for "equivalent" or "other" instruction 
"elsewhere" than at a school. 
The states of Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, 
and Wyoming do not make statutory provisions for home 
instruction. Instead, the statutes of these states require 
attendance at public or nonpublic schools. 
The statutes of the thirty-five states which do allow 
for home instruction have a variety of requirements for it, 
mainly in the areas of curriculum; qualifications of the 
instructor; approval or permission to operate; attendance 
or enrollment records; length of school day or term; and 
tes~ing or other evaluation of student progress. 
87 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF HOME INSTRUCTION 
Surrounding the topic of home instruction is an arena 
of complex legal issues, extending to constitutional law, 
statutory law, case law, and administrative law. A detailed 
discussion of statutory law relating to home instruction 
was presented in Chapter III. However, in four of the fif-
teen states that have made no statutory provisions for home 
instruction, such learning arrangements have become legal 
by other means. Illinois has permitted home instruction 
through case law, since the Levisen1 decision equated home 
instruction with nonpublic school attendance. Michigan has 
permitted home instruction since the state attorney general 
ruled that home instruction by a certified teacher was the 
equivalent of instruction in a nonpublic school. 2 In addi-
tion, the state school boards of Kentucky and New Hampshire 
1People v. Levisen, 90 N.E. 2d 213 (Ill. 1950). 
2opinion, Michigan Attorney General No. 5579, 
September 27, 1979; cited in Michigan, Michigan Statutes 
Annotated, Sec. 15.41561 (1984). 
have adopted regulations that would permit the operation 
of approved home instruction programs.3 
In court cases dealing with home instruction, the 
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wording of the particular state statutes heavily influenced 
which legal issues of home ~nstruction have been litigated. 
In states that have barred home instruction, most cases have 
revolved around whether or not a person's home could be 
considered a nonpublic schoo1. 4 In states that have ex-
plicitly permitted home instruction, a major issue has been 
whether parents or the state sh6uld bear the burden of proof 
concerning any alleged inadequacies of the home program.5 
Efforts by parents to circumvent strict regulations 
for home schools, such as the requirement of a teacher's 
certificate where no such requirement was made of nonpublic 
schools, have led to cases similar to those that have been 
characteristic of states which have banned home instruction. 
That is, parents may have attempted to have their homes 
declared to be nonpublic schools, thereby avoiding the 
3"State Home-Instruction Laws As of A]Jgust 1984," 
Education Week, January 30, 1985, pp. 14-15. 
4James W. Tobak and Perry A. Zirkel, "Home Instruction: 
An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law," University of 
Dayton Law Review, 8(Fall, 1982), p. 57. 
5Ibid., p. 50. 
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necessity of obtaining a teacher's certificate. 6 Another 
issue that has surfaced is whether or not parents whose home 
instruction requests were denied received due process during 
the consideration of their application. 
In states that allowed instruction by a private tutor, 
the qualifications of the tutors were likely targets for 
litigation, along with any requirements concerning curricu-
lum and schedules of instruction. Equivalence of education 
has been the major issue most likely to arise in states 
whose statutes have permitted a child to receive instruction 
elsewhere than at school.7 The questions that had to be 
answered included a clarification of standards that must 
be satisfied in order to create an educational setting that 
was "equivalent" to that available in the local public 
schools; who would determine which learning arrangements 
were equivalent and which ones were not; and who should 
have to prove that the home instruction was equivalent or 
8 not. 
Other major issues that have arisen in all states, re-
gardless of the wording of the statutes, have included 
freedom of religion, equal protection of the laws, the 
6Ibid. , p. 51. 
7Ibid., p. 57· 
8Ibid. 
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right to privacy, parents' rights concerning the upbringing 
and education of their children, impermissible vagueness 
of statutes, state regulation of nonpublic education, the 
state's police power, the state's role as parens patriae, 
and the state's compelling interest in education. These 
issues have been litigated quite frequently despite the 
assertion by Chief Justice Erickstad of the North Dakota 
Supreme Court that "courts are ill-equipped to act as school 
boards ..• The courtroom is simply not the best arena for the 
debate of educational policy and the measurement of educa-
tional quality."9 
The discussion that follows provides the reader with 
a summary of the major legal issues of home instruction as 
gleaned from the review of the literature and from the study 
of over 125 court decisions. Approximately one-half of the 
judicial decisions examined dealt specifically with home 
instruction cases. The remainder dealt with important peri-
pheral issues that have had a direct bearing on or strong 
implications for home instruction. 
9state v. Shaver, 294 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D. 1980); 
pp. 899-900. 
91 
PARENTS' RIGHTS TO DIRECT 
THE EDUCATION OF 
THEIR CHILDREN 
Overview 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never 
heard a case concerning the permissibility of home instruc-
tion, decisions from four cases litigated before the nation's 
highest court have combined to provide a "constitutional 
backdrop" for home instruction cases. 10 These four landmark 
cases, Meyer, 11 Pierce, 12 Tokushige, 13 and Yoder, 14 deal 
directly or indirectly with parents' rights to direct the 
education of their children. 
The 1923 Meyer decision invalidated a Nebraska law that 
prohibited teaching foreign languages to students who had 
not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the law interfered with "the power of parents to control 
10Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 19. 
11Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 
L.Ed. 1042 (1923). 
12Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 
571 ( 1925). 
l3Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 234, 47 S.Ct. 
406 (1927). 
14wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 
1526, 32 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1972). 
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the education of their own."l5 Two years later, the Court 
heard the Pierce 16 case, in which it struck down Oregon's 
legislative attempt to require that all students attend only 
public schools. 17 Relying on Meyer, 18 the Pierce 19 Court 
stated that Oregon's law 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and educatio~ 
of children under their control •.• The child is not 
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture 
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations.20 
The case of Farrington v. Tokushige 21 originated in 
the United States Territory of Hawaii in 1927. Hawaiian 
laws enacted in 1923 and 1925 limited enrollment in foreign 
language schools to those who had finished the first two 
grades in an American public school, where instruction would 
be conducted in English, rather than in Japanese or Chinese. 
15Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 at 401 (1923). 
16Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
17Ibid. 
l8Meyer v. Nebraska. 
19Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
20Ibid., pp. 534-535· 
21Farrington v. Tokushige, 47 S.Ct. 406 (1927). 
The Supreme Court struck down the legislative enactments, 
saying that the "Japanese parent has the right to direct 
the education of his own child without unreasonable re-
strictions."22 
The most recent of these four landmark decisions was 
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the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder. 23 The litigious dispute 
in Yoder centered around Wisconsin's compulsory attendance 
law, which required schooling until age sixteen. People 
of the Amish religion claimed that school attendance beyond 
the eighth grade (usually age fourteen) violated their 
religious beliefs. The Yoder court devised a tripartate 
test to be used when the state's compelling interest carne 
into conflict with the free exercise of religion. The three 
questions formulated were. 1) whether or not the disputed 
action was based on a sincere religious belief, 2) whether 
or not the state's requirement interfered with the free 
exercise of that religious belief, and 3) whether or not 
the state's compelling interest justified interference with 
the free exercise of religious beliefs. 24 Wisconsin's 
compulsory attendance law was found to be unconstitutional 
when applied to Amish students who had completed the eighth 
grade. 
22Ibid., p. 409. 
23wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
24 Ibid., p. 214. 
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As already indicated, the above four landmark cases 
have been cited frequently as precedents in court cases con-
cerning home instruction. Recurring constitutional issues 
have been the free exercise of religion (based on the First 
Amendment25); due process of law, equal protection of law, 
and constitutional guarantee of liberty (based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment 26 ); and the right to privacy (based 
on the Ninth Amendment 27). 
Free Exercise of Religion 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
says, in part, 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or
8
prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof ••• 2 
The First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom was 
thus accomplished through the establishment clause and the 
free exercise clause. The latter has been more often dis-
puted in home instruction cases. 
Supreme Court cases that were useful in tracing the 
history of free exercise litigation included Reynolds v. 
25u.s. Const. amend. I (1791). 
26u.s. Const. amend. XIV (1868). 
27u.s. Const. amend. IX (1791). 
28u.s. Const. amend. I (1791). 
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United States, 29 Cantwell v. Connecticut,3° Prince v. 
Commonwealth,3l Braunfeld v. Brown,32 and Sherbert v. 
Verner.33 The 1879 Reynolds34 case established the belief-
action dichotomy, in which the Court espoused that a person 
was absolutely entitled to hold any religious beliefs what-
soever, but he was not absolutely free to act in accordance 
with those beliefs. Accordingly, the 1879 Reynolds decision 
stated that a Mormon could not practice polygamy.35 In 
the 1940 Cantwell v. Connecticut case, the Court ruled in 
favor of a Jehovah's Witness who was playing recordings of 
religious messages on public street corners. More signi-
ficantly, the Court ruled that the First Amendment's 
restriction on acts of the United States Congress also were 
made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.36 
29Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 
(1879). 
3°cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 
84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). 
3lPrince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 
88 L.Ed. 2d 645 (1944). 
32Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 81 S.Ct. 1144, 
6 L.Ed. 2d 563 (1961). 
33sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790 
(1963). 
34Reynolds v. United States. 
35Ibid. 
36cantwell v. Connecticut. 
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The 1944 Prince37 case also involved a Jehovah's Witness 
engaged in street-corner evangelism. The Supreme Court 
decided that although an adult was entitled to distribute 
religious pamphlets on city streets, her nine year-old niece 
could not do the same. The opinion of the majority stated, 
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. 
But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion w~en they can make that choice for 
themselves.j 
In the 1961 Braunfeld v. Brown case, Jewish merchants 
lost their bid to remain open on Sunday, despite prevailing 
blue laws.39 In the 1963 Sherbert40 case, the Court indicated 
that a member of the Seventh Day Adventist faith was found 
to be entitled to continued unemployment benefits, even 
though she had refused to consider accepting a job that would 
require her to work on Saturday. The Court ruled that the 
state's compelling interest in the unemployment compensation 
was not sufficient to deny Adele Sherbert's religious free-
41 dom. William B. Ball, Yoder's winning attorney who began 
with no favorable precedent cases involving Amish defiance 
37Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
38Ibid., p. 170. 
39Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
40sherbert v. 
41Ibid. 
Verner. 
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of compulsory attendance laws, later declared the Sherbert42 
decision to be a "golden nuggett." 43 As previously discussed, 
the Yoder44 case involved the free exercise of religion. 
Similarly to Sherbert, 45 the Yoder46 Court found that 
the state's compelling interest in two additional years 
of schooling did not outweigh the resulting burden on the 
free exercise of religion by the Amish people. 47 
Home instruction cases that have involved the free 
exercise of religion have generally ended in defeat for home 
schoolers. The single exception was the 1979 case, People 
v. Nobe1, 48 that was litigated in Michigan. The case followed 
an opinion from the state's attorney general that home in-
struction would comply with the compulsory attendance laws 
if home instruction met all requirements for nonpub1ic 
schools, including having a certified teacher. Mrs. Nobel 
qualified for a Michigan teacher's certificate but did not 
42sherbert v. Verner. 
43William B. Ball, "Building A Landmark Case: 
Wisconsin v. Yoder," Compulsory Education and the Amish: 
The Right Not To Be Modern, ed. Albert M. Keirn (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 115-116. 
44wisconsin v. Yoder. 
45sherbert v. Verner. 
46wisconsin v. Yoder. 
47Ibid. 
48People v. Nobel, No. S 791-0114-A, S 791-0115-A 
(Mich.Allegan Cty. Dist. Ct. 1979). 
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wish to apply, and her religious beliefs compelled her not 
to apply. Moreover, her religious beliefs commanded her 
to teach her children. Judge Gary Stewart of the Allegan 
County District Court applied Yoder•s49 three-pronged test 
and concluded that since Mrs. Nobel was obviously entitled 
to a certificate in spite of the fact that her religious 
beliefs prevented her from applying for one, the state's 
interest in Mrs. Nobel's certification was outweighed by 
the free exercise of her sincere religious beliefs. 50 
It should be noted, however, that the Nobel case did 
not involve the issue of a constitutional right to engage 
in home instruction on religious grounds. The state of 
Michigan had already conceded, through the opinion of the 
attorney general, that home instruction that met certain 
standards would be permitted. Parents lost all cases studied 
that involved noncompliance with compulsory attendance laws 
based on the free exercise of religion. For example, in 
the 1950 Commonwealth v. Bey5l case, Mohammedans were not 
permitted to keep their children home from school on every 
Friday. Examples of home instruction cases that dealt 
49wisconsin v. Yoder. 
5°People v. Nobel. 
51commonwealth v. Bey, 70 A. 2d 693 
(Pa. Super.Ct. 1950). 
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with a claimed denial of free exercise of religion are 
Rice,52 State v. Superior Court,53 Kasuboski,54 F. & F. v. 
Duval County,55 Riddle,56 Jernigan,57 and Duro.58 
In the 1948 Rice59 case, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia ruled against three families who asserted freedom 
of religion as a reason for wanting to teach their children 
at home without meeting the state's requirements for home 
60 - 61 instruction. Also, in the 1959 State v. Superior Court 
case, the Washington Supreme Court found for the state and 
against the members of the Seventh Elect Church in Spiritual 
Israel, who did not believe in public school attendance. In 
52Rice v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E. 2d 342 (Va. 1948). 
53state v. Superior Court, 346 P. 2d 999 (Wash. 1959), 
sub nom State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. No. 412 v. 
Superior Court for King Cty., 346 P. 2d 999 (1960), cert. 
denied 363 u.s. 814 (1960). 
54state v. Kasuboski, 275 N.W. 2d 101 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1978). 
55F. & F. v. Duval Cty., 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1973). 
56state v. Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d 359 (W.Va. 1981). 
57Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. Cr.App. 
1982). 
58Duro v. District Attorney, Second Jud. Dist. of N.C., 
712 F. 2d 96 (Fourth Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 
998 (1984). 
59Rice v. Commonwealth. 
60Ibid. 
61state v. Superior Court, 346 P. 2d 999 (Wash. 1959). 
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Kasuboski, 62 a Wisconsin case, members of the Life Science 
Church did not send their eight children to public schools 
because, as they maintained, the public schools featured 
racial integration and Jewish influences, both of which they 
opposed on religious grounds. 63 In a Florida case, F. & F. 
v. Duval County, a similar assertion of religious opposition 
to "race-mixing" was made by plaintiffs who called their 'home 
instruction program the Ida M. Craig Christian Day Schoo1. 64 
In the 1981 case of State v. Riddle, the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia advised that the Riddles 
should have attempted to have their home instruction efforts 
approved by the county superintendent. Instead, the Riddles 
had simply ignored the compulsory attendance law and had 
later asserted a religious right to do so. But the court 
ruled that even sincerely held religious convictions did 
not justify totally ignoring the compulsory attendance 
65 law .. 
A 1982 home instruction case from the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Alabama was Jernigan v. Stateft6 The Jernigans 
62state v. Kasuboski. 
63Ibid. 
64F. & F. v. Duval Gty. 
65state v. Riddle, p. 365. 
66J . 4 4 ern1gan v. State, 12 So. 2d 12 2 (Ala. Cr. App. 
1982). 
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were Catholics who did not live within commuting distance 
of a parochial school, so they obtained a Catholic cor-
respondence course by which to teach their children at home. 
The Alabama court's unanimous decision distinguished Jernigan 
from Yoder, 67 even though it recognized the sincerity of 
the Jernigans' beliefs. The Amish sent their children to 
public schools for the first eight grades. Furthermore, 
the Jernigans had not demonstrated, as had the Amish, that 
their education plan would be successful in preparing their 
children for life in the society in which they would live. 68 
Another unsuccessful bid to claim a constitutional right 
to educate children at home because of religious freedom 
was waged by Larry Duro of North Carolina. In the Duro69 
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit also found significant differences from Yoder.7° 
... Duro refuses to enroll his children in any 
public or nonpublic school for any length of time, 
but still expects them to be fully integrated 
and liv71normally in the modern world upon reaching age 18. 
The court applied Yoder's72 three tests and found that 
67wisconsin v. Yoder. 
68Jernigan v. State. 
69Duro v. District Attorney. 
7°wisconsin v. Yoder. 
71Duro v. District Attorney, p. 98. 
72w. . Y 1scons1n v. oder. 
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Duro's beliefs were sincere, but that "North Carolina has 
demonstrated an interest in compulsory education which is 
of sufficient magnitude to override Duro's religious 
interest."73 
The religious freedom of children has not been ad-
dressed in a home instruction case. It should be remembered, 
though, that the Prince74 ruling held that a nine year-old 
did not herself have the necessary maturity to make a deci-
sion to distribute religious literature on public streets.75 
In Yoder,76 Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas' 
dissenting opinion lamented the fact that the Amish children 
did not testify.77 Interestingly, no state compulsory atten-
dance law has referred to any children's rights to attend 
school or to receive instruction. Only California and New 
Mexico have referred to a child as a "person,"7B even though 
the Supreme Court case of Tinker v. DesMoines established 
that students were "persons" who did not "shed their 
73Duro v. District Attorney, p. 99. 
74Prince v. Commonwealth. 
'Y5Ibid. 
76wisconsin v. Yoder. 
77Ibid. 
78william F. Aikman and Lawrence Kotin, Legal 
Implications of Compulsory Education - Final Report, U. S. 
Educational Resources Information Center, ERIC Document 
ED 130 387, May 1976, pp. 78-79. 
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constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."79 No 
education case involving a difference of opinion between 
parent and child has been heard by the United States Supreme 
Court, but in abortion cases, minors have been able to ob-
tain abortions despite parents• objections. 80 
Due Process of Law 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states, 
... nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty,
8
or property without due 
process of law ... 1 
The term "due process" has come to stand for guarantees of 
fair treatment by a state government and any of its agencies. 
Two types of due process are substantive and procedura1. 82 
"Substantive due process requires that all legislation be 
in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective." 83 
Procedural due process requires that a person be afforded 
79Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community School 
District, 393 u.s. 503 at 505, eg s.ct. 733 at 736. 
21 L.Ed. 2d 731 (1969). 
80 
Ralph D. Mawdsley and Steven Permuth "Home Instruc-
tion for Religious Reasons: Parental Right'or State Option?" 
West's Education Law Reporter 1 (1982), p. 948. 
81 
U.s. Const. amend. XIV (1868). 
82
steven H. Gifts, Law Dictionary. (New York: 
Barron's Educational Services, Inc.,l984), p. 145. 
83Ibid. 
10~ 
with notice and a right to a fair hearing before being 
deprived of life, liberty, or property. 84 The Pierce85 case 
was litigated on the issue of substantive due process, but 
most modern cases involving due process have concerned the 
procedural type. 
Of all the types of constitutional protection claimed 
by home-schoolers, due process of law has been the most sue-
cessful. Judges have been likely to be sympathetic toward 
parents who have sought to gain approval of their home 
instruction through proper channels but who were treated 
unfairly. 86 
Perchemlides v. Frizzle, 87 although an unreported trial 
court decision that has little precedential power, has bec9me 
an important case for those who are interested in the topic 
of home instruction. The thirty-page opinion by Justice John 
M. Greaney of the Superior Court of Hampshire County, 
Massachusetts, not only discussed the case at hand, but sug-
gested a list of guidelines for the local school system to 
84Ibid., p. 146. 
85Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
86
William D. Valente, Overview of Constitutional 
Development Affecting Individual and Parental Liberty 
Intere~ts in Elementary and Secondary Education, u. s., 
Educat1onal Resources Information Center, ERIC Document 
ED 168 174, December, 1978,p. 30. 
8
:Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641 ~ass. 
Hampsh1re Cty. Super. Ct. 1978). 
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use in handling home instruction request. The Perchemlides 
family home instruction application was rejected by Superin-
tendent Donald Frizzle for several reasons, one of which 
was that the curriculum plan submitted was not detailed 
enough. The Perchemlides responded with a twenty-four page 
proposal. Frizzle appointed a school committee to discuss 
the Perchemlides• application, and the Perchemlides were 
permitted to attend one committee meeting, but the committee's 
final rejection merely reiterated Frizzle's original deci-
sion, without considering the additional information sup-
plied by the Perchemlides. Judge Greaney agreed that the 
Perchemlides had been denied due process of law, but noted 
that the plaintiffs erred in keeping their son out of school 
while their application was being processed. Judge Greaney 
ruled that the Perchemlides should resubmit their applica-
tion and spelled out what criteria could and could not be 
used in judging its merits. 88 
An increasingly popular means of attacking laws that 
prohibit or regulate home instruction has been to charge 
that such laws are unconstitutionally vague. Protection 
against vague laws is a due process consideration in that 
it involves the issue of fair warning that certain actions 
are prohibitect. 89 In the case ofurayned v. City of Rockford, 
BBibid. 
89Gifts, Law Dictionary, p. 509. 
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the United States Supreme Court ruled that "[v]ague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning."90 
According to the Grayned decision, laws must be written so 
that a "person of ordinary intelligence" had a "reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited ..... 91 
Early attempts by home-schoolers to declare terms such 
as "private school" and "certified teacher" unconstitutionally 
vague were usually unsuccessful. In recent years, however, 
somewhat of a trend has developed to declare the term "pri-
vate school" vague in absence of a state's legislature de-
fining the term. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled in 
the 1983 Popanz92 case that the Wisconsin legislature should 
define the term "private school" since "citizens or the 
courts should not have to guess as to its meaning."93 
Accordingly the Supreme Court of Wisconsin then reversed 
' 
the White94 decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 
which had previously declared that the term "private school" 
was not unconstitutionally vague. 
9°Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S.Ct. 2294 at 2299 (1972). 
9llbid., pp. 2298-2299. 
92state v. Popanz, 332 N.W. 2d 750 (Wis. 1983). 
93Ibid., p. 755. 
94state v. White and White, 325 N.W.2d 76 (Wis.App. 
1982), rev'd. 332 N.W.2d 756 (Wis. 1983). 
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The year after Popanz,95 the Supreme Court of Georgia, 
in the Roemhild96 case, echoed the opinion of Wisconsin•s 
highest court that the term 11 private school 11 was imper-
missibly vague. A dissenting opinion suggested that anyone 
of ordinary intelligence who desired to determine the meaning 
of 11 private school 11 need only consult a dictionary or rely 
on common sense.97 
Disputed terms and court decisions in which they were 
found not to be impermissibly vague have included: 11 private 
school 11 in the Grigg98 and the BowmanSI9 cases; 11 qualified 11 
teacher in the Ridd.lelOO case; 11 private tutor 11 in the 
Bowman101 case; 11 Certified teacher 11 in the Moorheact102 
case; and 11 equivalent instruction, .. also from the Moorhead103 
case. 
95state v. Popanz. 
96Roemhild v. State, 308 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1983). 
97Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
98Grigg 
99state 
100state 
101state 
102state 
l03Ibid. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
v. 
Commonwealth, 297 S.E. 2d 799 (Va. 1982). 
Bowman, 653 P~ 2d 254 (Ore.Ct.App. 1982). 
Riddle, 285 S.E. 2d 359 (W.Va. 1981). 
Bowman. 
Moorhead, 308 N.W. 2d 60 (Iowa 1981). 
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Equal Protection of the Laws 
Another clause of the Fourteenth ~mendment states, 
"No state shall .•. deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 11104 Equal protection of 
laws means that legislative actions should be fairly applied 
to all groups of people rather than selectively enforced 
in a discriminatory manner. Any differential treatment that 
is provided citizens must be predicated on a legitimate 
state interest. 105 
An illustrative case is Hanson v. Cushman. 106 The 
plaintiffs wished to teach their children at home, but they 
did not want to comply with the insistence of Michigan's 
attorney general that teachers of home instruction must be 
certified. The Hansons argued that the attorney general's 
opinion provided certified teachers the privilege of en-
gaging in home instruction, thus denying the same opportunity 
to uncertified teachers. The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan found that Michigan's 
requirement for a certified teacher applied equally to public 
schools, nonpublic schools, and home schools. Furthermore, 
l04u.s. Const. amend. XIV (1868). 
l05Gifts, Law Dictionary, pp. 157-158. 
106Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 
1980). 
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the state's requirement for instruction by certified teachers 
was justified in order to help minimize state costs in 
supervising the larger number of widely scattered home 
schools that might appear should the requirement be 
dropped. 107 
Similarly, in State v. Bowman,the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon insisted the state's differential treatment of 
students enrolled in nonpublic schools and those taught at 
home was reasonable. In light of the greater potential for 
abuse in home schools than in nonpublic schools, stricter 
regulations for home instruction were justified. 108 
New Mexico's statutory prohibition of home instruction 
by specifically excluding it from a definition of nonpublic 
schools has been upheld. In the 1983 Edgington 109 case, 
the Court of Appeals of New Mexico ruled that the state had 
a legitimate interest in forcing children to associate with 
persons other than their immediate family members. Thus, 
the questionable statute did not amount to an equal protec-
tion violation. 
107Ibid. 
108state v. Bowman, 653 P. 2d 254 (Ore. Ct. App. 
1982). 
109state v. Edgington, 663 P. 2d 374 (N.M. Ct.App. 
1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 354, 78 L.Ed. 2d 318 (1983). 
110 
Constitutional Guarantee of Liberty 
It has already been noted that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment specified that a person cannot be deprived of 11 life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law ..... 110 The 
Supreme Court case of Meyer v. Nebraska helped define the 
concept of 11 liberty" which has since been cited by parents 
as a reason that they should be allowed to educate their 
children in accordance with their own wishes. The Meyer 111 
court explained that "liberty" 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the 
individual •.. to marry. err~blish a home 
and bring up children ... 
The Meyer 113 ljberty dicta have been cited as a relevant pre-
cedent by home-schoolers in Stephens v. Bongart, 114 in State 
v. Hoyt, 11 5 and in Hanson v. Cushman, 116 for example. 
Right to Privacy 
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 117 the 
United States Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's law 
110 U.S.Const. amend. XIV (1868). 
111Meyer v. Nebraska, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923). 
112Ibid., p. 626. 
113Meyer v. Nebraska. 
114stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937). 
115state v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929). 
116Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
117Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965). 
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against teaching or using hirth control methods. A concur-
ring opinion by Justice Arthur Goldberg maintained that the 
Ninth Amendment was written by James Madison to alleviate 
fears that citizens would lose specific rights not mentioned 
in the first ten amendments. 118 The Ninth Amendment there-
fore guaranteed that "the enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."ll9 The right to pri-
vacy in family matters was thus guaranteed by the Ninth 
Amendment. 120 The abortion cases of Roe v. Wade 121 and Doe 
v. Bolton122 advanced the idea that education of children 
was a parental activity protected by the right to privacy. 123 
An example of a home instruction case in which parents claimed 
protection by the Ninth Amendment was Hanson v. Cushman, 124 
which the parents lost. However, Judge John Greaney's 
118Ibid., p. 1684. 
119 ( U.S. Const. amend. IX 1791). 
120Griswold v. Connecticut, p. 1685. 
121Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 
L.Ed. 2d 147 (1973). 
122 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed. 
2d 201 ( 1973). 
123Robin Ellsberg Neuman, ed., "Project: Education 
and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights - Part 
II: The State's Requirement of Compulsory Education and 
the Individual's Right of Access to Education," Michigan 
Law Review, 74 (June, 1976), p. 1395. 
124Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
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Perchemlides 125 decision stated that 11 the right to choose 
alternative forms of education 11 was protected by the right 
of privacy. 126 
Conclusion 
As already indicated, the Supreme Court has never de-
cided a case encapsulating parents' rights in home instruc-
tion. Yet, relevant constitutional issues have been dis-
cussed in the landmark cases-of Meyer, 127 Pierc~ 128 
Tokushige, 129 and Yoder. 13° The constitutional issues of 
home instruction have included the free exercise of religion, 
due process of law, equal protection of the law, the guar-
antee of liberty, and the right to privacy. However, par-
ents' rights in the education of their children have never 
been judged to be absolute. Very frequently, such rights 
have been overridden by the state's compelling interest in 
compulsory school attendance. 
125Perchemlides v. Frizzle. 
126Ibid., p. 9. 
127Meyer v. Nebraska. 
128Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
129Farrington v. Tokushige. 
13°wisconsin v. Yoder. 
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THE STATE'S COMPELLING INTEREST 
IN COMPULSORY SCHOOL 
ATTENDANCE 
The state's compelling interest in compulsory school 
attendance is based on the need for an educated citizenry 
that is capable of sustaining a system of democratic 
self-government. John Elson wrote that 
because education is so closely identified with the 
welfare of society and with the state's role as the 
ultimate guardian of the welfare of the children, 
the state is allowed enormous discretion in regu-
lating all aspects of education ..• l31 
The language used in judicial decisions pertaining to 
home instruction has affirmed the necessity of mandatory 
education that is either provided by and/or regulated by 
the state. "It is obvious," wrote Judge Moser in State v. 
Kasuboski, "that compulsory education is a reasonable state 
regulation ..• " 132 In the 1982 Rivinius 133 case in North 
Dakota, Justice Sand reiterated that 
the state has a compelling interest in requiring 
minimum standards of education to insure adequate 
education of the children of the state to enab~e 
them to be viable citizens in the community.l3 
131John Elson, "Legal Dimension of State Regulation 
of Nonpublic Schools," Super-Parent: An Analysis of State 
Educational Controls, ed. Donald A. Erickson, U.S. Education 
Resources Information Center, ERIC Document ED 096 770, 
October, 1983, p. 17. 
132state K b k" 105 v. asu os 1, p. • 
l33state v. Rivinius, 328 N.W. 2d 220 (N.D. 1982). 
l34Ibid., p. 228. 
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Likewise, Justice Staples, writing the opinion of the 
Virginia Supreme Court's majority opinion in Rice,l35 declared: 
In the first place, the legitimate interest of the 
State in the welfare and education of its children is 
universally recognized .•.. There is nothing which con-
tributes more to the development of the highest type 
of citizenship .... It is, therefore, recognized by the 
authorities ..• that to accomplish this end the State 
may resort to what is generally referred to as c£rogul-
sory education or school attendance of children. ~ 
The Rice137 opinion went on to state that "no amount of 
religious ferver" entitled a parent to ignore his obliga-
tion to send a child to school or "to inflict another 
illiterate citizen on his community or his State. 111 38 
When parents have chosen home instruction rather than 
public school attendance for their children, there has 
been a question as to whether or not the state could be ex-
pected to supervise such learning arrangements effectively 
so as to protect the state's compelling interest in education. 
In the Hoytl39 case, Chief Justice Peaslee of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court wrote 
l35Rice v. Commonwealth. 
136 48 Ibid., p. 3 . 
l37Rice v. Commonwealth. 
138 48 Ibid., p. 3 • 
139state v. Hoyt. 
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The state must bear the burden of reasonable super-
vision, and the parent must offer educational facili-
ties which do not require unreasonable supervision. 
If the parent undertakes to make use of units of 
education so small ... that supervision thereof would 
impose an unreasonable burden upon the state, he 
offends against the reasonable provisions for schools 
which can
4
be supervised without unreasonable 
expense.l 0 
As Chief Justice Peaslee explained, the existence of 
small, separate educational facilities maintained for the 
members of individual families could create an unmanageable 
network of home schools that could not be efficiently super-
vised by state officials who would need to establish whether 
or not children were being instructed and what they were 
being taught. According to Hoyt, 141 the state could insist 
upon "educational facilities" that could be supervised with-
out "unreasonable" costs to the state. "Anything less than 
this would take from the state all-efficient authority to 
regulate the education of the voting population." 142 
In a more recent case, State v. Bowman, 143 the Hoyt 144 
judicial dicta concerning the possibility of home schools 
were expanded. The State v. Bowman decision emphasized 
140Ibid., p. 171. 
141state v. Hoyt. 
142Ibid., p. 171. 
143state v. Bowman, 653 P. 2d 254 (Ore.Ct.App. 1982). 
144state v. Hoyt. 
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potential abuse of home instruction. The opinion of the 
majority of the court, written by Judge Richardson, explained 
that the Oregon legislature had properly assigned more 
stringent regulations to instruction received at home than 
to instruction received at a nonpublic school, since 
the opportunity to neglect children's education without de-
tection was greater in separate homes than in established 
schools. 145 Judge Richardson wrote, 
The legislature apparently believed that private 
schools, as institutions established for educational 
purposes, will satisfy the legislative purpose 
with minimal state oversight, while teaching by a 
parent or private teacher may be abused by some 
parents in avoidance of both the legislative 
purpose ang
6
their responsibility to educate their 
children.l · 
Related Concepts: Police Power and Parens Patriae 
Two concepts related to the state's compelling interest 
in education are the state's 11 police power 11 and the state's 
role as parens patriae. The Tenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution maintains: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved
4
to the states respectively, or to 
the people.l 7 
From the Tenth Amendment is derived the state's police power, 
which is defined as 
145state v. Bowman. 
146 rbid., p. 258. 
147 U.S. Const. amend. X (1791). 
inherent power of state governments ••• to impose 
upon private rights those restrictions that are 
reasonably related to promotion and maintenance 
of the health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare of the public.l4~ 
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Because of the link between education and the general wel-
fare of society, the state may invoke police power to require 
school attendance and to regulate schools that are attended 
to satisfy compulsory attendance laws. 
The term parens patriae literally means "parent of his 
country," and it "refers traditionally to the role of the 
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal 
149 disability," such as "minors and incompetent persons." 
When children are abused or neglected, the state, under 
the concept of parens patriae, may assume custody of children 
or require that parents modify objectionable behavior. 
In the 1944 Prince v. Commonwealth cas~l50 the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the State of Massachusetts, as 
parens patriae, could prevent a guardian from allowing her 
nine year-old niece to distribute religious literature on 
street corners despite the fact that such evangelism was 
required by their religion. The decision was written by 
Justice Rutledge who stated that 
148Gifts, Law Dictionary, p. 350. 
149Ibid., p. 334. 
l50Prince v. Commonwealth, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944). 
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neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood 
are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general 
interest in youth's well being, the state as parens 
patriae may restrict the parents' control by requiring 
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the 
child's labor, and in many other ways.l5l 
Child Neglect Charges 
Acting as parens patriae, local authorities may file 
child neglect charges against parents who do not educate 
their children in accordance with state law. Par~nts who 
engage in home instruction have often been· charged with 
child neglect and/or truancy. Jud~cial decisions have yielded 
mixed results, depending on individual circumstances of the 
particular cases. Two cases ended in convictions for 
American Indians who chose not to send their children to 
public schools and who did not provide their children with 
alternative instruction. The difficulties in the Baum152 
case began over remarks written by an English teacher on 
a book report about the life of Geronimo. Siba Baum and 
her mother, descendants of the Blackfoot Indian tribe, inter-
preted the teacher's comments as racial slurs. A conference 
with the principal, an apology from the teacher, and the 
scheduling of guest speakers who made presentations on 
Indian heritage and culture still did not appease the parent. 
l5libid., p. 442. 
152rn re Baum, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). 
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Mrs. Baum did not bring her daughter back to school. The 
appellate division of the New York Supreme Court found 
against the parent, declaring that defiance of compulsory 
attendance laws was not a legitimate method of attempting 
to modify a school's policies or curriculum. Siba Baum was 
judged to be a neglected child.l53 
In the 1976 McMillan154 case in North Carolina, the 
parents were likewise convicted of child neglect for refus-
ing to send their two children (ages ten and thirteen) to 
school, because the subjects of Indian heritage and culture 
were not taught. The North Carolina Court of Appeals 
insisted that the Indian heritage of Shelby and Abe McMillan 
would not be threatened in any way by public school atten-
dance. Moreover, since the children were neither permitted 
to attend school nor provided with alternate instruction 
in a nonpublic school, they were neglected children. 155 
In the Matter of Thomas H., a New York couple decided 
to teach four of their six children at home on a 100-acre 
farm. 156 The father, who was unemployed at the time of the 
l53Ibid. 
154In re McMillan, 226 S.E. 2d 693 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1976). 
l55Ibid. 
l56In re H., 357 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N.Y. Fam.Ct. 1974). 
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suit, listed his occupation as a college teacher and held 
a valid New York English teaching certificate for grades 
seven through twelve. The mother had attended college for 
two years. Although New York permits children to receive 
equivalent instruction outside of a school setting, testimony 
in the instant case indicated that the fourteen subjects 
prescribed by law were not covered thoroughly. The parents• 
own testimony indicated that the topics of New York history, 
United States history, and geography were not approached 
in a systematic way. Despite the father•s protestation 
that 11 schools can•t touch creativity in our wa~, .. •• 157 the 
children were declared neglected by the court. 
Frequently, however, parents have been cleared of child 
neglect charges, when it has been demonstrated that equiva-
lent or appropriate instruction was indeed provided for 
children. In the 1974 Davis 158 case, Justice Griffith of 
New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that 
the parents have provided tutors for their children 
and ••• their difficulty with the school authorities 
stems from their extreme concern with [rather than 
the neglect of] the children•s education.l59 
l57Ibid., p. 388. 
158rn re Davis, 318 A. 2d 151 (N.H. 1974). 
159 Ibid., p. 152. 
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Even though New Hampshire law did not provide for in-
struction by tutor, the court ruled that since the charges 
were made under child neglect statutes rather than compulsory 
attendance statutes, the parents could not be convicted. 160 
In another New York case, In re Lash, the parents of 
a handicapped child were cleared of child neglect charges 
when it was shown that they had hired two certified teachers 
to tutor their son at home for twenty hours per week. 161 
However, the parents were directed by the Family Court of 
Nassau County to notify school authorities of inten-
tions to provide alternate instruction for their son and 
to file a copy of the curriculum as required by the regu-
lations of the Commissioner of Education. 162 
In an earlier New York case, In re Richards, the court 
ruled in favor of a mother who kept her daughter at home 
and taught her to the best of her ability rather than let 
her child walk one and four-tenths miles over steep and 
treacherous icy paths to the nearest school bus stop. 163 
Judge Brown's decision found that 
it is apparent that the refusal to send the daughter 
to school was not prompted by any spirit of defiance 
160rn re Davis, 
161 rn re Lash, ~01 N.Y.S. 2d 124 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977). 
162 Ibid., p. 127. 
163rn re Richards, 2 N.Y.s. 2d 608 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1938). 
122 
or willfulness, but rather from a conviction that it 
would not be safe.~ 4.to travel from the home in order to attend school.lo 
In finding that eight year-old Alice Richards was not 
a neglected child, Judge Brown reasoned that the girl's 
absence from school during bad weather conditions might 
"postpone the day of graduation," but it would not "imperil 
the welfare of the child," since she was being taught at 
home when not able to attend schoo1. 165 
STATE REGULATION OF 
NONPUBLIC EDUCATION 
The 1925 Supreme Court case of Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters established that attendance at nonpublic schools 
could satisfy the state's compelling interest in education. 
The Pierce166 ruling also declared that the state had the 
authority "to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise 
and examine them, their teachers and pupils ..... 167 In the 
1968 Allen168 case, the Supreme Court acknowledged power 
of the state to reasonably regulate nonpublic schools. 
164Ibid., p. 610. 
165Ibid., p. 611. 
166Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). 
167 Ibid., p. 573. 
168Board of Education of Central School District 
No. 1 v. Allen, 88 S.Ct. 1923 (1968). 
Justice Byron White, writing the majority opinion 
maintained: 
a substantial body of case. law has confirmed the 
power of the State to insist that attendance at 
private schools, if it is to satisfy state com-
pulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which 
provide minimum hours of instruction, employ 
teachers of specified training, ~nd cover pre-
scribed subjects of instructiontb9 
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The rulings of most state courts have upheld the vali-
dity and reasonableness of regulations for nonpublic 
schools. 17° An early ruling cited by Justice White in the 
Allen171 decision was the 1922 case of State v. Hoyt172 in 
New Hampshire. Oscar Hoyt and several other defendants kept 
their children at home where they were instructed by a pri-
vate tutor. The court insisted that unsupervised instruc-
tion did not comply with the compulsory attendance 
statute. 173 Justice White also referred to the 1962 
174 Meyer.korth case, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court 
169Ibid., pp. 1927-1928. 
17°Lawrence Kotin and William F. Aikman, Legal 
Foundations of CompuJ.sory School Attendance (Port Washington, 
NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), p. 154. 
171Board of Education v. Allen. 
172state v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929). 
173Ibid., p. 171. 
174Meyerkorth v. State, 115 N.W. 2d 585 (Neb. 1962), 
appeal dismissed 372 U.S. 705, 83 S.Ct. 1018, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 125 TI903) 0 
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upheld the state's right to supervise "parochial schools" 
and to require that teachers be certified. 175 
The 1980's has witnessed a number of cases in which 
operators of fundamentalist Christian schools have sought 
to avoid state regulation by asserting a belief that apply-
ing for state approval violated their religious convictions. 
Some state courts have upheld state regulations of nonpublic 
schools and have issued injunctions forbidding the operation 
of unauthorized schools. One such case was that of State 
ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, heard by the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 176 The defendents, led 
by Pastor Everett Sileven, objected to Nebraska's system 
of approving nonpublic schools. Pastor Sileven was espe-
cially upset over the inspection of "God's property" by 
the county superintendent and the requirement for certi-
fied teachers. 177 The church school operators suggested 
that the state could monitor quality of their educa-
tional program by administering standardized tests. The 
school's curriculum consisted of booklets called PACE 
(Packet of Accelerated Christian Education), 
which students completed individually and at 
l75Ibid. 
176state ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 
301 N.W. 2d 571 (Neb. 1981), ap)eal dismissed 454 U.S. 803, 
102 s.ct. 75, 70 L.Ed. 2d (1982 • 
l77Ibid., p. 574. 
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their own rate. Justice Hastings observed that, "One gets 
the impression that the method of instruction is not unlike 
a correspondence course, with the addition of helping super-
visors."178 The court upheld Nebraska's approval plan for 
nonpublic schools, including the requirement that teachers 
must be certified. "The problem with testing," wrote Justice 
Hastings, "is that it sometimes comes too late."l79 In the 
1984 Kandt v. North Platte Baptist Church180 case, Nebraska's 
Supreme Court insisted the church could not operate an 
unapproved school. In the 1984 Sheridan Road Baptist Church 
v. Department of Education181 case, two churches filed a 
suit to prevent the state of Michigan from enforcing teacher 
certification and curriculum requirements for nonpublic 
schools. However, the Michigan Court of Appeals sustained 
the legislative enactment. 182 
l7Bibid. 
179Ibid., p. 579. 
180state ex rel. Kandt v. North Platte Baptist Church 
of North Platte, 345 N.W. 2d 19 (Neb. 1984). 
181sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Department of 
Education, 348 N.W. 2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
182Ibid. 
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The preceding judicial examples have demonstrated that 
courts generally have upheld state regulations of nonpublic 
schools. On the other hand, judicial decisions that limit 
the state's regulatory power have usually been made when 
the prescribed regulations were "so detailed and burdensome 
as to affect the very viability of the organization."183 
The 1927 Supreme Court case of Farrington v. Tokushige was 
an example of a situation in which extensive regulations 
of Japanese schools in Hawaii were judged as likely to 
destroy them. Not only were schools and teachers required 
to obtain annually a permit and to pay a fee, but students 
were allowed to attend only for an hour each day and only 
if they had completed the first and second grades in an 
American public school.lB4 
A more recent example was provided by the 1976 Whisner 185 
case in Ohio. The Ohio State Board of Education had pro-
mulgated fifteen pages of minimum standards for nonpublic 
elementary schools. Furthermore, the State Board of 
Education specified that eighty percent of the school day 
was to be spent on certain required academic subjects and 
the remaining twenty percent of the school day :spent· 
lB3Kotin and Aikman, Legal Foundations of Compulsory 
School Attendance, p. 154. 
184Farrington v. Tokushige, 47 S.Ct. 406 (1927). 
185state v. Whisner, 351 N.E. 2d 750 (Ohio 1976). 
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on physical education, art, and other specific activities. 
As operators of the Tabernacle Christian School pointed 
out, strict adherence to the Board's daily curriculum plan 
left no time at all to be devoted to religious studies. 
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, saying, 
In our view, these standards are so pervasive 
and all-encompassing that total compliance with 
each and every standard would effectively eradi-
date the distinction
8
getween public and non-
public education ... l 
In another 1971·~ase, the Supreme Court of Ver~ont ruled, in 
LaBarge, 187 that "equivalent" education might be 
obtained in a school that had not been approved by the 
Department of Education. Truancy charges were dropped. 188 
Advocates of nonpublic religious schools scored major 
victories in landmark cases in Kentucky and Maine. In 
Kentucky State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education 
v. Rudasill, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the state 
could not specify which textbooks must be used in nonpublic 
schools, nor could it require that teachers be certified. 189 
The court suggested that the state implement a standardized 
186 68 Ibid. , p. 7 . 
187state v. LaBarge, 357 A. 2d 121 (Vt. 1976). 
188Ibid. 
189Kentucky State Bd., Etc. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W. 
2d 988 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied 100 s.Ct. 2158 (1980). 
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testing program to determine if nonpublic schools were 
achieving the aims of compulsory education. 19° The Bangor 
Baptist Churchl9l case in Maine established that nonpublic 
schools did not have to obtain state approval before admitting 
students. Additionally, pastors or administrators of church 
schools could not be charged with inducing truancy by 
"preaching" their belief "that the Bible commands fundamen-
talist Chris~ians to send their children to schools regu-
lated solely by fundamentalist Christians ... "192 
Introduction 
STATE REGULATION OF 
HOME INSTRUCTION 
The status of state regulation of nonpublic schools 
is important to the study of the legal aspects of home in-
struction because, in states where home instruction is per-
mitted in lieu of compulsory school attendance, then the 
home instruction is subject to regulation by the state. As 
previously discusse~ the Supreme Court ruled in the Allen193 
l90ibid. 
191Bangor Baptist Church v. State of Maine, etc., 
576 ~ Supp. 1299 (D. Me. 1983). 
l92Ibid., p. 1334. 
l93Board of Education v. Allen. 
case that states have the authority to establish minimum 
standards for nonpublic schools, such as insisting that 
certain subjects be taught for a minimum number of hours 
per day or week by 11 teachers of specified training. 111 94 
Justice Byron White wrote, 
Indeed, the State's interest in assuring that 
these standards are being met has been considered a 
a sufficient reason for refusing to accept in-
struction at home as ~ompliance with compulsory 
education statutes.l9? 
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Commonly disputed aspects of state regulation of home 
instruction are qualifications of teachers of home instruc-
tion; qualifications of private tutors, permissibility of 
correspondence courses, e~uivalence of home instruction to 
public 6r nonpu~lic school attendance, and the burden of 
proof. 
Qualifications of Teachers of Home Instruction 
Walther found that a requirement for teacher certifi-
cation was the most controversial aspect of state regulation 
of nonpublic schools. 196 So it has been with home instruc-
tion, where requirements for instruction only by certified 
l94Ibid., p. 1928. 
l95rbid. 
l96John F. Walther, 11 State Regulation of Nonpublic 
Schools" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign, 1982), p. 96. 
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or otherwise approved teachers have severely limited the 
number of households eligible to conduct home instruction 
programs. Together with certain curriculum demands, Mawdsley 
and Permuth cited the requirement for a certified teacher 
as one that could make home instruction very "impractical" 
or even "impossible."l97 Depending on the wording of state 
statutes and the individual circumstances of particular cases, 
state courts have ruled both for and against teacher certi-
fication and approval requirements for instructors in home 
schools. 
In the 1948 case of Rice v. Commonwealth, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld that state's requirement 
that home teachers be approved by the division superinten-
dent of schools. Justice Staples wrote that 
in order to impart an education to a child, it 
is self-evident that the instructor must have 
adequate learning and training in the art of 
teaching. Obviously, an illiterate parent cannot 
properly educate his child, nor can he, by 
attempting to do soA
8
avoid his obligation to 
send it to school.l~ 
Many other state courts have followed the example of 
Rice. 199 For example, in the 1960 State v. Superior Court 
case, the Supreme Court of Washington found that a mother 
l97Mawdsley and Permuth, "Home Instruction for Religious 
Reasons, 11 p. 951. 
198Rice v. Commonwealth, p. 348. 
l99Rice v. Commonwealth. 
131 
who did not hold a teacher's certificate was not qualified 
to teach in the state of Washington, thereby rendering in-
valid the claim that she was operating a nonpublic school 
for her daughter. 200 In another example, the Iowa Supreme 
court upheld the statutory requirement for a certified 
teacher in the 1981 Moorhead201 case, despite the defendent's 
claim that the meaning of the term "certified teacher" was 
unclear. 
In the 1984 Morrow202 case, a father claiming to be 
a school adminis-trator operated a program of home instruc-
tion for his three children. By his own admission, Roland 
Morrow did not possess a valid Nebraska certificate for being 
a teacher or an administrator. The decision of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court reiterated that state statutes required atten-
dance at public or nonpublic schools as well as certifica-
tion for teachers and administrators. 203 
State courts have not been unanimous in support of 
teacher certification requirements. Home instruction by 
a mother who was only a high school graduate was permitted 
in the 1967 Massa204 case in New Jersey, even though an 
200state v. Superior Court. 
201state v. Moorhead. 
202state ex rel. Douglas v. Morrow, 343 N.W. 2d 903 
(Neb. 1984) . 
203Ibid. 
204state v. Massa, 231 A. 2d 252 (N.J. 1967). 
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assistant school superintendent testified that only a certi-
fied teacher could provide "equivalent" education. The 
Morris County Court maintained that since the New Jersey 
Legislature had not mentioned the requirement of having a 
certified teacher, it must not have intended to impose such 
as a minimum standard. 205 
The case of People v. Nobel, previously discussed under 
the topic of free exercise of religion, was an unusual case 
involving the lack of teacher certification of a Michigan 
woman. Michigan statutory law has not made provision for home 
instruction, but an opinion by the state•s attorney general 
has indicated that "comparable" instruction at home by a 
"certificated" teacher would satisfy parental obligation. 206 
The Nobel 207 decision went one step further. The case in-
valved a program of home instruction offered by Peter and 
Ruth Nobel for their children. Mrs. Nobel had received a 
college degree in elementary education, but she had never 
applied for a teacher•s certificate because she said that 
to do so would violate her religious beliefs. Judge Gary 
Stewart of the District Court of Allegan County considered 
the aforementioned opinion of the attorney general, but 
205Ibid., p. 256. 
206opinion, Michigan Attorney General No. 5579, 
September 27, 1979; cited in Michigan, Michigan Statutes 
Annotated, Sec. 15.41561 (1984). 
207People v. Nobel. 
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found that it had not addressed the issue of certification 
when it conflicted with religious beliefs. Judge Stewart 
observed that Mrs. Nobel was qualified to obtain a certifi-
cate but, because of her religion, did not want to apply 
for one. He concluded that in Mrs. Nobel's case, obtaining 
certification would not make her a better teacher nor faci-
litate her children's learning, but it would interfere with 
her religion. 208 
Qualifications for Private Tutors 
Concerning requirements for persons eligible to 
provide home instruction, qualifications of "private tutors" 
and the acceptability of instruction by "private tutors" 
have been two other controversial issues. In the 1982 case of 
State v. M.M. and S.E.,209 a Florida court ruled that a mother 
who was teaching her two children at home was not operating 
a "private school" and that she did not qualify as a private 
tutor as prescribed by Florida law. 209 On the other hand, 
an Oklahoma attorney general opinion issued in 
1973 postulated that a private tutor would not have to hold 
a teacher's certificate. 210 In the 1904 Indiana case of 
208 Ibid. 
209state v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1982). 
210opinion, Oklahoma Attorney General No. 73-129, 
February 13, 1973; cited in Oklahoma, Oklahoma Statutes 
Annotated, Title 70, Sec. 10-105 (19831. 
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State v. Peterman, Clarence Peterman's employment of a former 
teacher to instruct his child was allowed despite the fact 
that Indiana law at that time required attendance at "public, 
private, or parochial schools." 211 As Judge Peaslee wrote, 
The law was made for the parent who does not educate 
his child, and not for the parent who employs a 
teacher and pays him out of his private purse, and 
so places within the reach of the child the 
opportunity and means of acquiring an education 
equal to that obtainable in the public schools of 
the state.212 
Oklahoma compulsory attendance laws have since been 
expanded to allow for "other means of education" in addition 
to public or nonpublic school attendance. 21 3 The state of 
Texas, however, reworded its compulsory attendance laws in 
1923 to delete the phrase "or who is being instructed by 
a private tutor," thereby requiring attendance at public 
or nonpublic schools. 214 Two New Hampshire cases, Hoyt 21 5 
and Davis,
216 
ended with similar results. Both courts ruled 
that having provided instruction at home by a private tutor 
211 state v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. App. Ct. 1904). 
212 Ibid., p. 552. 
21 3oklahoma, Statutes Annotated, Title 70, 
Sec. 10-105 (1983). 
214Texas, Vernon's Texas Code Annotated, Title 2, Sec.21.033 
( 198 3) ' p 0 86 0 
21 5state v. Hoyt. 
216 rn re Davis. 
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was not an acceptable defense to the state's compulsory 
attendance laws. 
Permissibility of Correspondence Courses 
The acceptability of courses taken from correspondence 
schools has been another example of a disputed aspect of 
studies undertaken at home. Opinions by the attorneys 
general of Minnesota21 7 and Maine218 have advised that en-
rollment in correspondence courses does not constitute en-
rollment in a nonpublic school within the meaning contem-
plated by legislative enactment related to compulsory school 
attendance laws. Two states that do permit enrollment in. 
correspondence schools in lieu of compulsory attendance are 
Montana and Colorado. Montana's statutes permit "supervised 
home study" and "supervised correspondence study" but do 
not offer a definition of "supervised" nor a list of approved 
correspondence schools. 21 9 In Colorado, the State Board 
21 70pinion, Minnesota Attorney General No. 169-B, 
November 13, 1947; cited in Minnesota, Minnesota Statutes 
Annotated, Sec. 120-10 (1984), p. 43. 
218Maine, Attorney General's Report 1963-64; cited 
in Maine, Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, Title 20-A 
Sec. 5001 \1983), p. 160. 
219 Montana, !"1ont~na Cod~ __ 8-nno_~~t.ed, Sec. 20-5-102 (1984). 
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of Education will provide a list of approved correspondence 
courses for home study. 220 
In four court cases studied, attempts to satisfy com-
pulsory attendance requirements through the use of cor-
respondence courses were unsuccessful. In the 1961 Shinn221 
case, a.California court ruled that a correspondence· 
school was not a nonpublic school. The Kansas Supreme Court, 
ruling before the 1972 Yoder 222 case, decided that for a 
fifteen year-old Amish girl who had completed the eighth 
grade, a correspondence course did not suffice to satisfy 
the compulsory attendance law. 223 In 1981, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa affirmed a lower court's finding that, in the 
224 Moorhead case, enrollment in a home correspondence course 
did not amount to "equivalent instruction" by a "certified 
teacher." In the Riddle 225 case, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals ruled that enrollment in a correspondence 
220
M. Chester Nolte, "Home Instruction in Lieu of 
Public School Attendance," School Law in Changing Times, 
ed. M. A. McGhehey (Topeka, Kansas: National Organization 
on Legal Problems of Education, 1982), p. 10. 
221
In re Shinn, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 {Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1961 ) . 
222W. . Y 1scons1n v. oder. 
223state v. Garber, 419 P. 2d 896 {Kan. 1966). 
224state v. Moorhead. 
225state v. Riddle. 
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school did not fulfill the statutory requirement that instruc-
tion in home schools be provided by "persons" who were 
"qualified to give instruction." 
Equivalence of Home-Instruction to Public School Attendance 
Equivalence of home instruction to public school atten-
dance has been a major issue in court cases that have origi-
nated primarily (but not exclusively) in states whose 
statutes have permitted children to attend upon_"equivalent" 
instruction "elsewhere." If standards for equivalency were 
specified in state statutes or by an administrative agency 
designated by the legislature, courts generally upheld those 
regulations. 226 When statutes have failed to define equi-
valence, judges have had to decide the matter. 227 Such 
equivalency has been measured against the offerings of the 
public schools in the districts wherein the home-schoolers 
resided. 
The first home instruction case heard in the United 
228 States was Commonwealth v. Roberts. The decision by 
Judge Allen of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
stated that the intent of compulsory attendance laws was 
"that all the children shall be educated, not that they 
226Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 46. 
227Ibid. 
228commonwealth v. Roberts, 38 N.E. 402 (Mass. 1893). 
shall be educated in any particular way,n 229 Although 
Roberts23° was decided in favor of the home-schoolers on 
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the basis of academic equivalence, subsequent decisions in 
other jurisdictions indicated a temporary trend-disallowing 
home instruction for lack of either academic or social equi-
valence. Two notable illustrations were provided in the 
1937 Stephens v. Bongart 231 case and the 1950 Knox v. O'Brien232 
case, both of which occurred in New Jersey. In the former 
case, evidence showed that instruction at the Bongart house-
hold was frequently interrupted for errands and by guests. 
No regular schedule of daily instruction was followed. 
Teaching materials were not comparable to those available 
in the local New Jersey public schools. These and other 
factors pointed to a lack of academic equivalence. Also, 
Justice Siegler emphasized that because of a lack of a group 
experience, the Bongarts' instruction was not equivalent 
to the program provided in the public schools. 233 In Knox 
v. O'Brien, Judge Tenenbaum devised a three-pronged test 
to measure equivalency: teacher certification, comparable 
materials, and the presence or absence of the ''full 
229Ibid., p. 403. 
23°commonwealth v. Roberts. 
231 8 Stephens v. Bongart, 1 9 A. 131 (N.J. 1937). 
232Knox v. O'Brien, 72 A. 2d 389 (N.J. 1950). 
233stephens v. Bongart. 
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advantages supplied by the public schools. 11234 The home 
instruction provided by the o•Briens failed to meet two of 
the three tests. Although Justice Tenenbaum acknowledged 
that teaching materials used were adequate, he found that 
Mrs. o•Brien•s teacher training in secondary education some 
twenty years earlier did not qualify her currently to teach 
elementary school subjects. Justice Tenenbaum ended his 
decision with a discussion on the advantages of children 
associating with other children in a common educational 
experience. 235 
In 1967, another New Jersey case, State v. Massa, was 
decided on the issue of equivalence. The decision encap-
sulated the former standard of academic equivalence and added 
a new dimension. Judge Collins maintained that since the 
relevant New Jersey statute permitted "equivalent" instruc-
tion to be received "elsewhere than at.school," insistence 
upon group education or social equivalency could not be con-
tinued.236 Since Massa, 237 judicial interpretations of 
equivalence have disregarded the socialization aspects of 
public school education and have permitted home instruction 
that was academically equivalent. 238 
234Knox v. o•Brien, p. 391. 
235Ibid., p. 392. 
236state v. Massa. 231 A. 2d 252 (N.J. 1967). 
237state v. Massa. 
238Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 58. 
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Two New York cases of the 1970's were examples of home 
instruction programs that did not feature academic equiva-
lence in the views of their respective courts. In the 1977 
Franz239 case, home instruction was disallowed because the 
instructional program lasted only about one and a half hours 
per day and the curriculum was decided mainly by assessing 
the children's interests. 240 The 1974 In re H. 241 case was 
decided against the home-schoolers when it was shown that 
the father, who had an advanced degree in literature, syste-
matically taught his children only the subject of math, 
leaving the rest of the curriculum to be covered by field 
trips or to be woven into daily life situations on their 
farm. Since the home curriculum did not provide adequate 
coverage in all fourteen branches of education required under 
New York law, the home curriculum was flawed as not equiva-
242 
lentto instruction provided by public schools. 
However, parents• conscientious efforts providing 
coverage of all subjects required by law have been sustained 
239rn re Franz, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1977). 
240Ibid. 
241rn re H., 357 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974). 
242Ibid. 
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by New York courts. In the 1972 Foster243 case, the home 
instruction provided two daughters was judged equivalent. 
Moreover, in the 1974 Myers 244 case, Mrs. Myers demonstrated 
that she had a baccalaureate degree and a teacher's certifi-
cate. Mrs. Myers also used the same textbooks provided in 
the fourth grade of the local public schools. Additionally, 
she took her daughter to ballet, art, and music lessons. 
The Myers' program was found to be equivalent. However, 
the Myers were ordered to provide the local board of educa-
tion with regular reports concerning their home instruction 
efforts. 245 
Burden of Proof Requirements 
In cases involving the equivalence issue, a major factor 
influencing the outcomes has been assignment of the burden 
of proof either on the parents or on the state. Two ele-
ments of burden of proof are the presentation of evidence 
and persuasion of the court. 246 Although there are 
243In re Foster, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 8 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972). 
244rn re Myers, 119 N.Y.S. 2d 98 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1953). 
245Ibid. 
246Mawdsley and Permuth, "Home Instruction for 
Religious Reasons," p. 62. 
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exceptions to the rule, courts have frequently placed the 
burden of proof on the state when statutes have made home 
instruction or equivalent. instruction part of the basic 
compulsory attendance requirement. Conversely, the burden 
of proof has been placed on the parents when statutes have 
made home instruction or equivalent instruction an exemp-
tion from the basic compulsory attendance requirements. 247 
In Sheppard v. State248 and Wright v. State, 249 two 
Oklahoma cases, the burden of proof was placed on the state 
to show that the school-aged children were not receiving 
equivalent instruction at home. Parents won both cases 
since the state could not prove that equivalent instruction 
was not provided at home. In the Sheppard case, the school 
principal, testifying for the state, indicated that twins 
were not receiving equivalent instruction. Yet the principal 
admitted that he had never observed the home instruction 
250 program. 
247Patricia M. Lines, 11 Private Education Alternatives 
and State Regulation, .. Journal of Law and Education, 
12(April, 19e3), p. 212. 
248sheppard v. State, 306 P. 2d 346 (Okla. Crim. Ct. 
App. 1957). 
249wright v. State, 209 P. 179 (Okla. Crim. Ct. 
App. 1922). 
25°sheppard v. State, p. 254. 
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251 . In the 1957 Cheney case, a court in Kansas City ruled 
that since home instruction was aliowed by the basic com-
pulsory attendance statute, the state must prove that chil-
dren were not being taught at home before a conviction of 
compulsory attendance law violation could be reached. In 
the 1958 Pilkinton252 case, the state lost because the war-
rant that was issued did not charge parents with failure to 
teach their child at home. The 1982 Monnig253 case, 
similarly to the Sheppard254 case from Oklahoma, showed that 
a school principal who had never observed a home instruction 
program was not qualified to testify about its alleged 
deficiencies. 
Other cases have placed the burden of proof on the 
parents, such as the 1959 Washington case of State v. Superior 
Court. 255 Also, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Moorhead, 256 
placed the burden of proof on the parents to establish that 
home instruction was equal "in kind and amount" to that 
provided in the public schools. 257 
251state v. Cheney, 305 s.w. 2d 892 (Mo. 19571· 
252state v. Pilkinton, 310 s.w. 2d 304 (Mo. Ct.App. 
1958) . 
253In re Monnig, 683 S.W. 2d 782 (Mo. App. 1982). 
254Sheppard v. State. 
255state v. Superior Court, 346 P. 2d 999 (Wash. 1959). 
256state v. Moorhead. 
257 64 Ibid. , p. . 
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Tne courts of New Jersey and New York have sometimes 
split the burden of proof. The judicial decisions required 
the state to prove that the children were not attending a 
school and yet required the parents to prove that children 
were instead receiving equivalent instruction at home. The 
1965 Vaughn258 decision in New Jersey held that it was too 
difficult for the state to prove that home instruction did 
not meet the requirement of "equivalent" instruction "else-
where" since the parents themselves were the parties most 
knowledgeable about particular facets of their home instruc-
tion program. Concerning the state's requirment of proving 
nonattendance, the Kelly v. 259 case established that 
official transcripts of a child's absences were admissible 
as evidence in court, thus eliminating the necessity for 
260 public school teachers to testify in person. In re H., 
a case previously discussed, provided another example of 
a split burden of proof. The state proved that the children 
were not attending public schools. The parents lost when 
they failed to demonstrate that the home instructional pro-
gram was equivalent to that provided by the public schools. 
258state v. Vaughn, 207 A. 2d 537 (N.J. 1965). 
259rn re Kelly v., 405 N.Y.S. 2d 207 (Fam. Ct. 1978). 
260rn re H., 357 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974). 
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Equivalence of Home Instruction to Nonpublic School 
Attendance 
In states that have made no statutory provisions for 
home instruction, parents have sometimes attempted to have 
their homes declared nonpublic schools, thereby bene-
fitting from the Supreme Court's Pierce261 doctrine that 
permits nonpublic school attendance in every state. Even 
in states that have made explicit statutory provisions for 
home instruction, parents have tried to avoid strict regu-
lations for home schools, such as instruction by a certified 
teacher, by claiming to be operating a nonpublic schoo1. 262 
Key elements affecting the outcomes of such cases have been 
the educational level nf the parents and the regularity of 
the time of the instruction. 263 Other important factors 
have been 1) whether or not parents have sought approval of 
their home as a nonpublic school, 2) whether or not parents 
were certified teachers or persons of obvious competence, 
and 3) whether or not instruction was given in all subjects 
required to be taught by local public and nonpublic schools. 264 
261 Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
262Tobak and Zirkel, "Home Instruction," p. 51. 
263Kern Alexander and K. Forbis Jordan, Legal Aspects 
of Educational Choice: Compulsory Attendance and Student 
Assignment, U.S., Educational Resources Information Center, 
ERIC Document ED 096 770, October 1973, p. 26. 
264Kotin and Aikman, Legal Foundations of Compulsory 
School Attendance, p. 166. 
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An early case in which instruction by a private tutor 
was ruled to be the equivalent of enrollment in a nonpublic 
school was State v. Peterman. 265 The court's opinion 
stated that a 
school in the ordinary acceptation of its meaning, 
is a place where instruction is imparted to the 
young ... We do not think that the number of 
persons, whether one or many, make a place where 
instructiog
6
is imparted any less or more 
a school.2 
In the Counort267 case, the ruling went against the 
parents, but one passage of the court's opinion stated that, 
"Undoubtedly a private school may be maintained in a private 
home in which the children of the instructor may be 
pupils." 268 
Even though Illinois has no statutory provisions for 
home instruction, the Illinois Supreme Court established 
home instruction by case law in the 1950 Levisen269 case. 
Using the language of Peterman, 27° the Illinois Supreme Court 
agreed with the parents' contention that they were providing 
265state v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. App. Ct. 1904). 
266Ibid., p. 551. 
267state v. Counort, 124 P. 911 (Wash. 1912). 
268Ibid., p. 912. 
269People v. Levisen. 
27°state v. Peterman. 
their daughter with a nonpublic school education by 
teaching her at home. 271 
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Most courts, however, have been unwilling to conclude 
that home instruction is another form of nonpublic school 
instruction. The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled in 1916, 
in the State v. Will case, that home instruction programs 
. 272 
were not the equivalent of nonpublic school attendance. 
The court noted that the state legislature had deleted an 
explicit statutory provision for home instruction in 1903. 
In another Kansas case of 1963, the state Supreme Court's 
Lowry273 decision ruled against a physician and a certified 
teacher who withdrew their four children from public schools, 
claiming to enroll them in their own nonpublic school at 
home. The court ruled that the Lowry's nonpublic school 
was nothing more than scheduled home instruction. 
In the 1912 State v. Counort case, the Supreme Court 
of Washington, in a unanimous decision, insisted that home 
instruction was not within the nonpublic school concept. 
271People v. Levisen. 
272state v. Will, 160 P. 1025 (Kan. 1916). 
273state v. Lowry, 383 P. 2d 962 (Kan. 1963). 
Judge Morris declared: 
We do not think that the giving of instruction by 
a parent to a child ••• is within the meaning of the 
law "to attend a private school." Such a 
27
4 
requirement means more than home instruction. 
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Two California cases, Shinn275 and Turner, 276 also resulted 
in refuted claims of conducting nonpublic schools. The 
Shinns additionally asserte~ to no avail, that their 
children were too precocious to be properly educated in the 
public schools. The Turner277 court insisted that instruc-
tion by a parent or tutor at home was not a form of non-
public school attendance. A Florida ruling previously 
mentioned, State v. M. M. and S. E., held that instruction 
by a parent at home was not the equivalent of enrollment 
in a nonpublic school. 278 
North Carolina has very staunchly resisted efforts 
by home-schoolers to operate legally. In 1969 and in 
1979, opinions were issued from the attorney general's 
office indicating that home instruction did not comply 
with North Carolina's compulsory attendance laws. 279 
274state v. Counort, p. 911. 
275In re Shinn. 
276People v. Turner, 263 P. 2d 685 (Cal. 1953). 
277People v. Turner. 
278 8 State v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 19 2). 
279"Legal Update: Home Instruction," Attorney 
General's Office, Raleigh, N.C., January, 1984, p. 1. 
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The 19~3 Duro280 case, previously mentioned, showed that 
no claims to a religious basis for operating a home school 
would be honored. Another 1983 decision in North Carolina, 
Delconte v. State, found that Larry Del9onte's Hallelujah 
School was not a "private church school" or "school of 
religious charter." 281 
Conclusion 
Because of the state's compelling interest in education, 
the legislature of any state may regulate or prohibit home 
instruction in lieu of compulsory school attendance. Where 
home instruction is permitted, it is subject to reasonable 
state regulations, which may properly be more stringent than 
those assigned to nonpublic schools. Common state regu-
lations of home instruction include curriculum requirements, 
teacher qualifications, and length of the school day and 
term. 
280Duro v. District Attorney. 
281Delconte v. State, 308 S.E. 2d 898 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1983). 
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SUMMARY 
The legal aspects of home instruction are evident in 
statutory law, case law, constitutional la~ and administra-
tive law. Two competing elements are the parents' rights 
to direct the education of their children and the state's 
compelling interest in ed~cation, which gives it the author-
ity to ban or regulate home instruction. 
Parents are protected from unreasonable state regula-
tions by the United States Constitution. The First Amendment 
assures citizens of the right of free exercise of religion. 
From the Fourteenth Amendment come the rights of liberty, 
due process of law, and equal protection of the laws. The 
right to privacy is derived partly from the Ninth Amendment. 
Parents' attempts to claim a First Amendment religious right 
to educate their children at home usually fail. Most court 
victories for parents have been won in the area of procedural 
due process. A strategy that has recently become effective 
for parents is to attack the vagueness of certain segments 
of compulsory attendance laws. Another strategy that is 
gaining in popularity is to rely on the right to privacy 
in the matters of educating children. 
The state uses its police power to regulate nonpublic 
schools and home instruction. A wide variety of strict and 
lenient requirements are found in statutory provisions. 
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Frequently litigated regulations of home instruction include 
qualifications for teachers or private tutors, permissibility 
of correspondence courses, and the academic or social equi-
valence of home instruction to public or nonpublic school 
attendance. There is a trend to focus on academic, rather 
than social equivalence. Determinations of academic equi-
valency usually depend a great deal on the curriculum, 
teaching materials, regularity of instruction, and the cre-
dentials of the teacher. 
As was shown in Chapter III, thirty-five states have 
made statutory provisions for home instruction. Chapter IV 
has shown that four additional states, Illinois, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, and Kentucky, also have legalized home 
instruction by other methods. The remaining eleven states 
that do not permit home instruction are Arkansas, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
CHAPTER V 
REVIEW OF SELECTED 
COURT DECISIONS 
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This chapter presents a review of nineteen key court 
cases in seven categories of frequently litigated issues. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has never heard 
a home instruction case, four decisions by the nation's 
highest court have served as strong precedents in the re-
lated areas of the free exercise of religion and parents' 
rights to direct the education of their children. The other 
fifteen cases reviewed dealt specifically with home instruc-
tion. An effort was made to select relatively recent or 
unique home instruction cases in six categories that have 
shown a high incidence of litigation. Issues that have 
mostly been abandoned (such as the requirement for social 
equivalency in alternative learning arrangements), and 
issues that have not been well-developed by the case law 
of home instruction (such as the right to privacy), were 
excluded from this review, as were cases dealing with the 
state regulation of nonpublic schools. The categories 
and cases included in Chapter V are listed below: 
1. Parents• Rights to Direct the Education 
of Their Children 
Meyer v. Nebraska.(l923} 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925} 
Farrington v. Tokushige (1927} 
2. Free Exercise of Religion 
Yoder v. Wisconsin (1972} 
Duro v. District Attorney (1983} 
State v. Riddle (1981} 
People v. Nobel (1979} 
3. Due Process of Law 
Perchemlides v. Frizzle (1978} 
State v. Popanz (1983} 
4. Equal Protection of the Laws 
State v. Edgington (1983} 
Hanson v. Cushman (1980} 
State v. Bowman (1982} 
5. Equivalence of Home Instruction to 
Public School Attendance 
State v. Massa (1967} 
In re H. (1974} 
6. Equivalence of Home Instruction to 
Nonpublic School Attendance 
People v. Levisen (1950} 
Delconte v. State (1983} 
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Facts 
7. Burden of Proof 
In re Monnig (1982) 
State v. Moorhead (1981) 
State v. Vaughn (1965) 
PARENTS' RIGHTS TO DIRECT THE 
EDUCATION OF THEIR 
CHILDREN 
Meyer v. Nebraska 
262 u.s. 390, 43 s.ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) 
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Robert T. Meyer, an instructor at Zion Parochial School, 
disobeyed a 1919 Nebraska statute that prohibited the 
teaching of foreign languages to children who had not yet 
completed the eighth grade. Meyer had taught reading of 
Biblical stories in the German language to a ten year-old 
boy. Meyer was convicted in a district court and by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court. He appealed. 1 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court found that the Nebraska 
statute unreasonably interfered with Meyer's liberty in-
terest, guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
"Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably 
1Meyer v. Nebraska, 260 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 
L.Ed. 2d 1042 (1923). 
15~ 
be regarded as harmful," wrote Justice J. C. McReynolds in 
the. majority's opinion. 2 
The ·Court also expounded on the concept of liberty, 
saying that 
... it denotes.not merely freedom from ~odily 
restraint but also the right of the individual .•. to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish 
a home and bring up children ... 3 
The Nebraska state legislature, by passage of the challenged 
statute, had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by inter-
fering 
with the calling of modern language teachers, with 
the opportunities of the pupils to acquire know-
ledge, and with the power o4 parents to control 
the education of their own. 
Discussion 
The decision in Meyer v. Nebraska has become the 
leading precedent establishing parents' rights to direct 
the education of their children. Subsequently, the Meyer5 
case has been.cited in the great majority of court chal-
lenge of compulsory attendance laws or state regulations 
of nonpublic schools. 
2 Ibid., p. 627. 
3 Ibid., p. 626. 
4 Ibid., p. 627. 
5Meyer v. Nebraska. 
Facts 
Pierce v .. society of Sisters 
Pierce v. Hill Military. Academy 
268 u.s. 51o, 45 s.ct. 571 (19~5> 
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In 1922, the legislature of Oregon amended its com-
pulsory attendance law, requiring that all students attend 
public schools in grades one through eight. Nonpublic 
school attendance in the primary grades.would no longer 
satisfy the compulsory attendance law. (Although it had 
no bearing on the Pierce6 decision, it is interesting to 
note that the amended law of 1922 did permit home instruc-
tion, provided that prior approval was obtained from the 
county superintendent and the children attained satisfactory 
scores on examinations given once every three months.)7 
The original plaintiffs in Pierce8 were corporations 
that operated two nonpublic schools, a parochial school 
and a military academy, both of which were threatened with 
extinction in 1926 when enforcement of the new law was to 
begin. The United States District Court for the District 
of Oregon had granted an injunction restraining Governor 
Pierce and other state officials from enforcing the compul-
sory law. The state officials appealed. 
6Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. ~10, 
45 s.ct. 571 (1925). 
7 Ibid., p. 531. 
8Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
1~ 
Decision 
The Supreme Court found that both corporations owned 
a considerable amount of property devoted to the operations 
of their schools. Enrollment at the schools had dropped 
steadily since the law was passed in 1922, even though it 
was not scheduled for enforcement until 1926. The Court 
reasoned that adherence to the new compulsory attendance 
law would amount to "arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful 
interference with their patrons and the consequent destruc-
tion of their business and property."9 
Additionally, the Court relied on the Meyer10 decision 
in stating 
••. we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control ... The funda-
mental theory of liberty upon which all governments 
in this Union repose excludes any general power of 
the State to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers 
only.ll 
Even though the Supreme Court ruled that Oregon's 1922 
compulsory attendance law was unconstitutional because of 
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty and substan-
tive due process, the Court recognized the state's authority 
to regulate (rather than to prohibit) nonpublic education. 
9Ibid., p. 536. 
10Meyer v. Nebraska. 
11Pierce v. Society of Sisters, pp. 534-535. 
No question is raised concerning the power of the 
State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, 
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupf~s; 
to require that all children attend some school ... 
Discussion 
The most important legacy of the Pierce13 decision 
is its affirmation of the rights of parents to select alter-
native schools for their children. That Oregon's law was 
found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court prevented 
other states from following suit at a time when distrust 
of foreigners and fear of Bolshevism prompted many legis-
lative attempts to combat the perceived threats through 
laws designed to promote Americanization. Thus, Pierce14 
prevented states from disallowing the operation of nonpublic 
schools. More recently, in states which have not made 
statutory provisions for home instruction, the Pierce15 
doctrine has provided home-schoolers with an incentive to 
have their homes recognized as nonpublic schools, atten-
dance at which constitutes compliance with the compulsory 
attendance laws of every state in the country. The case 
also has served as a strong precedent in establishing the 
12Ibid., p. 534. 
l3Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
14Ibid. 
l5Ibid. 
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state's authority to regulate nonpublic schools and any 
other learning arrangements undertaken by parents of school-
aged children in lieu of public school attendance. 
Farrin~ton v. Tokushige 
273 u.s. 23 , 47 s.ct. 4o6 (1927) 
Facts 
In 1927 there were 163 foreign language schools in 
the Territory of Hawaii. One hundred and forty-seven of 
these schools conducted instruction in Japanese. Instruc-
tion in the remaining sixteen schools was in the Chinese 
and Korean languages. 16 Seeking to promote Americanization 
of the population, the territorial legislature passed a 
law requiring all students in the first and second grades 
to attend American schools, in which the language of in-
struction would be English. Thereafter, students could 
attend foreign language schools for a maximum of one hour 
per day or six hours per week. 17 New textbooks chosen after 
September 1, 1924, were to be selected "upon the principle 
that the pupil's normal medium of expression is 
E 1 . h .. 18 ng 1s ... 
16Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 234, 47 S.Ct. 
406 ( 1927). 
l7Ibid., p. 407. 
18Ibid. 
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T. Tokushige and others were successful in obtaining 
a temporary injunction preventing Governor Wallace R. 
Farrington, the attorney general, and the superintendent 
of public instruction from enforcing the new law. The 
decree was ordered by the United States District Court for 
Hawaii and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Farrington and others appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. 19 
Decision 
Justice J. C. McReynolds, delivering the opinion of 
the Court, noted that there was a "grave problem incident 
to the large alien population of the Hawaiian Island, 1120 
but cautioned that "the limitations of the constitution must 
not be transcended. 1121 The Court ruled that enforcement of 
the Hawaiian law in question would-lead to the destruction 
of the foreign language schools and would deprive parents 
of the right to obtain instruction which was important 
to them and which had not been proven to be harmful to 
the territory. 22 Since the Fourteenth Amendment prevented 
only states from depriving persons of liberty without 
due process of law, the Court relied on the Fifth 
l9Ibid., p. 406. 
20Ibid., p. 409. 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid. 
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Amendment's similar restriction of the federal government, 
which would be applicable in the Territory of Hawaii. The 
laws regulating foreign language schools were found to be 
unconstitutional. 
Discussion 
The decision in Farrington v. Tokushige was the ~hird 
stone in the constitutional foundation of parents' rights 
to direct the education of their children. Following the 
Meyer23 and Pierce24 decisions, Farrington v. Tokushige 
helped firmly establish the doctrine that even though 
parents' rights were subject to regulation by the government, 
unreasonable regulations could not be upheld. The issue 
of parents' rights in making decisions about the educa-
tion of their children is a constantly recurring theme in 
litigation involving home instruction. 
FREE EXERCISE OF 
RELIGION 
Wisconsin v. Yoder 
4o6 u.s. 205, 92 s.ct. 1526, 32 t.Ed. 2d 15 (1972> 
Facts 
Jonas Yoder and other members of the Old Order Amish 
religion refused to send their children, ages fourteen and 
23Meyer v. Nebraska. 
24Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 
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fifteen, to school after completion of the eighth grade, 
despite Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law, which re-
quired school attendance until age sixteen. 25 The Amish 
maintained that school attendance after the eighth grade 
threatened the continued existence of the Amish religion 
and the Amish way of life. Especially repugnant to the 
Amish were increasing emphasis in high school on sports 
and on competition in classes, along with the danger of 
peer pressure to conform. 26 The Amish claimed protection 
from the compulsory attendance law by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The 
Amish were convicted in Green County Court, but the deci-
sion was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The 
State of Wisconsin appealed. 27 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court ruled 6-1 in favor of 
the Amish. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger, agreed that the portion of Wisconsin's 
compulsory attendance law that required graduates of the 
eighth grade to continue school attendance until age six-
teen was unconstitutional when applied to members of the 
25wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 
32 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1972), p. 207. 
26Ibid., p. 211. 
27Ibid., p. 213. 
Amish faith. Justice Burger recognized that the state had a 
compelling interest in education, but found that such 
interest must be balanced against the parents' rights to 
direct the religious upbringing of their children and the 
parents' First Amendment rights to free exercise of re-
ligion.28 
Justice Burger devised a test with three questions to use 
when balancing a compelling state interest against a free 
exercise claim. The Court would look for 1) sincere 
religious beliefs; 2) a burden on the free exercise of 
those beliefs; and 3) "a state interest of sufficient mag-
nitude to override the interest claiming protection ... u 29 
The majority of the Supreme Court found that the Amish 
religion and mode of life were indeed ''inseparable 
and interdependent."30 The Court distinguished a mode 
of life based on religious beliefs from a way of life based 
on philosophical beliefs, which would not be protected 
by the First Amendment.31 Answering the first two ques-
tions of the test it had devised, the Court found that 
28Ibid., p. 214. 
29Ibid. 
30!bid., p. 215. 
31Ibid., p. 216. 
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refusal by the Amish to comply fully with the compulsory 
attendance law was based on sincere religious beliefs, 
the free exercise of which was severely burdened by the 
law. The remaining determination was to decide if the 
state's compelling interest in education was strong enough 
to override the burden on the Amish free exercise of 
religion. Considering the 300-year history of the Amish 
in producing self-sufficient citizens, the Court determined 
that the state's interest in the two disputed years of 
schooling was outweighed by the potential damage of those 
two years of schooling to the Amish free exercise of 
religion. 
Discussion 
The decision in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder caused 
some observers to predict the end of compulsory attendance 
laws, but the experience of the intervening thirteen years 
has shown that co~rts have not been willing to grant ex-
tensions of the Yoder32 doctrine to non-Amish plaintiffs. 
It is exc~edingly difficult to duplicate the Amish circum-
stances of preparing for a life totally divorced from the 
mainstream of American society. The case offers limited, 
if any, protection for home-schoolers, since the Amish 
32wisconsin v. Yoder. 
willingly sent their children to school in grades one 
through eight. None of the cases studied resulted in 
court-approved permission for home-schoolers to operate 
(where such permission had not already been authorized 
by other means) based on either a First Amendment claim 
or the Yoder33 ruling. Lest state officials become com-
placent, it should be remembered that prior to Wisconsin 
v •. Yoder, the Amish had never won a legal battle over 
compulsory attendance laws. 
Facts 
Duro.v .. District Attorney 
712 F.2d 96 (Fourth Cir., 1983), 
cert. denied 101 S.Ct. 998 (1984) 
Mr. and Mrs. Peter Duro and their children resided 
in Tyrrell County, North Carolina. The Duros were 
Pentecostalists.34 Mr. Duro refused to send any of his 
five school-aged children to public or nonpublic schools 
because of his objections to the "unisex movement," 
"secular humanism" and the "use of physicians."35 Instead, 
the children were taught by their mother, who used the 
33Ibid. 
34Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 
(Fourth CiT., 1983), cert. denied 101 S.Ct. 998 (1984). 
35 Ibid . , p . 97 • 
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Alpha Omega Christian Curriculum, a "self-teaching" pro-
gram utilized by a nearby nonpublic school, the Cabin 
Swamp Christian School.36 
North Carolina compulsory attendance la\'IS required 
that children between the ages of seven and sixteen attend 
a public or nonpublic school.37 Accordingly, on Febru~ry 
10, 1981, four charges of compulsory attendance violations 
were brought against Duro. The charges were later dropped 
because of technical flaws in the warrants. Duro, however, 
filed suit against the district attorney, claiming that 
the compulsory attendance law "violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
because his religious beliefs prohibit[ed] him from sending 
his children t~ a public or nonpublic school."38 The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina, relying on Yoder,39 ruled in favor of Duro. 
The district attorney appealed. 40 
36Ibid. 
37North Carolina, The.General Statutes of North 
Carolina, Sec. 115C-378 (1980). 
38Duro v. District Attorney, p. 97. 
39wisconsin v. Yoder. 
40nuro v. District Attorney, p. 97. 
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Decision 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit found that facts in Duro41 were "readily dis-
tinguishable"42 from Wisconsin v. Yoder. For example, the 
Amish people sent their children to public schools for the 
first eight grades and thereafter used Amish vocational 
training to prepare children for life in Amish society. 
Duro did not send his children to any school and had no 
proven means of preparing his children for life in the 
"modern world" Umt tt1ey would enter upon attainment of 
age eighteen. 43 Furthermore, the Amish successfully demon-
sirated that two additional years of high school for 
Amish youths burdened the Amish free exercise of religion. 
In contrast, most members of the Pentecostalist Church 
the Duros attended willingly sent their children to 
public schools. 44 Using the Yoder45 tests, the court 
found that any burden on Duro's sincere religious beliefs 
41Duro v. District Attorney. 
42Ibid., p. 98. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid., p. 97. 
45wisconsin v. Yoder. 
was overridden by North Carolina's compelling interest 
in compulsory school attendance, despite the state's 
deregulation of nonpublic schools in 1979. 46 
Discussion 
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This case was the first home instruction case to be 
heard in a federal court of appeals. 47 Since the Supreme 
Court would not agree to hear the case, then the Duro48 
decision serves as a binding precedent in all states of 
the Fourth Circuit, which are Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. North Carolina 
is the only one of those five states which currently bans 
home instruction. Home instruction is permitted implicitly 
by the statutes of Maryland49 and South Carolina.5° 
Explicit permission is granted by the statutes of Virginia51 
and West Virginia.52 Since North Carolina's ''absolute 
46Duro v. District Attorney, pp. 98-99. 
47Neal Devins, ''The Limits of 'Compelling Interest' 
In the Education of Young Citizens," Education Week, 
3(February 1, 1984), p. 20. 
48Duro v. District Attorney. 
49Maryland, Annotated Code of Maryland, Sec. 7-301 
(1983). 
5°south Carolina, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 
Sec. 59-65-40(1983). 
5lVirginia, Code of Virginia, Sec. 22.1-254.1 (1984). 
52west Virginia, West Virginia Code, Sec. 18-8-1 (1984). 
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prohibition" of home instruction was upheld, the decision 
in Duro v._ District Attorney indicated that other states 
in the Fourth Circuit had "absolute authority to regulate" 
home instruction. 53 It alsoestablished that similar claims 
to a constitutional right to teach children at home based 
on the freedom of religion were not likely to meet with 
success in~the Fourth Circuit. 
State v. RiddJe 
285 S.E.2d 359 (W.Va. 1981) 
Facts 
Because of their religious beliefs, Bobby and Esther 
Riddle objected to public schools, which they perceived 
to be a "pernicious influence on the young."54 For a while, 
the Riddles sent their children, Tim and Jill, to the 
Emmanuel Christian Academy. Later the parents withdrew 
the children because of an objectionable religious doc-
trine. The Riddles then embarked on a program of home 
instruction. They did not obtain approval of the county 
superintendent prior to commencing their home instruction, 
because they mi.stakenly believed that a teacher 1 d certifi-
cate was a prerequisite.55 
53 Devins_, "The Limits of 1 Compelling Interest 1 In 
the Education of Young Citizens," p. 20. 
54state v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W.Va. l9Rl), 
p. 361. 
55 6 Ibid., p. 3 3. 
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Esther Riddle obtaiued a course of study from a cor-
respondence school in Prospect Heights, Illinois. Testi-
mony indicated that the correspondence school provided 
lesson plans, made homework assignments, and graded them. 
The children were taught from 8:30 a.m.-3:00p.m. daily for 
180 days per school year.56 
The Riddles did not apply for permission to operate 
a program of home instruction, despite encouragement from 
employees of the Harrison County Board of Education. The 
Riddles were tried and convicted in Harrison County Circuit 
Court for violating the compulsory school attendance law. 
They appealed on First Amendment grounds, claiming that 
the law interfered with the free exercise of their reli-
gion. 
Decision 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ascertained 
that circumstances in the case of State v. Riddle were 
quite different from those of Wisconsin v. Yoder. In the 
latter case, only two years of schooling were in dispute. 
The court reasoned that since the Wisconsin case had dealt 
with "near adults, the balance tipped slightly in the 
direction of free exercise," but that in State v. Riddle, 
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"the balance is decidedly the other way.u57 Also, the 
court referred to the Amish 300-year history of preparing 
Amish youngsters for adulthood. The court insisted the 
Riddles were not entitled to constitutional protection 
from the compulsory attendance law. Justice Neeley, writing 
the opinion of the court said, 
We find it inconceivable that in the twentieth 
century the free exercise clause of the first 
amendment implies that children can lawfully be 
sequestered on a rural homestead during all of 
their formative years to be released upon the 
world after their opportunities to acquire basic 
skills have been foreclosed and their capacity 
to cope with modern society has been so under-
m~ned as to prohibit useful, happy or productive 
l1ves.' 
The court upheld the Riddles' compulsory attendance 
violation conviction, saying that even sincere religious 
beliefs could not excuse "total noncompliance with the com-
pulsory attendance law.u59 The Riddles were wrong in 
assuming they could ignore the law, "await criminal 
prosecution, and then assert a first amendment defense. 1160 
57 Ibid., p. 362. 
5Sibid., p. 366. 
59Ibid., p. 365. 
60rbid., p. 364. 
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Discussion 
Just as the North Carolina case of Duro v. District 
Attorney showed that claims to a constitutional right to 
conduct home instruction based on the free exercise of 
religion were unlikely to succeed in states that prohibited 
home instruction, the decision in State v. Riddle showed 
that even in states that explicitly allowed home instruc-
tion, religious freedom could not be used to circumvent 
compliance with compulsory attendance laws. Home-schoolers 
seeking to avoid prosecution should comply with whatever 
local regulations have been adopted by school boards. 
Facts 
People v. Nobel 
No. S 791-0114-A, S 791-0115-A 
(Mich. Allegan Cty. Dist. Ct. 1979} 
Home instruction became legal in Michigan after the 
state's attorney general declared that home instruction by 
a certified teacher was the equivalent of nonpublic school 
attendance. Peter and Ruth Nobel, however, kept their 
children at home for instruction by Mrs. Nobel, who was 
not a certified teacher. Mrs. Nobel had a degree in ele-
mentary education and would automatically have quali-
fied for a teaching certificate had she applied for one. 
Her religious beliefs mandated that parents must teach 
their children, so she felt "that for her to accept ..• 
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certification would ..• be placing her responsibilities for 
education of her children in a position subservient to 
that of the State ... "61 The Nobels were charged with 
breaking the compulsory attendance law. 
Decision 
Judge Gary Stewart of the Allegan County District 
62 Court applied Yoder's balancing test and decided in favor 
of the defendants. Since Mrs. Nobel clearly was entitled 
to a teacher's certificate, the mere application would not 
enhance her teaching performance. However, application for 
teacher certification would burden her First Amendment 
freedom of religion. In this case, Judge Stewart felt that 
the state's compelling interest in seeing that teachers in-
volved in home instruction were certified was outweighed 
by Mrs. Nobel's First Amendment rights. 63 
Discussion 
The Nobe164 case was unique among all the cases 
studied in that it was the only ruling in favor of horne-
schoolers that was decided either on First Amendment 
61People v. Nobel, No. S 791-0114-A, S 791-0115-A 
(Mich. Allegan Cty. Dist. Ct. 1979), p. 2. 
62Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
63People v. Nobel, p. 11. 
64People v. Nobel. 
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grounds or by application of the Yoder65 test. However, 
the case did not establish a fundamental right to teach 
children at home if such learning arrangements had not 
already been legalized. 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Perchemlides v •. Frizzle 
No. 16641 (Mass. Hampshire Cty. Super.Ct. 1978) 
Facts 
Peter and Susan Perchemlides were experienced home-
schoolers who had instructed two of their sons at home 
for four years before returning them to the public schools. 
In 1977, the Perchemlides became dissatisfied with the 
progress of a younger child, Richard (whom they had pre-
viously instructed at home), in the second grade at Marks 
Meadow Elementary School. Therefore, the Perchemlides 
decided to return Richard to home instruction and obtained 
an application form. The Perchemlides' application was 
denied by Superintendent Donald Frizzle, who found the 
request inadequate since it did not substantiate the 
Perchemlides' training, did not specify curricular sequence, 
did not reveal what group experiences would be provided 
65wisconsin v. Yoder. 
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for Richard, and because Richard's prior instruction at 
home had not prepared him for the second grade. 66 
The superintendent then referred the matter to a school 
committee for further consideration. Meanwhile, the 
Perchemlides, who were permitted to attend only one of 
the meetings of the school committee, prepared a revised 
curriculum plan that was twenty-four pages in length. 
The school committee rejected the plan. The school system 
initiated truancy proceedings against the Perchemlides, 
who filed a motion stating that they had a statutory right 
to educate their child at home. Moreover, they said they had 
been denied due process of law. 67 
Decision 
Judge John M. Greaney of the Superior Court of 
Hampshire County found that since the state legislature 
had not taken steps to delete the phrase ''otherwise 
instructed" from compulsory attendance laws after the home 
instruction case of Commonwealth v. Roberts, 68 then the 
lawmakers had intended to "preserve home education as one 
66Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641 (Mass. Hampshire 
Cty. Super. Ct. 1978), p. 3. 
67 4 Ibid., p .. 
68commonwealth v. Roberts, 38 N.E. 402 (Mass. 1893). 
of the alternatives available to Massachusetts 
parents ... "69 The Perchemlides thus were entitled by 
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Massachusetts law to operate a program of home instruction, 
subject to regulation by the state under its police power. 
Judge Greaney determined that his role was to weigh the 
"substantive standards used by the superintendent and the 
school committee" against the parents' constitutional 
rights and to "analyze the procedural due process aspects 
of the case ... "70 
Accordingly, Judge Greaney examined the school commit-
tee's reasons for denying the Perchemlides' request and 
found that most members relied on "impermissible stan-
dards" such as insistence on group education.71 Concern-
ing procedural due process, Judge Greaney ruled that 
applicable standards included the "right to be heard, 
presence of counsel if desired, some transcription of a 
record, [and] compliance with public meeting laws ... ," 
all of which could have been accomplished through school 
committee meetings.72 Despite the amount of time and 
69Perchemlides v. Frizzle, p. 9. 
70ibid., p. 15. 
71 Ibid., p. 19. 
72Ibid., p. 24. 
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attention devoted to the Perchemlides• application by the 
superintendent and the school committee, denial of due 
process was evident by the fact that the only reasons ever 
given to the Perchemlides for rejecting their request were 
written by the superintendent 11 before the single school 
committee meeting which the Perchemlides were permitted 
to attend ... and before the Perchemlides had an opportunity 
to submit their expanded proposal. 11 73 
Judge Greaney directed the Perchemlides to resubmit 
their application for home instruction. He then specified 
what should and should not be considered by the school 
committee in processing the application. The factors that 
the committee should concern itself with included the com-
petency of the teachers, the presence or absence of re-
quired subjects in the curriculum, teaching methods, time 
of instruction, adequacy of texts, and evaluation proce-
dures. The committee was instructed not to consider 
the parents• reasons for wanting to educate their 
child at home; the lack of a curriculum identical 
to that provided in the public schools; the lack of 
group experience; ... the creation of a precedent, 
if any, if the plan is approved; and any other 
factors that deviate from the substance of the plan 
in relation to whether 1t is an adequate, home 
education alternative.74 
73Ibid., p. 25. 
74Ibid., p. 28. 
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Even though Judge Greaney ruled in favor of the Perchemlides, 
he chastised them for removing Richard from school before 
the home instruction request could be approved. Judge 
Greaney specified a deadline by which Richard must return 
to school in the event that the second home instruction 
request were still being processed.75 
Discussjon 
Even though the case of Perchemlj.des v. Frizzle was 
tried in a lower court and has extremely limited prece-
dential value, it is an important case to study for those 
who have an interest in the topic of home instruction. 
Especially in states that permit home instruction by 
implicit or explicit statutory law or by rules and regu-
lations of administrative agencies, it is very important 
to afford parents with procedural due process. Judge 
Greaney's thirty-page homily provided a thorough dis-
cussion of minimum standards for procedural due process. 
Although it seems ironic to read a judge's instructions 
to the committee members to disregard the possibility of 
creating a precedent by their decisions, all of the 
standards should be useful to school administrators who 
desire to provide due process to home-schoolers. 
75Ibid., p. 30. 
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State v. Popanz 
332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983) 
Facts 
In 1980, Lawrence Popanz decided to teach his chil-
dren at home. Subsequently, he notified school authorities 
that his three daughters would be attending the Free 
Thinker School in Avoca, Wisconsin, administered by the 
Agency for the Church of the Free Thinker, Inc. Popanz 
and a local school administrator then became involved in 
a long series of disputes regarding proper procedure 
for securing approval of a nonpublic school. Later, the 
administrator and the principals of the two public schools 
where the girls would have been enrolled initiated pro-
ceedings against Popanz for violating the compulsory atten-
dance law. Popanz was convicted but appealed on the 
grounds that the term "private school" was unconstitu-
tionally vague. 76 
Decision 
As a precedent regarding the issue of vagueness, the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin relied on the Grayned77 decision 
of the United States Supreme Court. According to the 
76state v. Popanz, 332 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. 1983). 
77Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed. 2d 222 (1972). 
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Grayned decision, a vague law did not provide fair warning 
of prohibited behaviors to persons seeking to avoid legal 
penalties.78 Additionally, vague laws would have the 
effect of impermissibly delegating determinations of vio-
lations to many different officials who, forced to rely 
on subjective judgments, would make such determinations 
in arbitrary and discriminatory decisions.79 Therefore, 
the Popanz 80 court reasoned, it must be decided whether 
or n.ot the use of the term "private school" in Wisconsin's 
compulsory attendance law afforded fair notice to those 
who wished to comply with the statute and whether or not 
sufficient standards existed to prevent local school 
authorities throughout the state from "creat.ing and apply-
ing their own standards." 81 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin agreed with Lawrence 
Popanz that there was no definition of "private school" 
provided by statutes or by administrative rules and 
regulations of the Department of Public Instruction. 
78Ibid., p. 108. 
79Ibid. 
80state v. Popanz. 
81 Ibid., p. 754. 
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Eschewing definitions later suggested by the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, Justice Abrahamson wrote, 
We are not convinced that these definitions 
are the only ones a citizen, an administrator, or 
a court using dictionary definitions, court deci-
sions and the statutes could deduce. In any 
event the legislature or its delegated agent should 
define the phrase "private school;" citizens or 
the courts should not have to guess at its 
meaning.e2 
Since the term "private school" was not defined, the court 
found that too much discretion had been delegated to local 
school authorities who would rely on subjective standards 
to determine what constituted a "private school" and what 
did not. The resultant arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement of the law would violate the principles of due 
process. Because the statute failed "to provide fair 
notice" to those who wanted to obey it and because it 
lacked "sufficient standards for proper enforcement," the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the 
Circuit Court of Iowa County, finding in favor of Lawrence 
Popanz. 83 
82Ibid., p. 754. 
83 Ibid. 
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Discuss:l.on 
The Popanz84 decision means that state legislatures 
should not assume the judiciary will uphold compulsory 
attendance laws that lack a definition of the term 
"private school" or of any other type of "school" which 
state statutes name as the kind that may be attended to 
comply with the law. To avoid litigation based on the 
challenge of vagueness, state legislatures should follow 
the advice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to define 
"private school" in order to eliminate guesswork on the 
part of citizens and courts. 
Facts 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
State v. Edgington 
663 P.2d 374 {N~M.Ct.App. 1983), cart. 
denied 104 S.Ct. 354, 78 L.Ed. 2d 318 (1983) 
Don and Paula Edgington taught their two school-aged 
children at home with materials obtained from the Illinois-
based Christian Liberty Academy. New Mexico statutes, 
however, specifically excluded home instruction from the 
definition of "private school." The Edgingtons claimed 
that such exclusion was arbitrary, unreasonable, and 
84state v. Popanz. 
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violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The District Court of Socorro County agreed 
with the Edgingtons and ruled in their behalf. The state 
appealed. 85 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico decided to judge 
the merits of the compulsory attendance law by whether 
or not it bore a "rational relation to a legitimate state 
interest."86 The court ruled that the state did indeed 
have a legitimate interest in seeing that children were 
educated outside their homes. 
By bringing children into contact with some other 
person, other than those in the excluded group, 
those children are exposed to at least one other 
set of attitudes, values, morals, lifestyles 
and intellectual abilities. Therefore ... [t]he 
statute in .. question does not present an· equal 
protection violation. · 
Discussion 
New Mexico is the only state that has specifically 
excluded home instruction by statutory definition. The 
Edgington88 decision indicated that such a statutory 
85state v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1983), cert. denied 104 S.Ct. 354, 78 L.Ed. 2d 318 (1983). 
86 Ibid . , p • 3 77 . 
87Ibid., p. 378. 
88state v. Edgington. 
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provision did not violate the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislatures in other jurisdic-
tions that do not wish to allow home instruction or in 
jurisdictions where the term "private school" has been 
ruled unconstitutionally vague could follow New Mexico's 
example, thereby avoiding court challenges by home-
schoolers on the issue of vagueness. 
Hanson v. Cushman 
490 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980) 
Facts 
Lowell and Carol Hanson had four school-aged children 
who were taught at home in the Clonlara School by their 
mother and Charlotte O'Brien, an adult who lived in the 
Hanson residence. An opinion by Michigan's attorney 
general required certified teachers for home schools. 
Neither Mrs. Hanson nor Mrs. O'Brien was certified. The 
Hansons filed suit, seeking to have the state compulsory 
attendance law declared unconstitutional. Defendants in-
eluded Gerald Cushman, an assistant superintendent of the 
Greenville School District, and other school officials 
whose duty it was to report violations of the compulsory 
attendance law. 89 
89Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F.Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Michigan declared that there were no legal 
precedents indicating that parents had ''a fundamental con-
stitutional right to educate their children at home ..... 9° 
The court found that the plaintiffs' desire to educate 
their children at home did not rise above a philosophical 
choice such as the Yoder9l Court had excluded from con-
stitutional protection. As to the plaintiffs' arguments 
that they were denied equal protection of the laws because 
they were not certified school teachers, the court ruled 
that the state had a legitimate and reasonable goal in 
mind in requiring that home instruction be conducted only 
by certified teachers.92 
Discussion 
The decision in Hanson v. Cushman indicated that home 
schoolers might find it difficult to avoid teacher certi-
fication requirements by asserting the right to equal pro-
tection of the laws. Other courts might be equally 
inclined to rule that the distinction made between certi-
fied teachers and other citizens who were not certified 
teachers was based on a rational state interest. 
90ibid., p. 112. 
91wisconsin v. Yoder. 
92Hanson v. Cushman, p. 115. 
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State v. Bowman 
652 P.2d 254 (Ore.Ct. App. 1982) 
Facts 
Kay Bowman was a home-schooler who resided in Oregon. 
After she moved from the Roseburg school district to 
Josephine County, she became upset by the stricter regula-
tions placed on home instruction in her new school dis-
trict. In the past, Mrs. Bowman had alternately placed 
her children in public schools for a while and then in-
structed them at home for a while. Upon returning to the 
public schools, the children had always received full 
credit for work they had done at home; that is, they were 
placed in the grade to which other students of their ages 
were assigned. School officials in Josephine County, how-
ever, indicated that they would not grant Mrs. Bowman's 
child high school credits for subjects studied at home. 
They cautioned that the child would be considered a first 
semester freshman should he return to the public school. 
Mrs. Bowman thereupon stopped cooperating with school 
authorities and failed to present her son for testing. 
Subsequently, she was convicted of violating the com-
pulsory attendance law.93 
93state v. Bowman, 653 P.2d 254 (Ore.Ct. App. 1982), 
pp. 254-256. 
Mrs. Bowman appealed, seeking to have Oregon's com-
pulsory attendance law ruled to be unconstitutional. First 
of all, she maintained that the terms "private or p~rochial 
school" and "parent or private teacher" were impermissibly 
vague.94 For the current djscussion, however, the perti-
nent part of Mrs. Bowman's defense was her assertion that 
she was denied equal protection of the laws. Mrs. Bowman 
claimed that the law unconstitutionally placed harsher 
regulations on students who were taught at home than on 
students who were taught in nonpublic schools.95 
Declsion 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon ruled that the state 
had a legitimate interest to protect when it had created 
two distinct categories of students, those taught in non-
public schools and those taught in home schools. Justice 
Richardson, writing the opinion of the court, stated, 
The legislature apparently believed that private 
schools, as institutions established for educational 
purposes, will satisfy the legislative purpose with 
minimal state oversight, while teaching by a parent 
or private teacher may be abused by some parents in 
avoidance of both the legislative purpose and their 
responsibility to educate their children.9b 
94Ibid., p. 257. 
95rbid. 
96Ibid., p. 258. 
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Discussion 
Differential treatment for students in nonpublic 
schools and students taught at home was thus held not to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws. Together with State v. Edgington 
and Hanson v. Cushman, the decision in State v. Bowman 
has shown that relying on equal protection of the laws 
has been a relatively ineffective legal strategy employed 
by home-schoolers. However, school administrators should 
be cautioned to apply any existing requirements for ap-
proval of home instruction programs equally to all peti-
tioners. Discriminatory enforcement of written policies 
would abridge citizens' constitutional rights to fair 
treatment. 
Facts 
EQUIVALENCE OF HOME INSTRUCTION 
TO PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
State v. Massa 
231 A .-·2d 25-2TN:J~ 1967) 
Frank Massa and his wife were charged with failing 
to send twelve-year-old Barbara Massa to public or nonpublic 
schools or to provide her with equivalent education else-
where than at school. Mrs. Massa, a high school graduate, 
taught her daughter at home. Exhibits introduced by the 
defense indicated that the home instruction program gave 
adequate coverage to the subjects taught to children of 
the same age in the local schools, and that Barbara's 
achievement exceeded the median on standardized tests ex-
cept in the subject of mathematic~.97 
David MacMurray, the Assistant Superintendent of the 
Pequannock Schools, testified that the education given 
to Barbara Massa by her mother was not equivalent to that 
provided by the public schools since Mrs. Massa had no 
background in teaching and since solitary instruction 
inherently precluded social equivalence.98 
Declsion 
rhe Morris County Court carefully examined the New Jersey 
compulsory attendance law. The crucial phrase of the law 
was the part that directed parents who did not send their 
children to public or nonpublic schools to "cause such 
child ... to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere than 
t h l 11 99 J d C 11 . d t d from the Knox100 a sc oo. . u ge o lns epar e 
rationale, which required both social and academic equiva-
lence of home instruction programs. Since the legislature 
97state v. Massa, 231 A.2d 252 (N.J. 1967), 
pp. 253-254. 
9Bibid., p. 254. 
99Ibid. 
lOOKnox v. O'Brien, 72 A.2d 389 (N.J. 1950). 
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had specifically authorized education that took place 
"elsewhere than at school," it must not have intended to 
require social equivalence as a standard of measurement, 
Judge Collins reasoned. The court thus decided to base 
its decision solely on academic, rather than social, equiv-
alence. The Massas were found not guilty. 
Discussion 
The decision in State v. Massa marked the abandonment 
of the social equivalence standard, which has not since 
been successfully used in any case originating in any of 
the sixteen states which permit "equivalent" instruction 
"elsewhere." Protesting the lack of group socialization 
or the social equivalency of home schools is not likely 
to be an effective means of attacking home instruction 
in court. 
In re H. 
357 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974) 
Facts 
A New York couple was charged with neglecting their 
three children because they were not sending them to school. 
The parents said they were providing their children at 
home with an adequate education. The father held a grad-
uate degree in literature and had a permanent New York 
teacher's certificate in secondary (grades seven through 
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twelve) English. The mother had attended a small college 
for two years and had job experience as a librarian. In 
August, 1973, the father left a teaching position and the 
family moved to a 100-acre farm, where the program of home 
instruction was undertaken. 101 
Decision 
Judge Frederick D. Dugan of the Family Court of Yates 
County found that the children were indeed being neglected 
since they were not being provided with an education that 
was equivalent to that available in the public schools, 
where the fourteen branches required by law were taught. 
The home-schoolers had admitted that New York history and 
United States history did not rec~ive very much coverage. 
Testimony also indicated that there was no systematic 
102 approach to the study of geography. The parents instead 
insisted upon the educational value to be derived from 
everyday life on the farm and from a series of field trips 
the family took. Because of their failure to cover ade-
quately all fourteen of the required branches of learning, 
the home-schoolers lost. 
101 rn re H., 357 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1974), 
pp. 384-388. 
102Ibid., p. 389. 
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Discussion 
Despite Judge Dugan's assessment of the parents as 
"competent" instructors, 103 he found their program not 
equivalent because it did not cover all of the prescribed 
subjects. Other factors Judge Dugan noted included the 
lack of formal textbooks for some subjects. The In re 
H. case would be important to remember for school admin-
istrators in states where "equivalent" instruction "else-
where" than at school is allowed. Though the burden of 
proof was placed on the parents in this case, administra-
tors should be prepa~ed to address the issue of whether 
or not all required subjects were being covered by 
home-schoolers. 
Facts 
EQUIVALENCE OF HOME INSTRUCTION 
TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
People v. Levisen 
90 N.E. 2d 213 (Ill. 1950) 
Marjorie Levisen and her husband were Seventh Day 
Adventists who taught their seven year-old daughter at 
home despite Illinois' statutory requirement for attendance 
at public or nonpublic schools. The Levisens were con-
victed by the Greene County Court of violating the 
l03Ibid., p. 391. 
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compulsory attendance law. They appealed, using the 
language of the Peterman104 decision and by maintaining 
that "by receiving instruction in the manner shown by the 
evidence that the child was attending a private 
school."l05 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Illinois agreed with the Levisens 
that instruction at home was equivalent to nonpublic school 
attendance. The Levisens' daughter was being instructed 
regularly in the subjects taught to third-graders in the 
local schools. The child demonstrated a "proficiency 
comparable with average third-grade students."106 The 
couTt cautioned that no parents.should attempt to use the 
decision in People v. Levisen as a means of evading "their 
responsibility to educate their children," and placed the 
burden of proof on the parents to show "that they have 
in good faith provided an adequate course of instruction 
in the prescribed branches of learning."l07 
104 4 State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. App. Ct. 190 ). 
l05People v. Levisen, 90 N.E. 2d 213 (Ill. 1950), 
p. 215. 
106Ibid. 
l07Ibid. 
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Discussion 
The People v. Levisen decision was an important one 
in that it effectively legalized home instruction in 
Illinois, a state whose legislature did not make provi-
sions for home instruction. Courts in other jurisdictions, 
however, have been very reluctant to equate home instruc~ 
tion with nonpublic school attendance. Illinois is the 
only state in which home instruction is legal solely 
because of case law. 
Delconte v. State 
308 S.E. 2d 898 (N.C.Ct.App. 1983) 
Facts 
Before moving to North Carolina in 1981, the Delconte 
family lived in New York, where they engaged in a program 
of home instruction as permitted by law. Other members of 
the fundamentalist Christian group to which the Delcontes 
belonged sent their children to both public and nonpublic 
schools. The Delcontes, however, believed in a biblical 
obligation to teach their children at home, which they 
continued to do, even after moving to North Carolina, a 
state which does not permit home instruction. 108 
108Delconte v. State, 308 S.E. 2d 898 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1983). 
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Several months after the Delcontes moved to Harnett 
County, North Carolina, they were visited by the local 
public elementary school principal, who inquired about 
the status of the two school-aged children. Later, Larry 
Delconte notified the school superintendent that he planned 
to teach his children at home due to his religious beliefs. 
Delconte then applied to the Office of Nonpublic Educa-
tion for permission to operate the Hallelujah Schoo1. 109 
The request was rejected by the coordinator of nonpublic 
education, since the state's attorney general had stated 
that home instruction was not a nonpublic school. 
Delconte then filed a complaint seeking relief from 
the compulsory attendance law. The Superior Court of 
Harnett County ruled in Delconte's favor, saying he had 
a protected religious right to educate his children at 
home and that the Hallelujah School was a nonpublic 
llO school. The state appealed. 
Decisi.on 
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the 
ruling of the Harnett County Superior Court. North Carolina 
l09Ibid., p. 901. 
110Ibid., p. 898. 
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law permitted attendance at a "private church Rchool" or 
a "school of religious charter," defining the same as schools 
"operated by any church or other organized religious group 
or body as part of its ministry."lll Yet Delconte testi-
fied that his family did not belong to a church or orga-
nized religious group. North Carolina law also permitted 
attendance at "qualified nonpublic school[s]. 11112 The 
court pointed out that there was no precedent case in North 
Carolina interpreting the word "school," but that most 
other jurisdictions had held "that home instruction cannot 
reasonably be considered a school. 11 ll3 The North Carolina 
Court of Appeals also referred to two opinions from the 
attorney general's office that home instruction did not 
comply with the compulsory attendance law. Since there 
had been no "legislative action in response to those 
opinions," the court held that "'school' means an educa-
tional institution and does not include home instruc-
t . ..114 lOn. 
Concerning Delconte's contention that he had a First 
Amendment right to conduct home instruction, the Court 
111 North Carolina, The General Statutes of North 
Carolina, Sec. 115C-554 (1980). 
112Ibid., Sec. 115C-556 (1980). 
ll3Delconte v. State, p. 902. 
114Ibid., p. 903. 
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of Appeals applied the Yoder11 5 test, but found that it 
was not clear whether Delconte's objections to school 
attendance was based on religious or philosophical be-
liefs. According to Wisconsin v. Yoder, actions based 
on philosophical beliefs are not protected by the First 
Amendment. 116 The court insisted that even if Delconte•.s 
beliefs were ones that could have been constitutionally 
protected, North Carolina's compelling interest in edllca-
tion would cverride those rights. 117 
Discussion 
Delconte's claim to a First Amendment right to edu-
cate his children at home was made before the Duro118 
decision, which clearly indicated that attempts, based 
on religious grounds, to avoid compliance with compulsory 
attendance laws would not work in North Carolina or any-
where else in the Fourth Circuit. However, the Delconte119 
decision did contain an element not addressed by the Duro120 
11 5wisconsin v. Yoder. 
116Ibid., p. 216. 
ll7Delconte v. State, p. 904. 
118Duro v. District Attorney. 
ll9Delconte v. State. 
120Duro v. District Attorney. 
court; namely, whether or not a home school could be con-
sidered a nonpublic school. Statutory definitions precluded 
declaration of the Delconte home· as a "church school" or 
11 school of religious charter. 11 Lacking a statutory defi-
nition of "school," the court relied on precedents from 
other jurisdictions and on opinions by the attorney 
general that home instruction did not qualify as attendance 
at a school. Delconte made no challenge as to the vague-
ness of the term "schooJ," nor djd he claim denial of due 
process during his application to have the Hallelujah 
School approved. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
In re Monnjg 
683 S.W. 2d 782 (Mo.App. 1982) 
Facts 
At the time of this case, the relevant Missouri com-
pulsory attendance statute required persons who had control 
of children between the ages of seven and sixteen to send 
the children regularly to 
some day school ... or [to] provide the child at 
home with regular daily instructions ... at least 
substantially equivalent to the instruction given ... 
in the df2 schools in the locality in which the chid 
resides. 1 
121Missouri, Vernon's Annotated Missouri.Statutes, 
Sec. 167.031 (1981 . 
199 
The Monnigs taught their children Stanley, Suzanne, and 
Tammy at home using a correspondence course obtained from 
the Christian Liberty Academy. Neither the juvenile 
officer nor the school principal involved in the case had 
ever made an attempt to ascertain the equivalency of the 
Monnigs' program to that of the local schools. Neverthe-
less, the juvenile court declared the children to be neg-
lected. The Monnigs appealed, contending that the state 
should have had to prove not only that the children were 
not attending public school but that the children were 
not receiving equivalent instruction at home. 122 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals for the Western District of 
Missouri found that evidence proved that the parents had 
not complied with the first component of the compulsory 
attendance law, namely, to send children under their con-
trol to a school. However, the court found insufficient 
evidence to convict the parents of the second component 
of the law, which allowed alternate instruction to be 
given at home. 123 Furthermore, the court ruled that the 
122rn re Monnig, 683 S.W. 2d 782 (Mo.App. 1982). 
123Ibid., pp. 786-787. 
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burden of proof in the matter rested on the state. The 
decision of the juvenile court was reversed and remanded 
with orders for a new tria1. 124 
Discussjon 
Missouri's compulsory attendance law made home in-
struction an integr·al parL of Lhe basic law rather than 
. 
an exception to the law. Consequently, the burden of proof 
rested on the state to demonstrate that the Monnig 
children were not receiving instruction equivalent to that 
provided in the public school. The testimony of the school 
principal did nothing to help the state's case, since he 
had not observed the Monnigs' home instruciion and did 
not know what subjects were taught or what materials were 
used. Especially in states where home instruction is 
included in the basic compulsory attendance requirement, 
rather than in exemptions from compulsory attendance, 
local school authorities should not initiate truancy or 
neglect proceedings against home-schoolers that they have 
not observed or investigated. 
124Ibid., p. 789. 
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State v. Moorhead 
308 N.W. 2d 60 (Iowa 1981) 
Facts 
Norman and Linda Moorhead taught two of their children, 
Janese and Kirk, at home. They were convicted in the 
Warren District Court of violating Iowa's compulsory 
attendance law. The defendants appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Iowa, maintaining that the state should have borne 
the burden of proving that Janese and Kirk were not re-
ceiving "equivalent" instruction "elsewhere" from a "cer-
tified teacher." 125 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Iowa determined that the issue 
of "equivalent" instruction "elsewhere" was a defense to 
the charge of violating the compulsory attendance statute, 
rather than being part of the offense itself. Therefore, 
it was up to the parents to prove that they were providing 
"equivalent" instruction by a "certified teacher." 126 
The court sustained the defendants' prior convictions, 
despite their additional contentions that the terms 
"equivalent" and "certified teacher" were unconstitutionally 
127 vague. 
125state v. Moorhead, 308 N.W. 2d 60 (Iowa 1981), p.62. 
126Ibid. 
127·Ibid. 
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Discussion 
Even though Iowa's statutes implicitly made home 
instruction a part of the basic attendance requirement 
rather than an exception to it, the court ruled that the 
burden of proof was on the parents to sho~ as they 
offered in their own defense, that they were providing 
equivalent instruction elsewhere by a certified teacher. 
The issue of the burden of proof has been and will most 
likely continue to be frequently contested in home instruc-
tion cases, particularly in states which implicitly permit 
home instruction through the legalization of "equivalent" 
instruction "elsewhere." 
State v. Vaughn 
207 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1965) 
Facts 
Leroy and Carmen Vaughn were convicted in the 
Englewood Municipal Court of failing to send their child 
to public schools. After several appeals, the case came 
under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
where the parents hoped to have their convictions of dis-
orderly persons charges overturned. The Vaughns maintained 
that the burden of proof was on the state to show that the 
child, who had not been in attendance at school, had not 
been provided with "equivalent instruction elsewhere." 128 
128 
State v. Vaughn, 207 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1965), p. 539. 
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Decisj.on 
The New Jersey Supreme Court split the burden of 
proof. The state would be required to prove that the child 
was not attending a public school, but the parents would 
be required to prove whether or not the child was attend-
ing any other day school or was being provided with equiva-
lent instruction at home, since "the facets relating to 
both of these alternatives would necessarily be peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the party to be charged." 129 
The Vaughns did not win their appeal. 
Dlscussion 
The issue of the burden of proof in home instruction 
cases has been blurred by many conflicting precedents. 
Previously, it was pointed out that whether statutory pro-
visions for home instruction were included as part of the 
basic attendance requirement or as an exception to it 
would usually be a major factor in determining which party, 
the parents or the state, would bear the burden of 
proof.l30 However, all three of the cases just reviewed 
were tried in states whose statutes made "equivalent" 
instruction received "elsewhere" a basic part of 
129Ibid., p. 540. 
13°Patricia M. Lines, "Private Education Alternatives 
and State Regulation," JournaJ of Law and Education, 
12 (April, 1983), p. 212. 
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their compulsory attendance requirements. In the Monnigl3l 
case from Missouri, the burden of proof was judged to rest 
entirely on the state. In the 132 Moorhead case from Iowa, 
the burden of proof was placed on the parents. Yet in 
the Vaughnl33 case from New Jersey, the burden of proof 
was split. In the latter ruling, the parents drew the 
more difficult part of the split burden, being required 
to substantiate the equivalency of their home instruction 
to that available in the public schools. The three above 
decisions have demonstrated that there has been no defi-
nitive solution to the issue of the burden of proof in 
home instruction cases. While general rules may be of 
some value, it should be remembered that there have been 
many exceptions to those rules, evident in an array of 
contradictory precedents. 
l3lrn re Monnig. 
132state v. Moorhead. 
l33state V h v. aug n. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Home instruction has existed in America since colonial 
times, but it did not become a litigious subject until 
~ne states adopted compulsory attendance laws. 
Today, thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
permit home instruction, by virtue of statutory provisions, 
case law, attorney general's opinions, or policies of the 
state school boards. Home instruction litigation, however, 
is not confined to the eleven remaining states which do 
not currently condone home instruction. Indeed, a large 
number of cases has arisen in states that have made ex-
plicit or implicit statutory provisions for home instruc-
tion. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the legal-
ity of home instruction for school-aged children in the 
United States, through analyses of general statutory pro-
visions and of judicial decisions. The study has dealt 
with legal issues and not with the desirability of home 
instruction in lieu of compulsory school attendance. 
In Chapter I, five questions were proposed to guide 
the research. Chapter II was a review of the literature, 
which served to identify and introduce some of the major 
legal issues pertinent to home instruction. The answers 
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to most of the five original questions were found in 
Chapters III, IV, and V, in the examination of the statu-
tory provisions, the analysis of case law, and the dis-
cussion of other legal aspects of home instruction. The 
answers to the five research questions can be used by 
school administrators who come into contact with home-
schoolers. Recommendations by the researcher for adminis-
trators were based upon the answers to the five basic re-
search questions. 
SUMMARY 
The introductory chapter stated several purposes for 
the study, including making public school administrators 
aware of the growing magnitude of home instruction liti-
gation. Additionally, related legal issues were examined 
and analyzed so that administrators could prepare them-
selves to address this area of concern. 
The review of the literature emphasized the identi-
fication of the major legal issues of home instruction 
that would be examined primarily in Chapters IV and V. 
Since the adoption of compulsory attend~nce laws preci-
pitated home instruction litigation, a brief review of 
the history of the compulsory attendance movement was 
presented merely as background material. Also, as 
stated in the introductory chapter, the major tech-
niques employed to investigate the legal aspects 
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of home instruction were examinations of statutory law 
and case law. Although administrative law was mentioned 
in that it served to authorize home instruction in two states 
where statutory and case law did not, no ctetailed exami-
nation of state or local school boards' rules and regula-
tions for home-schoolers was made. Repeating a statement 
made in the introductory chapter, no attempt was made to 
determine the desirability of home instruction as opposed 
to school attendance, although the opinions of others, 
especially participants in the judicial system, were neces-
sarily discussed in the review of landmark and recent 
court cases related to home instruction. 
The first key research question listed in Chapter I 
called for the identification of the major legal issues 
surrounding the topic of home instruction. The major legal 
issues are parents' rights to direct and control the 
education of their children; free exercise of religion; 
due process of law (including impermissible vagueness of 
statutes); equal protection of the laws; the constititional 
guarantee of liberty; the right to privacy; the state's 
compelling interest in education; the state's police power; 
the state's role as parens patrJ.ae; child neglect charges; 
state regulation of nonpublic education (including home 
instruction)~ qualifications for teachers of home instruc-
tion (including tutors); permissibility of correspondence 
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courses, equivalence of home instruction to public or non-
public school attendance, and burden of proof requirements. 
The second research question asked which of the issues 
are likely to be litigated. All of the major issues have 
been included in numerous court cases. Typically, several 
of the main issues identified above are contested in the 
same case. Seldom does a case revolve around only one of the 
main issues of home instruction. As Chapter V showed, seven 
of the most frequently litigated issues are parents' rights 
to direct the education of their children; free exercise of 
religion; due process of law; equal protection of the laws; 
equivalence of home instruction to public school attendance; 
equivalence of home instruction to nonpublic school atten-
dance; and the burden of proof. 
The third research question asked if the analysis of 
court cases revealed any specific trends. An examination of 
early cases revealed emphases on parents' rights, particu-
larly their liberty interests, and on equivalence of home 
instruction to school attendance. Recent cases have shown 
home-schoolers are opting to rely on privacy rights and 
due process rights, particularly the impermissible vague-
ness of statutes. "Private school" and "certified teacher" 
are two terms from state statutes that have been challenged 
as being unconstitutionally vague, meaning that they do not 
provide adequate guidance to citizens who are seeking to 
obey compulsory attendance laws. At first, challenges as 
209 
to the clarity of "private school 11 met with defeat, but 
recently, judges have been more likely to side with parents 
in cases where the term was not defined in state statutes. 
None of the cases studied presented a successful challenge 
to the clarity of the term 11 certified teacher. 11 
Equivalence of home instruction to school attendance 
has continued to be a frequently litigated issue. Judicial 
decisions of the early twentieth century tended to dis-
qualify home instruction as equivalent to school atten-
dance for the lack of socialization experiences comparable 
to those of public or nonpublic schools. In 1967 this 
trend was reversed when a New Jersey court ruled, in the 
case of State v. Massa, that insistence upon equivalent 
group experiences would render all private instruction 
unacceptable. Since then, courts in states that permit 
home instruction that is 11 equivalent" to public or nonpublic 
school attendance have tended to concentrate on the aca-
demic aspects of the case, even though some judges have 
made negative remarks concerning the effects of isolating 
children from those outside their immediate family. 
The fourth research question asked for the identifi-
cation of states which permit home instruction based on 
statutory and case law. The statutes of these thirty-five 
states currently permit home instruction: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 
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Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. 
Those thirty-five states were divided into these 
three categories: states whose statutes explicitly pro-
vided for home instruction; states not included in the 
first category whose statutes allowed instruction by a 
private tutor; and states whose statutes implicitly autho-
rized "equivalent" instruction to take place "otherwise" 
or "elsewhere" than at school. The fourteen states that 
explicitly allow home instruction are Arizona, Colorado, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
These six states and the District of Columbia permit home in-
struction by private tutor: Alabama, California, Florida, 
Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. The fifteen states 
whose statutes implicitly permit home instruction are Alaska, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
Case law from across the country has contributed 
significantly to the rights of home-schoolers, but Illinois 
is the only state that has authorized home instruction 
solely on the basis of case law, following the decision 
.~ 
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in People v. Levisen. Although the fourth research question 
asked only about states that permitted home instruction 
according to statutory and case law, it has been stated 
for the record that Michigan, New Hampshire, 
and Kentucky also permit home instruction. Michigan's 
attorney general authorized home instruction that met all 
the requirements for nonpublic schools. State school 
board policies in New Hampshire and Kentucky have autho-
rized home instruction. The eleven remaining states that 
do not currently permit home instruction are Arkansas, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
The fifth research question asked for an explanation 
of the legally acceptable criteria for home instruction. 
An examination of the legal precedents has revealed that 
because of the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, home 
instruction would be legal in any state if a person could 
have his home declared to be a nonpublic school. Factors 
that have been shown to sway judges in that direction have 
included the academic equivalence to educational programs 
available in public or nonpublic schools, the qualifica-
tions or competence of the instructors, the adequacy of 
materials, and the regularity of instruction. Primarily, 
however, courts have relied on the wording of state 
statutes to determine whether or not home instruction was 
legal. When legislatures t1ave specified requirements for 
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home instruction, courts have generally been willing to 
back them up. The legal precedents then, have shown a 
great amount of respect for statutory law. Current speci-
fic statutory regulations for home instruction were identi-
fied in Chapter III. The criteria regu1ated by statute 
included curriculum requirements, instructor qualifica-
tions, prior approval or permission by a superintendent 
or school board, reports of attendance or enrollment, 
length of school day or term, testing or evaluation re-
quirements, that instruction be given in English, immuni-
zation requirements, and building safety codes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In order to answer the five research questions out-
lined above, the investigator reviewed over 100 pertinent 
books, ERIC documents, journals, periodicals, newspapers, 
and dissertations; the compulsory attendance statutes of 
fifty states and the District of Columbia; and over 125 
court decisions. From this examination of the pertinent 
literature, statutory law, and case law, the answers to 
the five basic research questions were formed. In turn, 
conclusions drawn and recommendations made by the re-
searcher were developed in pursuing the answers to those 
five questions. 
Conflicting precedents are the rule rather than the 
exception in litigation involving home instruction. No 
213 
home instruction case has been tried before the United 
States Supreme Court. In 1984, the Court refused to re-
view the c'ase of Duro v. Dj.strict Attorney, in which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit up-
held North Carolina's prohibition of home instruction. 
With no major Supreme Court decision on home instruction 
to serve as a precedent, legal precedents from across the 
nation are even more varied than the state statutes them-
selves. Even decisions that were made using the very same 
statutes as guides have produced different results, de-
pending on the individual circumstances of the case and 
on trends set or followed by the particular courts. How-
ever, based on the review of literature, examination of 
state statutes, and analysis of case law, the following 
general conclusions concerning the legal aspects of home 
instruction can be drawn. 
1. Courts will generally uphold state compulsory 
attendance laws, because of wide judicial acceptance of 
the state's compelling interest in education. 
2. Because of intense judicial respect for parents' 
constitutional rights, courts will rule in favor of 
parents whose fundamental rights have been violated by 
application of the compulsory attendance law. 
3. Courts have not recognized the existence of a 
fundamental constitutional right to educate children at 
home rather than sending them to a school. 
2J.4 
4. Attempts by parents to seek constitutional pro~ 
tection from the application of compulsory attendance laws 
by asserting a First Amendment freedom of religion claim 
are almost always unsuccessful. 
5. Attempts by parents to claim protection from the 
application of compulsory attendance laws based on the 
right to equal protection of the laws are not generally 
successful. 
6. Parents' most effective legal strategy has been 
to assert that, in their attempts to comply with the com-
pulsory attendance statutes by providing an alternative 
program of home instruction, they were denied procedural 
due process of law. 
7. Courts are becoming increasingly willing to rule 
that undefined terms in compulsory attendance statutes, 
particularly the term "private school," render the statute 
impermissibly vague. 
8. Where specific standards for home instruction 
are mandated by law, courts will uphold these requirements, 
as long as they bear a rational relationship to legitimate 
state interests and that they are applied equally to all 
persons. 
9. When legislatures have authorized alternative 
instruction by the use of broad terms such as "equivalent" 
or "otherwise," and when the meanings of these terms are 
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disputed between parents and local authorities, the courts 
will help decide the meanings of these terms. 
10. Judicial assessments of the equivalence of home 
instruction will focus on the academic aspects of said 
instruction, including the curriculum, competence of the 
instructors, adequacy of instructional materials, and 
regularity of instruction. 
11. The burden of proving that an alternative educa-
tional program such as a home instruction program is "equi-
valent" may fall on the state, on the parents, or 
be split between the two parties. While it had been pre-
viously suggested by other researchers that the assignment 
of the burden of proof would depend a great deal on 
whether home instruction was listed as a basic part of 
the compulsory attendance law or as an exception to it, 
there are enough exceptions to this generalization to blur 
the distinction. 
12. Future court strategies by home-schoolers are 
likely to concentrate on the right to privacy, procedural 
due process rights, and challenges of vagueness against 
statutory wording such as "private school," "equivalent," 
"otherwise," "elsewhere," "private tutor," "competent," 
and "qualified." 
13. Interest in home schooling will remain high 
throughout the 1980's. Home instruction advocates and 
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support groups will lobby in the legislatures of the eleven 
states where home instruction is prohibited, seeking changes 
in the law. 
14. In states where home instruction is already per-
mitted, home-schooling lobbyists will likely seek relaxation 
of any strict regulations, such as the requirement for a 
certified teacher. 
15. Public school administrators will increasingly come 
into contact with home-schoolers throughout the 1980's. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated in the introductory chapter, it was not the 
purpose of this study to form opinions concerning the 
relative merits or deficiencies of home instruction or 
to recommend whether or not home instruction should be 
allowed. Rather, this study was designed to make public 
school administrators realize the importance of becoming 
familiar with the home instruction movement, because of 
the growing likelihood of coming into contact with home-
schoolers. Another stated purpose of this study was to 
provide public school administrators with a practical list 
of guidelines to use when they do come into contact with 
home-schoolers. The guidelines suggest how administrators 
can meet their own legal obligations and respect 
parents' rights. 
217 
Based on the findings of this study, which examined 
pertinent literature, statutory law, and case law, the 
following guidelines concerning the handling by public 
school administrators of home instruction requests have 
been formulated. These guidelines are based on established 
legal precedents discernible in case law and on current 
statutory law and judicial trends. 
GUIDELINES FOR USE BY PUBLIC SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATORS WHEN DEALING 
WITH HOME-SCHOOLERS 
1. Before contact with home-schoolers, public school 
administrators should study the state's compulsory 
attendance law. An effort should be made to refer to 
the most recent version of the statute, since legislatures 
are continually making revisions of laws pertaining to 
education. It should be remembered that home instruction 
advocacy groups are active lobbyists. 
2. Public school administrators must stay abreast 
of case law, particularly in their own states. Sometimes 
courts will depart from previously honored legal prece-
dents, so it is important for public school administrators 
to watch for new judicial trends. Administrators should 
also be cognizant of case law in other states whose statu-
tory provisions regarding home instruction are similar. 
In the event of pending judicial decisions in the same 
circuit of the federal court system or in the United States 
Supreme Court, administrators must follow such cases 
closely, since previous legal precedents can be invalidated 
as new ones are set. 
3. Public school administrators in the thirty-nine 
states ·(or the District of Columbia) where home instruction 
is permitted should be thoroughly familiar with and must 
follow any relevant and existing policies, rules, or regu-
lations that have been adopted by state school boards, 
state departments of instruction, or local school boards. 
4. In states allowing home instruction, public 
school administrators must be careful to honor the pro-
cedural due process rights of parents who seek to embark 
on a program of home instruction. It would be beneficial 
to obtain a copy of the case of Perchemlides v. Frizzle, 
available for the cost of reproduction from the Office 
of the Clerk of the Courts, Northampton, Massachusetts 
01060. Although this decision is not binding outside of 
the jurisdiction of the Hampshire County Superior Court, 
it offers an excellent discussion of ways that adminis-
trators can afford parents with procedural due process. 
Another good reason for becoming acquainted with this case 
is that home-schoolers are very likely to cite the case in 
the event of due process disputes. 
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5. Public school administrators in the eleven 
states that do not permit home instruction are obligated 
by law to report violations of compulsory school· atten-
dance statutes, regardless of their personal feelings about 
the desirability or legitimacy of home instruction. 
Efforts should be made to inform parents of the law and 
why they are in violation of it. Administrators should 
explain what parents must do to comply with the law and 
give them a certain date by which their children must re-
port to school to avoid prosecution. Care should be taken 
to document all such contact with parents and to carry 
through with announced plans according to whatever sche-
dule is adopted by the administrator. Usually the steps 
to pursue and time requirements concerning notification 
are specified in compulsory attendance statutes. These 
statutes should be followed explicitly. 
6. In states whose statutes permit "equivalent" 
instruction to take place "otherwise" or "elsewhere" than 
at school, administrators should be wary of bringing 
charges against home instruction programs that they know 
nothing about. Administrators should make efforts to be-
come familiar with the home instruction program, parti-
cularly the curriculum, qualifications of the instructor, 
adequacy of teaching materials, and the regularity of 
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instruction. School administrators' testimony that a home 
instruction plan is not equivalent is meaningless if the 
administrators are not acquainted with the questioned program 
of instruction. 
7. As a precautionary measure, administrators who 
anticipate becoming involved in litigation regarding home 
instruction should assume the burden of proof will be on 
themselves. The legal precedents on the burden of proof 
are contradictory between jurisdictions and even within 
jurisdictions. Even though school board counsel will un-
doubtedly request that the court rule that the burden of 
proof be placed on parents or at least be split between the 
state and the parents, administrators who hope to be on the 
winning side in court should proceed as if they will have 
to prove that the children are not attending school, that the 
children are not being instructed elsewhere as provided by 
law, or that the parents clearly have violated the state 
compulsory attendance law. 
8. Public school administrators should encourage 
their state legislators to include in the compulsory 
attendance statutes definitions of terms such as "private 
school," "nonpublic school," "equivalent," "competent," 
and "qualified." The existence of precise statutory defi-
nitions could preclude litigation based on assertions of 
impermissible vagueness. 
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9. Public school administrators should also suggest 
to the General Assemblies that they include a definition 
of "home instruction" in the compulsory attendance 
statutes and then specify whether or not home instruction 
will comply with the state's compulsory attendance law. 
This practice would relieve the courts of the task of de-
termining legislative intent and should serve to reduce 
the potential amount of litigation. 
10. School administrators should apply any existing 
requirements for approval of home instruction programs 
equally to all petitioners. Discriminatory enforcement of 
written policies would abridge citizens' constitutional 
right to equal protection of the laws. 
CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
If a school administrator becomes involved in a dis-
pute with home-schoolers, conscientious efforts should 
be made to resolve the controversy without litigation. In 
all instances, the state statutes must be followed, with 
due consideration given to prevalent case law and any 
existing policies of the state or local school board or of 
the state department of instruction. 
At all times, administrators must respect the con-
stitutional rights of home-schoolers. Providing due process 
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to all home instruction applicants is an ethical course of 
action and a wise legal tactic, since persons who could 
prove that they were arbitrarily deprived of constitutional 
rights by the actions of school administrators could be 
entitled to financial remuneration. 
Administrative awareness of the potential problems 
associated with processing home instruction requests and 
adherence to established guidelines will not serve as an 
absolute guarantee against involvement in home instruction 
litigation. However, school administrators can reduce the 
likelihood of costly (in terms of time, expense to the state, 
and possibly personal expense) involvement in such litiga-
tion by studying fully the legal aspects of home instruc-
tion and by formulating, adopting, and following a set of 
guidelines when dealing with home-schoolers. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study concentrated on the legal aspects of home 
instruction according to statutory law and case law. A 
closely related topic that was mentioned, but not explored, 
is the area of administrative law of home instruction. A 
study of the administrative law of home instruction would 
concentrate on policies, rules, and regulations of state 
departments of education, state school boards, and local 
school boards. Such a study would be useful, since some 
states permit or regulate home instruction by administrative 
law, rather than by statutory or case law. 
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APPENDIX 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR COMPULSORY SCHOOL 
ATTENDANCE AND EXEMPTIONS AS RELATED 
TO HOME INSTRUCTION 
ALABAMA 
Sec. 16-28-5. Private Tutor. 
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Instruction by a private tutor means and includes only 
instruction by a person who holds a certificate issued by . 
the state superintendent of education and who offers instruc-
tion in the several branches of study required to oe taught 
in the public schools of this state, for at least three hours 
a day for 140 days each calendar year, between the hours of 
e:OO A.M. and 4:00P.M., and who uses the English language 
in giving instruction. Such private tutor shall, prior to 
beginning the instruction of any child, file with the county 
superintendent of education, where his place of instruction 
is in territory under the control and supervision of the 
county board of education, or the city superintendent of 
schools, where his place of instruction is in territory under 
the control and supervision of a city board of education, a 
statement showing the child or children to be instructed, the 
subjects to be taught and the period of time such instruction 
is proposed to be given. Such tutor shall keep a register 
of work, showing daily the hours used for instruction and 
the presence or absence of any child being instructed and 
shall make such reports as the state board of education may 
require. 
Sec. 16-28-1. Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter, the following words, terms 
and phrases shall have the following respective meanings, 
unless clearly indicated otherwise: 
(1) Private School. Includes only such schools as 
hold a certificate issued by the state superintendent of 
education, showing that such school conforms to the 
following requirements: 
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a. The instruction in such schools shall be by persons 
holding certificates issued by the state superin-
tendent of education; 
b. Instruction shall be offered in the several branches 
of study required to be taught in the public schools 
of this state; 
c. The English language shall be used in giving 
instruction; 
d. A register of attendance shall be kept which clearly 
indicates every absence of each child from srich 
school for a half day or more during each school 
day of the school year. 
(2) Church School. Includes only such schools as offer 
instruction in grades K-12, or any combination thereof in-
cluding the kindergarten, elementary, or secondary level 
and are operated as a ministry of a local church, group of 
churches, denomination, and/or association of churches on a 
nonprofit basis which do not receive any state or federal 
funding. 
Sec. 16-28-3. Ages of children required to attend school; 
church school students exempt from operation 
of this section. 
Every child between the ages of seven and 16 years shall 
be required to attend a public school, private school, church 
school, or be instructed by a competent private tutor for 
the entire length of the school term in every scholastic year 
except that every child attending a church school as defined 
in Section 16-28-l is exempt from the requirements of this 
Section, provided such child complies with enrollment and 
reporting procedure specified in Section 16-28-7. 
ALASKA 
Sec. 14.30.010. When attendance compulsory. 
(a) Every child between seven and 16 years of age shall 
attend school at the public school in the district in which 
the child resides during each school term. Every parent, 
guardian or other person having the responsibility for or 
control of a child between seven and 16 years of age shall 
insure that the child is not absent from attendance. 
(b) This section does not apply if a child 
(1) is provided an academic education comparable 
to that offered by the public schools in the 
area, either by 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
( 7) 
(8) 
( 9) 
(10) 
(ll) 
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(A) attendance at a private school in which 
the teachers are certificated according 
to AS 14.20.020; 
(B) tutoring by personnel certificated 
according to AS 14.20.020; or 
(C) attendance at an educational program 
operated in compliance with AS 14.45.100 
- 14.45.140 by a religious or other 
private school; 
attends a school operated by the federal 
government; 
has a physical or mental condition which a 
competent medical authority determines will 
make attendance impractical; 
is in the custody of a court or law enfo.rce-
ment authorities; 
is temporarily ill or injured; 
has been suspended or denied admittance 
according to AS 14.30.045; 
resides more than two miles from either a 
public school or a route on which transporta-
tion is provided by the school authorities, 
except that this subsection does not apply 
if the child resides within two miles of a 
federal or private school which the child 
is eligible and able to attend; 
is excused by action of the school board of 
the district at a regular meeting or by the 
district superintendent subject to approval 
by the school board of the district at the 
next regular meeting; 
has completed the 12th grade; 
is enrolled in a full-time program of cor-
respondence study approved by the department; 
in those school districts providing an approved 
correspondence study program, a student may 
be enrolled either in the district correspon-
dence program or in the centralized corre-
spondence study program; 
is equally well-served by an educational 
experience approved by the school board as 
serving the child 1 s educational interests 
despite an absence from school, the request 
for excuse is made in writing by the child 1 s 
parents or guardian, and approved by the 
principal or administrator of the school that 
the child attends. 
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b. Instruction shall be offered in the several branches 
of study required to be taught in the public schools 
of this state; 
c. The English language shall be used in giving 
instruction; 
d. A register of attendance shall be kept which clearly 
indicates every absence of each child from such 
school for a half day or more during each school 
day of the school year. 
(2) Church School. Includes only such schools as offer 
instruction in grades K-12, or any combination thereof in-
cluding the kindergarten, elementary, or secondary level 
and are operated as a ministry of a local church, group of 
churches, denomination, and/or association of churches on 
a nonprofit basis which do not receive any state or federal 
funding. 
Sec. 16-28-3. Ages of children required to attend school; 
church school students exempt from operation 
of this section. 
Every child between the ages of seven and 16 years shall 
be required to attend a public school, private school, church 
school, or be instructed by a competent private tutor for 
the entire length of the school term in every scholastic 
year except that every child attending a church school as 
defined in Section 16-28-l is exempt from the requirements 
of this Section, provided such child complies with enrollment 
and reporting procedure specified in section 16-28-7. 
ALASKA 
Sec. 14.30.010. When attendance compulsory. 
(a) Every child between seven and 16 years of age shall 
attend school at the public school in the district in which 
the child resides during each school term. Every parent, 
guardian or other person having the responsibility for or 
control of a child between seven and 16 years of age shall 
insure that the child is not absent from attendance. 
(b) This section does not apply if a child 
(l) is provided an academic education comparable 
to that offered by the public schools in the 
area, either by 
(A) attendance at a private school in which 
the teachers are certificated according 
to AS 14.20.020; 
(B) tutoring by personnel certificated 
according to AS 14.20.020; or 
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(C) attendance at an educational program 
operated in compliance with AS 14.45.100 
- 14.45.140 by a religious or other 
private school; 
(2) attends a school operated by the federal 
government; 
(3} has a physical or mental condition which a 
competent medical authority determines will 
make attendance impractical; 
(4) is in the custody of a court or law enforcement 
authorities; 
(5) is temporarily ill or injured; 
(6) has been suspended or denied admittance 
according to AS 14.30.045; 
(7) resides more than two miles from either a 
public school or a route on which transporta-
tion is provided by the school authorities, 
except that this subsection does not apply 
if the child resides within two miles of a 
federal or private school which the child 
is eligible and able to attend; 
(8} is excused by action of the school board of 
the district at a regular meeting or by the 
district superintendent subject to approval 
by the school board of the district at the 
next regular meeting; 
(9) has completed the 12th grade; 
(10) is enrolled in a full-time program of cor-
respondence study approved by the department; 
in those school districts providing an approved 
correspondence study program, a student may 
be enrolled either in the district correspon-
dence program or in the centralized corre-
spondence study program; 
(11) is equally well-served by an educational 
experience approved by the school board as 
serving the child's educational interests 
despite an absence from school, the request 
for excuse is made in writing by the child's 
parents or guardian, and approved by the 
principal or administrator of the school that 
the child attends. 
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ARIZONA 
Sec. 15-802. Compulsory school attendance; exceptions; 
violation; classification. 
A. Every person who has custody of a child between the ages 
of eight and sixteen years shall send the child to a school 
for the full time school is in session within the school 
district in which the child resides, except that if a school 
is operated on an extended school year basis each child shall 
regularly attend during school sessions which total not less 
than one hundred seventy-five days, or the equivalent as 
approved by the superintendent of public instruction, during 
the school year. 
B. A person is excused from the duty prescribed by subsec-
tion A of this section when it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the county school superintendent that: 
1. The child is instructed at home by a person passing 
the reading, grammar, and mathematics proficiency examina-
tion as provided in section 15-533 in at least those subjects 
as reading, grammar, mathematics, social studies and science 
and the child takes the nationally standardized achievement 
test each year. The parent or guardian of a child being 
instructed at home satisfies the condition of this paragraph 
by filing with the county school superintendent a copy of 
the child's achievement test results each year and an affi-
davit stating that the child is being taught at home. The 
nationally standardized achievement test which shall upon 
request be provided by the department of education may be 
administered by a public or private school and all costs 
incurred in administering the test shall be charged to the 
person who has custody of the child. If the public school 
administers the nationally standardized achievement test 
as provided in this paragraph, the test results shall not 
be included in the summary report as provided in Sec. 15-743. 
The department of education shall upon request provide any 
information which the department provides to teachers and 
parents of public school children relating to the nationally 
standardized achievement test to the person who has custody 
of the child. If the information is written, all costs in-
curred in printing the information shall be charged to the 
person who has custody of the child. 
2. The child is attending a regularly organized private 
or parochial school. The parent or guardian of a child 
attending a private or parochial school satisfies the condi-
tion of this paragraph by filing an affidavit with the county 
school superintendent stating that the child is attending 
a school for the full time that the schools of the school 
district are in session. 
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ARKANSAS 
Sec. 80-1502. Attendance required of children aged seven 
to fifteen. 
Every parent, guardian, or other person residing within 
the State of Arkansas and having in custody or charge any 
child or childre~ between the ages of seven [7] and fifteen 
[15], (both inclusive) shall send such child or children 
to a public, private, or parochial school under such penalty 
for noncompliance with this section as hereinafter provided. 
CALIFORNIA 
Sec. 48200. Children between ages of 6 and 16 years. 
Each person between the ages of 6 and 16 years not 
exempted under the provisions of this chapter is subject 
to compulsory full-time education. Each person subject to 
compulsory full-time education and each person subject to 
compulsory continuation education not exempted under the 
provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 48400) of 
this part shall attend the public full-time day school or 
continuation school or classes for the full time designated 
as the length of the schoolday by the governing board of 
the school district in which the residency of either the 
parent or legal guardian is located and each parent, guardian, 
or other person having control or charge of such pupil shall 
send the pupil to the public full-time day school or continu-
ation school or classes for the full time designated as the 
length of the schoolday by the governing board of the school 
district in which the residence of either the parent or legal 
guardian is located. 
Sec. 48222. Attendance in private school. 
Children who are being instructed in a private full-time 
day school by persons capable of teaching shall be exempted. 
Such school shall, except under the circumstances described 
in Section 30, be taught in the English language and shall 
offer instruction in the several branches of study required 
to be taught in the public schools of the state. The atten-
dance of the pupils shall be kept by private school authori-
ties in a register, and the record of attendance shall indi-
cate clearly every absence of the pupil from school for a 
half day or more during each day that school is maintained 
during the year. 
Exemptions under this section shall be valid only after 
verification by the attendance supervisor of the district, 
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or other person designated by the board of education, that 
the private school has complied with the provisions of 
Section 33190 requiring the annual filing by the owner or 
other head of a private school of an affidavit or statement 
of prescribed information with the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. The verification required by this section shall 
not be construed as an evaluation, recognition, approval, 
or endorsement of any private school or course. 
Sec. 48224. Instruction by tutor. 
Children not attending a private, full-time, day school 
and who are being instructed in study and recitation for 
at least three hours a day for 175 days each calendar year 
by a private tutor or other person in the several branches 
of study required to be taught in the public schools of this 
state and in the English language shall be exempted. The 
tutor or other person shall hold a valid state credential 
for the grade taught. The instruction shall be offered be-
tween the hours of 8 o'clock a.m. and 4 o'clock p.m. 
COLORADO 
Sec. 22-33-104. Compulsory school attendance. 
(l) Every child who attained the age of seven years 
and is under the age of sixteen years, except as provided 
by this section, shall attend public school for at least 
one hundred seventy-two days during each school year, or 
for the specified number of days in a pilot program which 
has been approved by the state board under section 
22-50-103 (2). 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section 
shall not apply to a child: 
(a) Who is temporarily ill or injured or whose absence 
is approved by the administrator of the school of attendance; 
(b) Who attends, for the same number of days, an inde-
pendent or parochial school which provides a basic academic 
education comparable to that provided in the public schools 
of the state; 
(c) Who is absent for an extended period due to physical, 
mental, or emotional disability; 
(d) Who has been suspended, expelled, or denied admis-
sion in accordance with the provisions of this article; 
(e) To whom a current age and school certificate or 
work permit has been issued pursuant to the "Colorado Youth 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1971"; 
(f) Who is in the custody of a court or law enforcement 
authorities; 
(g) Who is pursuing a work-study program under the 
supervision of a public school; 
(h) Who has graduated from the twelfth grade; or 
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(i) Who is being instructed at home by a teacher cer-
tified pursuant to articles 60 and 61 of this title, or 
under an established system of home study approved by the 
state board. 
CONNECTICUT 
Sec. 10-184. Duties of parents. 
The parents and those who have the care of children 
shall bring them up in some lawful and honest employment 
and instruct them or cause them to be instructed in reading, 
writing, spelling, English grammar, geography, arithmetic 
and United States history and in citizenship, including a 
study of the town, state and federal governments. Each 
parent or other person having control of a child seven years 
of age and over and under sixteen years of age shall cause 
such child to attend a public day school regularly during 
the hours and terms the public school in the district wherein 
such child resides is in session, or while the school is 
in session in which provision for the instruction of such 
child is made according to law, unless the parent or person 
having control of such child is able to show that the child 
is elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in the studies 
taught in the public schools. 
DELAWARE 
Sec. 2702. Public school compulsory attendance requirements. 
(a) Every parent, guardian or other person in the State 
having control of a child between the ages of 6 and 16 shall 
send such child to a free public school, in the district of 
the residence of the parents, except as determined in ac-
cordance with Chapter 6 of this title, and shall send him 
to that school each day of the minimum school term of 180 
days beginning the first day of the school year in the calen-
dar year in which the child reaches the age of 6, unless the 
local school authorities determine that such beginning is 
not in the best interest of the child. In the event of 
parental objections to a decision of the local school author-
ities, an appeal may be made to the State Board of Education 
whose decision shall be final. 
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Sec. 2703. Private school attendance or other educational 
instruction. 
(a} Section 2702 of this title shall not apply if it 
can be shown, and witnessed by written endorsement, to the 
satisfaction of the superintendent of school districts, to 
the satisfaction of an official designated by the State Board 
of Education, and by a written examination, that a child is 
elsewhere receiving regular and thorough instruction in the 
subjects prescribed for the public schools of the State, in 
a manner suitable to children of the same age and stage of 
advancement. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Sec. 31-401. Regular school instruction required. 
Every parent, guardian, or other person residing perma-
nently or temporarily ln the District of Columbia who has 
custody or control of a child between the ages of 7 and 16 
years shall cause said child to be regularly instructed in 
a public school or in a private or parochial school or in-
structed privately during the period of each year in which 
the public schools of the District of Columbia are in ses-
sion: Providf~d, thn.t in::~trud.ion r;iven jn such private or 
parochial school, or pri vaLe.ly, .iB deemed equivalent by the 
Board of Education to the instruction given in the public 
school. 
Sec. 31-li05. Daily record uf' 1.1Lt.nndance. 
An accurate daily record of the attendance of all chil-
dren between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall be kept by 
the Luu.c!Jurs of uv~.:.·r·y puiJli.c, pri.vu.Ll!, or parochial school 
and by every teacher g:i. ving ins true tion privately. Such 
record shall at all times be open to the school-attendance 
officers or other persons authorized to enforce Sections 
31-401 to 31-410, who may inspect and copy the same. 
FLORIDA 
Sec. 232.01. Regular school attendance required between ages 
of 7 and 16; permitted at age of 6; exceptions. 
(1} (a} All children who have attained the age of 7 
years or who will have attained the age of 7 years by February 
1 of any school year or who are older than 7 years of age 
but who have not at.ta.irH.'d Uw age of lo years, except as 
hereinafter provided, are required to attend school regularly 
during the entire school term. 
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Sec. 232.02. Regular school attendance. 
Regular attendance is the actual attendance of a pupil 
during the school day as defined by law and regulations of 
the state board. Regular attendance within the intent of 
Sec. 232.01 may be achieved by attendance at: 
(1) A public school supported by public funds; 
(2) A parochial or denominational school; 
(3) A private school supported in whole or in part by 
tuition charges or by endowments or gifts; and 
(4) At home with a private tutor who meets all require-
ments prescribed by law and regulations of the 
state board for private tutors. 
GEORGIA 
Sec. 20-2-690. "Educational entities" listed; requirements 
for private schools and home study programs. 
(a) This subpart recognizes the existence of public 
schools, private schools, and home study programs as educa-
tional entities. 
(b) As used in this subpart, the term "private school" 
means an institution meeting the following criteria or re-
quirements: 
(l) The primary purpose of the institution is to pro-
vide education or, if the primary purpose of the institution 
is religious in nature, the institution shall provide the 
basic academic educational program specified in paragraph 
(4) of this subsection: 
(2) The institution is privately controlled and 
operates on a continuing basis; 
(3) The institution provides instruction each 12 months 
for the equivalent of 180 school days of education with each 
school day consisting of at least four and one-half school 
hours; 
(4) The institution provides a basic academic educa-
tional program which includes, but is not limited to, reading, 
language arts, mathematics, social studies, and science; 
(5) Within 30 days after the beginning of each school 
year, it shall be the duty of the administrator of each pri-
vate school to provide to the superintendent of schools of 
each local public school district which has residents en~ 
rolled in the private school a list of the name, age, and 
residence of each resident so enrolled. At the end of each 
school month, it shall be the duty of the administrator of 
each private school to notify the superintendent of each 
local public school district of the name, age, and residence 
of each student residing in the public school district who 
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enrolls or terminates enrollment at the private school during 
the immediately preceding school month. Enrollment records 
and reports shall not be used for any purpose except provid-
ing necessary enrollment information, except with the per-
mission of the parent or guardian of a child or pursuant 
to the subpoena of a court of competent jurisdiction; and 
(6) Any building used by the institution for private 
school purposes meets all health and safety standards 
established under state law and local ordinances. 
(c) Parents or guardians may teach their children at 
home in a home study program which meets the following 
requirements: 
(1) The parent, parents, or guardian must submit within 
30 days after the establishment of a home study program and 
by September 1 annually thereafter a declaration of intent 
to utilize a home study program to the superintendent of 
schools of the local school district in which the home study 
program is located; 
(2) The declaration shall include a list of the names 
and ages of the students who are enrolled in the home study 
program, the address where the home study program is located, 
and a statement of the 12 month period that is to be con-
sidered the school year for that home study program. Enroll-
ment records and reports shall not be used for any purpose 
except providing necessary enrollment information, except 
with the permission of the parent or guardian of a child 
or pursuant to the subpoena of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion; 
(3) Parents or guardians may teach only their own chil-
dren in the home study program provided the teaching parent 
or guardian possesses at least a high school diploma or the 
equivalent GED certificate, but the parents or guardians 
may employ a tutor who holds at least a baccalaureate college 
degree to teach such children; 
(4) The home study program shall provide a basic aca-
demic educational program which includes, but is not limited 
to, reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies, 
and science; 
(5) The home study program must provide instruction 
each 12 months to home study students equivalent to 180 school 
days of education with each school day consisting of at least 
four and one-half school hours unless the child is physically 
unable to comply with the above rule; 
(6) Attendance records for the home study program 
shall be kept and shall be submitted at the end of each 
month to the superintendent of schools of the local school 
district in which the home study program is located. Atten-
dance records and reports shall not be used for any purpose 
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except providing necessary attendance information, except 
with the permission of the parent or guardian of a child 
or pursuant to the subpoena of a court of competent juris-
diction; 
(7) Students in home study programs shall be subject 
to an appropriate nationally standardized testing program 
administered in consultation with a person trained in the 
administration and interpretation of norm reference tests 
to evaluate their educational progress at least every three 
years beginning at the end of the third grade and records 
of such tests and scores shall be retained but shall not 
be required to be submitted to public educational authorities; 
and 
(8) The home study program instructor shall write an 
annual progress assessment report which shall include the 
instructor's individualized assessment of the student's aca-
demic progress in each of the subject areas specified in 
paragraph (4) of this subsection, and such progress reports 
shall be retained by the parent, parents, or guardian of 
children in the home study program for a period of at least 
three years. 
(d) Any person who operates a private school without 
complying with the requirements of subsection (b) if this 
Code section or any person who operates a home study program 
without complying with the requirements of subsection (c) 
of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and 
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not 
to exceed $100.00. 
(e) The State Board of Education shall devise, adopt, 
and make available to local superintendents of schools, who 
shall in turn make available to administrators of private 
schools and parents or guardians with children in home study 
programs such printed forms and procedures as may be reason-
ably necessary to carry out efficiently the reporting pro-
visions of this Code section, but such printed forms and 
procedures shall not be inconsistent with or exceed the re-
quirements of this Code section. 
Sec. 20-2-690.1. Mandatory education for children between 
ages 7 and 16. 
(a) Every parent, guardian, or other person residing 
within this state having control or charge of any child or 
children between their seventh and sixteenth birthdays shall 
enroll and send such child or children to a public school, 
a private school, or a home study program that meets the re-
quirements for a public school, a private school, or a home 
study program; and such child shall be responsible for enroll-
ing in and attending a public school, a private school, or 
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a home study program that meets the requirements for a public 
school, a private school, or a home study program under such 
penalty for noncompliance with this subsection as is pro-
vided in Chapter II of Title 15, unless the child 1 s failure 
to enroll and attend is caused by the child 1 s parent, guard-
ian, or other person, in which case the parent, guardian, 
or other person alone shall be responsible; provided, how-
ever, that tests and physical exams for military service 
and the National Guard and such other approved absences shall 
be excused absences. 
(b) Any parent, guardian, or other person residing in 
this state who has control or charge of a child or children 
and who shall violate this Code section shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be subject 
to a fine not to exceed $100.00 or 1mprisonment not to exceed 
30 days, or both, at the discretion of the court having juris-
diction. Each day•s absence from school in violation of 
this part shall constitute a separate offense. 
(c) Local school superintendents in the case of private 
schools or home study programs and visiting teachers and 
attendance officers in the case of public schools shall have 
authority and it shall be their duty to file proceedings 
in court to enforce this subpart. 
HAWAII 
Sec. 298-9. Attendance compulsory; exceptions. 
Unless excluded from school or excepted from attendance, 
all children who will have arrived at the age of at least 
six years, and who will not have arrived at the age of eigh-
teen years, on or before December 31 of any school year, 
shall attend either a public or private school for and during 
such school year, and any parent, guardian, and aother person 
having the responsibility for or care of a child whose at-
tendance at school is obligatory shall send the child to 
some such school. Such attendance shall not be compulsory 
in the following cases: 
(1) Where the child is physically or mentally unable 
to attend school (deafness and blindness excepted) 
of which fact the certificate of a duly licensed 
physician shall be sufficient evidence; 
(2) Where a competent person is employed as a tutor 
in the family wherPin the child resides and proper 
instruction is thereby imparted as approved by 
the superintendent .... 
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IDAHO 
Sec. 33-202. School attendance compulsory. 
The parent or guardian of any child resident in this 
state who has attained the age of seven (7) years at the 
time of the commencement of school in his district, but not 
the age of sixteen (16) years, shall cause the child to be 
instructed in subjects commonly and usually taught in the 
public schools of the state of Idaho. Unless the child is 
otherwise comparably instructed, as may be determined by 
the board of trustees of the school district in which the 
child resides, the parent or guardian shall cause the child 
to attend a public, private or parochial school during a 
period in each year equal to that in which the public schools 
are in session; there to conform to the attendance policies 
and regulations established by the board of trustees, or 
other governing body, operating the school attended. 
ILLINOIS 
Sec. 26-l. Compulsory school age--Exemptions. 
Whoever has custody or control of any child between 
the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend 
some public school in the district wherein the child resides 
the entire time it is in session during the regular school 
term, except as provided in Section 10-19-1; Provided, that 
the following children shall not be required to attend the 
public schools. 
1. Any child attending a private or a parochial school 
where children are taught the branches of education taught 
to children of corresponding age and grade in the public 
schools, and where the instruction of the child in the 
branches of education is in the English language ... 
INDIANA 
Sec. 20-8.1-3-17 [28-5321]. Compulsory attendance. 
Subject to the specific exceptions under this chapter, 
each child shall attend either a public school which the 
child is entitled to attend under IC 20-8.1-6.1 or some 
other school which is taught in the English language. A 
child is bound by the requirements of this chapter from the 
earlier of the date on which he officially enrolls in a 
school or he reaches the age of seven [7], until the date 
on which he reaches the age of sixteen [16]. A child less 
than seven [7] years of age who js withdrawn from school 
is not subject to the requirements of this chapter until 
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he is re-enrolled or reaches age seven [7]. A child for 
whom education is compulsory under this section shall at-
tend school each year: 
(l) For the number of days public schools are in session 
in the school corporation in which the child is enrolled 
in Indiana; or 
(2) If the child is enrolled outside Indiana, for the 
number of days the public schools are in session where the 
child is enrolled. 
Sec. 20-8.1-3-34 [28-5338]. Compulsory attendance for full 
term. 
It is unlawful for a parent to fail, neglect or refuse 
to send his child to a public school for the full term as 
requir~d under this chapter unless the child is being pro-
vided with instr~ction equivalent to that given in the 
public schools ... 
IOWA 
Sec. 299.1. Attendance requirement. 
Any person having control of any child over seven and 
under sixteen years of age, 1n proper physical and mental 
condition to attend school, shall cause said child to at-
tend some public or private school for at least 120 days 
in each school year, commencing with the first week of school 
after the first day of September, unless the board of school 
directors shall determine upon a later date, which date shall 
not be later than the first Monday in December. 
The board may, by resolution, require attendance for 
the entire time when the schools are in session in any 
school year. 
In lieu of such attendance such child may attend upon 
equivalent instruction by a certified teacher elsewhere 
than at school. 
Sec. 299.4. Reports as to private instruction. 
Any person having the control of any child over seven 
and under sixteen years of age, who shall place such child 
under private instruction, not in a regularly conducted 
school, upon receiving notice from the secretary of the 
school district, shall furnish a certificate stating the 
name and age of such child, the period of time during which 
such child has been under said private instruction, the de-
tails of such instruction, and the name of the instructor. 
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KANSAS 
Sec. 72-llll. Compulsory school attendance; exemptions. 
(a) Every parent, guardian or other person in the state 
of Kansas, having control over or charge of any child who 
has reached the age of seven years and is under the age of 
sixteen years, shall require such child to attend continu-
ously each school year (1) a public school for the duration 
of the school term provided for in K.S.A. 72-1106, or (2) a 
private, denominational or parochial school taught by a com-
petent instructor for a period of time which is substan-
tially equivalent to the period of time public school is 
maintained in the school district in which the private, 
denominational or parochial school is located ... 
(d) When a recognized church or religious denomination 
that objects to a regular public high school education pro-
vides, offers and teaches, either individually or in co-
operation with another recognized church or religious deno-
mination, a regularly supervised program of instruction 
which is approved by the state board of education for children 
of compulsory school attendance age who have successfully 
completed the eighth grade, participation in such a program 
of instruction by children who have successfully completed 
the eighth grade and whose parents or guardians are members 
of the sponsoring church or religious denomination shall be 
regarded as acceptable school attendance within the meaning 
of this act. Approval of such programs shall be granted 
by the state board, for two year periods, upon application 
from recognized churches and religious denominations, under 
the following conditions: (l) Each participating child shall 
be engaged, during each day on which attendance is legally 
required in the public schools in the school district in 
which the child resides, in at least five hours of learning 
activities appropriate to the adult occupation that the child 
is likely to assume in later years; 
(2) Acceptable learning activities, for the purposes 
of this subsection, shall include, parent (or guardian)-
supervised projects in agriculture and home-making, work-
study programs in cooperation with local business and indus-
try, and correspondence courses from schools accredited by 
the national home study council, recognized by the United 
States office of education as the competent accrediting 
agency for private home study schools; 
(3) At least fifteen hours per week of classroom work 
shall be provided, at which time students shall be required 
to file written reports of the learning activities they have 
pursued since the time of the last class meeting, indicating 
the length of time spent on each one, and the teacher shall 
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examine and evaluate such reports, approve plans for further 
learning activities, and provide necessary assignments and 
instruction; 
(4) Regular attendance reports shall be filed as re-
quired by law, and students shall be reported as absent for 
each school day on which they have not completed the pre-
scribed minimum of five hours of learning activities; 
(5) The teacher shall keep complete records concerning 
instruction provided, assignments made, and work pursued 
by the students, and these records shall be filed on the 
first day of each month with the state board of education, 
and the board of education of the school district in which 
such child resides; 
(6) The teacher shall be capable of performing com-
petently the functions entrusted to the teacher; 
(7) In applying for approval under this subsection 
a recognized church or religious denomination shall certify 
its objection to a regular public high school education and 
shall specify, in such detail as the state board of educa-
tion may reasonably require, the program of instruction that 
it intends to provide and no such program shall be approved 
unless it fully complies with standards therefor which shall 
be specified by the state board of education; 
(8) If the sponsors of an instructional program ap-
proved under this subsection fail to comply at any time with 
the provisions of this subsection, the state board of educa-
tion shall, after a written warning has been served and a 
period of three weeks allowed for compliance, rescind approval 
aof the programs, even though the two year approval period 
has not elapsed, and thereupon children attending such pro-
gram shall be admitted to a high school of the school 
district. 
KENTUCKY 
Sec. 159.010. Parent or custodian to send child to school-
age limits for compulsory attendance. 
Written permission for withdrawal before 
eighteenth birthday. 
(1) Except as aprovided in KRS 159.030, each parent, 
guardian or other person residing in the state and having 
in custody or charge any child between the ages of six (6) 
and sixteen (16) shall send the child to a regular public 
day school for the full term that the public school of the 
district in which the child resides is in session, or to 
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the public school that the board of education of the dis-
trict makes provision for the child to attend. A child's 
age is between six (6) and sixteen (16) when the child has 
reached his sixth birthday and has not passed his sixteenth 
birthday. 
Sec. 159.030. Exemptions from compulsory attendance. 
(l) The board of education of the district in which 
the child resides shall exempt from the requirement of 
attendance upon a regular public day school every child of 
compulsory school age: 
(a) Who is a graduate from an accredited or an approved 
four (4) year high school; or 
(b) Who is enrolled and in regular attendance in a pri-
vate, parochial, or church regular day school. It shall be 
the duty of each private, parochial or church regular day 
school to notify the local board of education of those stu-
dents in attendance at the school. If a school declines, 
for any reason, to notify the local board of education of 
those students in attendance, it shall so notify each stu-
dent's parent or legal guardian in writing, and it shall 
then be the duty of the parent or legal guardian to give 
proper notice to the local board of education; or 
(c) Who is less than seven (7) years old and is en-
rolled and in regular attendance in a private kindergarten-
nursey school; or 
(d) Whose physical or mental condition prevents or 
renders inadvisable attendance at school or application to 
study; or 
(e) Who is enrolled and in regular attendance in pri-
vate, parochial, or church school programs for exceptional 
children; or] 
(f) Who is enrolled and in regular attendance in a sta~e 
supported program for exceptional children; 
(g) For purposes of this section, "church school" shall 
mean a school operated as a ministry of a local church, 
group of churches, denomination, or association of churches 
on a nonprofit basis. 
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LOUISIANA 
Title 17, Sec. 221. Age of compulsory attendance; duty of 
parents. 
A. Every parent, tutor, or other person residing within 
the state of Louisiana, having control or charge of any child 
between the ages of seven and fifteen, both inclusive, i.e., 
from the seventh to the sixteenth birthday, shall send such 
child to a public or private day school provided that any 
child below the age of seven who legallly enrolls in school 
shall also be subject to the provisions of this Subpart 
shall also assure the attendance of such child in regularly 
assigned classes during regular school hours established 
by the school board. 
Title 17, Sec. 236. Definition of a school. 
For the purpose of this Chapter, a school is defined 
as an institution for the teaching of children, consisting 
of an adequate physical plant, whether owned or leased, in-
structional staff members, and students. For such an insti-
tution to be classified as a school, within the meaning of 
this Chapter, instructional staff members shall meet the 
following requirements: if a public day school or a nonpublic 
school which receives local, state, or federal funds or 
support, directly or indirectly, they shall be certified 
in accordance with rules established by the Board of Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education; if a nonpublic school which 
receives no local, state, or fediral funds or support, 
directly or indirectly, they shall meet such requirements 
as may be prescribed by the school or the church. In addi-
tion, any such institution, to be classified as a school, 
shall operate a minimum session of not less than one 
hundred eighty days. Solely for purposes of compulsory 
attendance in a nonpublic school, a child who participates 
in a home study program approved by the Board of Elementary 
and Secondary Education shall be considered in attendance 
at a day school; a home study program shall be approved if 
it offers a sustained curriculum of a quality at least 
equal to that offered by public schools at the same grade 
level. 
MAINE 
Title 20-A, Sec. 5001. Compulsory attendance. 
The following provisions apply to compulsory attendance. 
1. Requirement. Persons 7 years of age or older and 
under 17 years shall attend a public school during its 
regular annual session. 
2. Exceptions. Compulsory attendance shall not apply 
to the following. 
A. Persons who graduate from high school before their 
17th birthday; 
B. Persons who have: 
(l) Reached the age of 15 or completed the 9th 
grade; 
(2) Permission to leave school from their parent 
or legal guardian; 
(3) Permission to leave school from the school 
board or its designee; and 
(4) Agreed in writing with their parent or legal 
guardian and the school board or its designee 
to meet annually until their 17th birthday 
to review their educational needs; 
2. Equivalent instruction is as follows: 
(1) A child shall be excused from attending a public 
,,. v day school if he obtains equivalent instruction 
in a private school or in any other manner ar-
ranged for by the school committee or the board 
of directors and if the equivalent instruction 
is approved by the commissioner; and 
(2) If any request to be excused is denied by a 
local school committee or board of directors, 
an appeal may be filed with the commissioner. 
The commissioner shall review the request to 
be excused to determine whether the local school 
committee or board of directors has been correct 
in its finding that no equivalent instruction 
is available to the child, he shall approve 
the request to be excused; or 
Children shall be credited with attendance at a private 
school only if a certificate showing their names, residence 
and attendance at the school, signed by the person or persons 
in charge of the school, has been filed with the school 
officials of the administrative unit in which the children 
reside. 
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MARYLAND 
Sec. 7-301. Compulsory attendance. 
Who must attend.--Each child who resides in this State 
and is 6 years old or older and under 16 shall attend a pub-
lic school regularly during the entire school year unless 
the child is otherwise receiving regular, thorough instruc-
tion during the school year in the studies usually taught 
in the public schools to children of the same age. 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Chapter 76, Sec. 1. School Attendance Regulated. 
Every child between the minimum and maximum ages estab-
lished for school attendance by the board of education, 
except a child between fourteen and sixteen who· meets the 
requirements for the completion of the sixth grade of the 
public school as established by said board and who holds a 
permit for employment in private domestic service or service 
on a farm, under section eighty-six of chapter one hundred 
and forty-nine, and is regularly employed thereunder for at 
least six hours per day, or a child between fourteen and 
sixteen who meets said requirements and has the written per-
mission of the superintendent of schools of the town where 
he resides to engage in non-wage-earning employment at home, 
or a child over fourteen who holds a permit for employment 
in a cooperating employment, as provided in said section 
eighty-six, shall, subject to section fifteen, attend a pub-
lic day school in said town, or some other day school ap-
proved by the school committee, during the number of days 
required by the board of education in each school year, un-
less the child attends school in another town, for said num-
ber of days, under sections six to twelve, inclusive, or at-
tends an experimental school project established under an 
experimental school plan, as provided in section one G of 
chapter fifteen, but such attendance shall not be required 
of a child whose physical or mental condition is such as 
to render attendance inexpedient or impracticable subject 
to the provisions of section three of chapter seventy-one B 
or of a child granted an employment permit by the superin-
tendent of schools when such superintendent determines that 
the welfare of such child will be better served through the 
granting of such permit, or of a child who is being other-
wise instructed in a manner approved in advance by the 
superintendent or the school committee. 
MICHIGAN 
Sec. 15.41561. Compulsory education. Sec. 1561. 
Except as aprovided in subsections (2) and (3), every 
parent, guardian, or other person in this state having con-
trol and charge of a child from the age of 6 to the child's 
sixteenth birthday, shall send that child to the public 
schools during the entire school year ... 
Children not required to attend school. 
A child shall not be required to attend the public 
schools in the following cases: 
(a) A child who is attending regularly and is being 
taught in a state approved nonpublic school, which teaches 
subjects comparable to those taught in the public schools 
to children of corresponding age and grade, as determined 
by the course of study for the public schools of the 
district within which the nonpublic school is located ... 
MINNESOTA 
Sec. 120.10. Compulsory attendance. 
Subdivision 1. Ages and term. Every child between 
seven and 16 years of age shall attend a public school, or a 
private school, during the entire time that the school is in 
session during any school year. No child shall be required 
to attend a public school more than 200 days or their equiva-
lent, during any school year. 
Subd. 2. School. A school, to satisfy the requirements 
of compulsory attendance, must be one: (1) in which all the 
common branches are taught in the English language, from 
textbooks written in the English language, and taught by 
teachers whose qualifications are essentially equivalent to 
the minimum standards for public school teachers of the same 
grades or subjects and (2) which is in session each school 
year for at least 175 days aor their equivalent; provided 
that in a program of instruction for children of limited 
English proficiency, instruction and textbooks may be in the 
primary language of the children of limited English profi-
ciency enrolled therein. Any other language may be taught 
as provided in section 126.07. As used in this subdivision, 
the terms "children of limited English proficiency" and 
"primary language" shall have the meanings ascribed to them 
in section 126.262. 
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Subd. 3. Legitimate exemptions. A p~rent, guardian, 
or other person having control of a child may apply to a 
school district to have the child excused from attendance 
for the whole or any part of the time school is in session 
during any school year. Application may be made to any member 
of the board, a truant officer, a principal, or the superin-
tendent. The school board of the district in which the child 
resides may approve the application upon the following being 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of that board: 
(1) That the child's bodily or mental condition is such 
as to prevent his attendance at school or application to 
study for the period required; or 
(2) That the child has already completed the studies 
ordinarily required in the tenth grade; or 
(3) That it is the wish of the parent, guardian, or 
other person having control of the child, that he attend 
for a period or periods not exceeding in the aggregate three 
hours in any week, a school for religious instruction con-
ducted and maintained by some church, or association of 
churches, or any Sunday school association incorporated under 
the laws of this state, or any auxiliary thereof. This school 
for religious instruction shall be conducted and maintained 
in a place other than a public school building, and in no 
event in whole or in part, shall be conducted and maintained 
at public expense. However, a child may be absent from school 
on such days as the child attends upon instruction according 
to the ordinances of some church. 
MISSISSIPPI 
Sec. 37-13-91. Compulsory school attendance. 
(l) This section shall be referred to as the 
"Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law." 
(2) The following terms as used in this section are 
defined as follows: 
(a) "Parent" means the father or mother to whom a child 
has been born, or the father or mother by whom the child 
has been legally adopted. 
(b) "Guardian" means a guardian of the person of a child, 
other than a parent, who is legally appointed by a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 
(c) "Custodian" means any person having the present 
care or custody of a child, other than a parent or guardian 
of said child. 
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(d) "School day" means not less than five (5) and not 
more than eight (8) hours of actual teaching in which both 
teachers and pupils are in regular attendance for scheduled 
schoolwork. 
(e) 11 School" means any public school in this state or 
any nonpublic school in this state which is in session each 
school year for at least one hundred fifty-five (155) school 
days, except that the "nonpublic" school term shall be the 
number of days that each school shall require for promotion 
from grade to grade. 
(f) "Compulsory-school-age child" means a child who 
has attained or will attain the age of six (6) years on or 
before September 1 of the calendar year and who has not 
attained the age of fourteen (14) years on or before 
September 1 of the calendar year. Provided, however, that 
to allow for an orderly implementation of this subsection, 
this subsection shall take effect in a staggered fashion: 
(i) Beginning with the school year 1983-1984, every 
child who has attained the age of six (6) years but has not 
attained the age of eight (8) years on or before September 
1, 1983, shall attend school. 
(ii) Each school year after 1983-1984, one (1) year 
of age shall be added to the age of pupils who shall be re-
quired to attend school as hereinabove provided, so that 
by the school year 1989-1990, every child who shall be 
between the ages specified in this subsection shall attend 
school as hereinabove required. 
(g) "School attendance officer" means any full-time 
employee of the youth court or family court assigned to moni-
tor compulsory public school attendance, to investigate 
nonattendance of compulsory-school-age children and to 
counsel all school-age children to attend school. Such 
officer shall possess the qualifications required for those 
persons employed by the Mississippi Department of Youth 
Services and who are assigned duties and responsibilities 
primarily related to youth counseling, probation and after-
care programs. 
(h) "Appropriate school official" means the superin-
tendent of the school district or his designee or, in the 
case of a nonpublic school, the principal or the headmaster. 
(i) "Nonpublic school" for the purposes of this section 
shall mean an institution for the teaching of children, 
consisting of a physical plant, whether owned or leased, 
including a home, instructional staff members and students, 
and which is in session each year. This definition shall 
include, but not be limited to, Private, church, parochial 
and home instruction programs. 
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(3) A parent, guardian or custodian of a compulsory-
school-age child in this state shall cause such child to 
enroll in and attend a public school or legitimate nonpublic 
school for the period of time that such child is of com-
pulsory school age, except under the following circumstances: 
(a) When a compulsory-school-age child is physically, 
mentally or emotionally incapable of attending school as 
determined by the appropriate school official based upon 
sufficient medical documentation. 
(b) When a compulsory-school-age child is enrolled in 
and pursuing a course of special education, remedial educa-
tion or education for handicapped or physically or mentally 
disadvantaged children. 
(c) When a compulsory-school-age child is being edu-
cated in a legitimate home instruction program. 
The parent, guardian or custodian of a compulsory-school-
age child described in item (a), (b), or (c) of this sub-
section, or the parent, guardian or custodian of a compulsory-
school-age child attending any nonpublic school, or the 
appropriate school official for any or all such children 
attending such school shall complete a "certificate of en-
rollment" in order to facilitate the administration of this 
section. 
The form of the certificate of enrollment shall be pre-
pared by the state board of education and shall be designed 
to obtain the following information only: 
(i) The name, address and date of birth of the 
compulsory-school-age child; 
(ii) The name and address of the parent, guardian or 
custodian of the compulsory-school-age child; 
(iii) A simple description of the type of education the 
compulsory-school-age child is receiving and, if such child 
is enrolled in a nonpublic school, the name and address of 
such school; and 
(iv) The signature of the parent, guardian or custodian 
of the compulsory-school-age child or, for any or all com-
pulsory-school-age child or children attending a nonpublic 
school, the signature of the appropriate school official 
and the date signed. 
The state board of education shall furnish a sufficient 
number of such certificates of enrollment to each school 
attendance officer in the state. 
The certificate of enrollment shall be returned to the 
school attendance officer for the youth court or family court 
where such child resides on or before September 15 of each 
year. Any parent, guardian or custodian found by the school 
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attendance officer to be in noncompliance with this section 
shall, after written notice of such noncompliance by the 
school attendance officer, comply with this subsection within 
fifteen (15) days after such notice or be in violation of 
this section. 
For the purposes of this subsection, a legitimate non-
public school or legitimate home instruction program shall 
be those not operated or instituted for the purpose of avoid-
ing or circumventing the compulsory attendance law ... 
(9) Notwithstanding any provision or implication 
herein to the contrary, it is not the intention of this 
section to impair the primary right and the obligation of 
the parent or parents, or person or persons in loco parentis 
to a child, to choose the proper education and training for 
such child, and nothing in this section shall ever be con-
strued to grant, by implication or otherwise, to the State 
of Mississippi, any of its officers, agencies or subdivi-
sions any right or authority to control, manage, supervise 
or make any suggestion as to the control, management or 
supervision of any private or parochial school or institu-
tion for the education or training of children, of any kind 
whatsoever that is not a public school according to the laws 
of this state; and this section shall never be construed 
so as to grant, by implication or otherwise, any right or 
authority to any state agency or other entity to control, 
manage, supervise, provide for or affect the operation, 
management, program, curriculum, admissions policy or discipline 
of any such school or home instruction program. 
MISSOURI 
Sec. 167.031. School attendance compulsory, who may be 
excused. 
Every parent, guardian or other person in this state 
having charge, control or custody of a child between the 
ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause the child to 
attend regularly some day school, public, private, parochial 
or parish, not less than the entire school term of the school 
which the child attends or shall provide the child at home 
with regular daily instructions during the usual school hours 
which shall, in the judgment of a court of competent juris-
diction, be at least substantially equivalent to the instruc-
tion given children of like age in the day schools in the 
locality in which the child resides; except that 
(1) A child who, to the satisfaction of the superinten-
dent of schools of the district in which he resides, or if 
there is no superintendent then the chief school officer, 
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is determined to be mentally or physically incapacitated 
may be excused from attendance at school for the full time 
required, or any part thereof; or 
(2) A child between fourteen and sixteen years of age 
may be excused from attendance at school for the full time 
required, or any part thereof, by the superintendent of 
schools of the district, or if there is none then by a court 
of competent jurisdiction, when legal employment has been 
obtained by the child and found to be desirable, and after 
the parents or guardian of the child have been advised of 
the pending action. 
MONTANA 
Sec. 20-5-102. Compulsory enrollment and excuses. 
(1) Except as aprovided in subsection (2), any parent, 
guardian, or other person who is responsible for the care 
of any child who is 7 years of age or older prior to the 
first day of school in any school fiscal year shall cause 
the child to be instructed in the program prescribed by the 
board of public education pursuant to 20-7-111 until the 
later of the following dates: 
(a) the child's 16th birthday; 
(b) the date of completion of the work of the 8th grade; 
(2) Such parent, guardian, or other person shall enroll 
the child in the school assigned by the trustees of the dis-
trict within the first week of the school term or when he 
establishes residence in the district unless the child is: 
(a) enrolled in a school of another district or state 
under any of the tuition provisions of this title; 
(b) provided with supervised correspondence study or 
supervised home study under the transportation provisions 
of this title; 
(c) excused from enrollment in a school of the district 
when it is shown that his bodily or mental condition does 
not permit his attendance and the child cannot be instructed 
under the special education provisions of this title; 
(d) excused from compulsory school attendance upon a 
determination by a district judge that such attendance is 
not in the best interest of the child; 
(e) excused by the board of trustees upon a determina-
tion that such attendance by a child who has attained the 
age of 16 is not in the best interest of the child and the 
school; or 
(f) enrolled in a nonpublic or home school that complies 
with the provisions of 20-5-109. For the purposes of this sub-
section (f), a home school is the instruction by a parent of 
his child, stepchild, or ward in his residence and a nonpublic 
school includes a parochial, church, religious, or private 
school. 
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Sec. 20-5-109. Nonpublic school requirements for compulsory 
enrollment exemption. 
To qualify its students for exemption from compulsory 
enrollment under 20-5-102, a nonpublic or home school shall: 
(1) maintain records on pupil attendance and disease 
immunization and make such records available to the county 
superintendent of schools on request; 
(2) provide at least 180 days of pupil instruction or 
the equivalent in accordance wlth 20-1-301 and 20-l-302; 
(3) be housed in a building that complies with applicable 
local health and safety regulations; 
(4) provide an organized course of study that includes 
instruction in the subjects required of public schools as 
a basic instructional program pursuant to 20-7-111; and 
(5) in the case of home schools, notify the county 
superintendent of schools of the student's attendance at the 
school. 
NEBRASKA 
Sec. 79-201. Compulsory education; attendance required; 
length of school term. 
Every person residing in a school district within the 
State of Nebraska who has legal or actual charge or control 
of any child, not less than seven nor more than sixteen years 
of age, shall cause such chlld to attend regularly the 
public, private, denominational, or parochial day schools 
each day that such schools are open and ln session except 
when excused by school authorities, unless such child has 
been graduated from high school ... 
NEVADA 
Sec. 392.040 Child between 7 and 17 years of age: 
Attendance in publlc school. 
l. Except as otherwise provided by law, each parent, 
guardian, or other person in the State of Nevada having con-
trol or charge of any child between the ages of 7 and 17 
years shall send such child to a public school during all 
the time such public school is in session in the school 
district in which such child resides ... 
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Sec. 392.070. Children recelvlng equivalent, approved 
instruction exempted from attendance. 
Attendance required by the provisions of NRS 392.040 
shall be excused when satisfactory written evidence is pre-
sented to the board of trustees of the school district in 
which the child resides that the child is receiving at home 
or in some other school equivalent inBtruction of the kind 
and amount approved by the state board of education. 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Sec. 193:1. Duty of Pupil. 
Every child between 6 and 16 years of age shall attend 
the public school within the district or a public school 
outside the district to which he is assigned or an approved 
private school during all the time the public schools are 
in session, unless he has been excused from attending on the 
ground that his physical or mental condition is such as to 
prevent his attendance or to make it undesirable ... 
NEW JERSEY 
Sec. l8A:38-25. Attendance required of children between 
six and 16; exceptions. 
Every parent, guardian or other person having custody 
and control of a child between the ages of six and 16 years 
shall cause such child regularly to attend the public schools 
of the district or a day school in which there is given in-
struction equivalent to that provided in the public schools 
for children of similar grades and attainments or to receive 
equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school. 
NEW MEXICO 
Sec. 22-1-2. Definitions. 
As used 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
in the Public School Code. 
"state board" means the state board of education; 
"state superintendent" means the superintendent of 
public instruction; 
"department of education" means the state department 
of public education; 
"certified school instructor" means any person holding 
a valid certificate authorizing the person to teach, 
supervise an instructional program, counsel or 
provide special instructional services in the public 
schools of the state; 
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E. "certified school administrator" means any person 
holding a valid certificate authorizing the person 
to administer in the public schools of the state; 
F. "certified school personnel" means certified school 
instructors and certified school administrators; 
G. "certificate" means a certificate issued by the state 
board authorizing a person to teach, supervise an 
instructional program, counsel, provide special 
instructional services or administer in the public 
schools of the state; 
H. "chief" or "director" means the director of public 
school finance unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise; 
I. "private school" means a school offering programs 
of instruction not under the control, supervision 
or management of a local school board exclusive of 
home instruction offered by the parent, guardian 
or one having custody of the student; 
J. "school district" means an area of land established 
as a political subdivision of the state for the 
administration of public schools and segregated 
geographically for taxation and bonding purposes; 
K. "local school board" means the governing body of a 
school district; 
L. "public school" means that part of a school district 
which is a single attendance center where instruc-
tion is offered by a certified school instructor 
or a group of certified school instructors and is 
discernible as a building or group of buildings 
generally recognized as either an elementary, 
secondary, junior high or high school or any 
combination thereof; 
M. "school year" means the total number of teaching days 
offered by public schools in a school district during 
a period of twelve consecutive months; 
N. "consolidation" means the combination of part or all 
of the geographical area of an existing school 
district with part or all of the geographical area 
of one or more contiguous existing school districts; 
0. "consolidated school district" means a school district 
created by order of the state board by combining 
part or all of the geographical area of an existing 
school district with part or all of the geograph-
ical area of one or more contiguous existing 
school districts; 
P. "state institution" means the New Mexico military 
institute, the New Mexico school for the visually 
handicapped, the New Mexico school for the deaf, 
the New Mexico boys' school, the New Mexico youth 
diagnostic center, the Los Lunas hospital and train-
ing school, the Fort Stanton hospital and training 
school, the New Mexico state hospital or the Carrie 
Tingley crippled children's hospital ... 
Sec. 22-12-2. Compulsory school attendance; responsibility. 
A. Any qualified student and any person who because of 
age is eligible to become a qualified student as defined by 
the Public School Finance Act [22-8-1 to 22-8-42 NMSA 1978] 
until attaining the age of majority shall attend a public 
school, a private school or a state institution. 
NEW YORK 
Sec. 3204. Instruction required. 
1. Place of instruction. A minor required to attend 
upon instruction by the provisions of part one of this 
article may attend at a public school or elsewhere. The re-
quirements of this section shall apply to such a minor, 
irrespective of the place of instruction. 
2. Quality and language of instruction; text-books. 
Instruction may be given only by a competent teacher. In 
the teaching of the subjects of instruction prescribed by 
this section, English shall be the language of instruction, 
and text-books used shall be written in English, except that 
for a period of three years, which period may be extended 
by the commissioner with respect to individual pupils, upon 
application thereof by the appropriate school authorities, 
to a period not in excess of six years, from the date of en-
rollment in school, pupils who, by reason of foreign birth 
or ancestry have limited English proficiency, shall be 
provided with instructional programs as specified in subdi-
vision two-a of this section and the regulations of the com-
missioner. The purpose of providing such pupils with instruc-
tion shall be to enable them to develop academically while 
achieving competence in the English language. Instruction 
given to a minor elsewhere than at a public school shall be 
at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given 
to minors of like age and attainments at the public schools 
of the city or district where the minor resides. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Sec. 115C-378. Children between seven and 16 required 
to attend. 
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Every parent, guardian or other person in this State 
having charge or control of a child between the ages of seven 
and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school con-
tinuously for a period equal to the time which the public 
school to which the child is assigned shall be in session. 
No person shall encourage, entice or counsel any such child 
to be unlawfully absent from school. 
The principal, superintendent, or teacher who is in 
charge of such school shall have the right to excuse a child 
temporarily from attendance on account of sickness or other 
unavoidable cause which does not constitute unlawful absence 
as defined by the State Board of Education. The term "school" 
as used herein is defined to embrace all public schools and 
such nonpublic schools as have teachers and curricula that 
are approved by the State Board of Education. 
All nonpublic schools_ receiving and instructing children 
of a compulsory school age shall be required to keep such 
records of attendance and render such reports of the atten-
dance of such children and maintain such minimum curriculum 
standards as are required of public schools; and attendance 
upon such schools, if the school refuses or neglects to keep 
such records or to render such reports, shall not be accepted 
in lieu of attendance upon the public school of the district 
to which the child shall be assigned: Provided, that instruc-
tion in a nonpublic school shall not be regarded as meeting 
the requirements of the law unless the courses of instruc-
tion run concurrently with the term of the public school in 
the district and extend for at least as long a term ... 
Sec. ll5C-548. Attendance; health and safety regulations. 
Each private church school or school of religious charter 
shall make, and maintain annual attendance and disease 
immunization records for each pupil enrolled and regularly 
attending classes. Attendance by a child at any school to 
which this Part relates and which complies with this Part 
shall satisfy the requirements of compulsory school atten-
dance: Provided, however, that such school operates on a 
regular schedule, excluding reasonable holidays and vaca-
tions, during at least nine calendar months of the year. 
Each school shall be subject to reasonable fire, health and 
safety inspections by State, county and municipal authori-
ties as required by law. 
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Sec. ll5C-549. Standardized testing requirements. 
Each private church school or school of religious charter 
shall administer, at least once in each school year, a 
nationally standardized test or other nationally standardized 
equivalent measurement selected by the chief administrative 
officer of such school, to all students enrolled or regularly 
attending grades one, two, three, six and nine. The nation-
ally standar~ized test or other equivalent measurement selected 
must measure achievement in the areas of English grammar, 
reading, spelling and mathematics. Each school shall make 
and maintain records of the results achieved by its students. 
For one year after the testing, all records shall be made 
available, subject to the provision of G.S. ll5C-196, at the 
principal office of such school, at all reasonable times, 
for annual inspection by a duly authorized representative 
of the State of North Carolina. 
Sec. 115C-550. High School competency testing. 
To assure that all high school graduates possess those 
minimum skills and that knowledge thought necessary to func-
tion in society, each private church school or school of 
religious charter shall administer at least once in each school 
year, a nationally standardized test or other nationally 
standardized equivalent measure selected by the chief ad-
ministrative officer of such school, to all students enrolled 
and regularly attending the eleventh grade. The nationally 
standardized test or other equivalent measurement selected 
must measure competencies in the verbal and quantitative 
areas. Each private church school or school of religious 
charter shall establish a minimum score which must be at-
tained by a student on the selected test in order to be 
graduated from high school. For one year after the testing 
all records shall be made available, subject to the provision 
of G.S.ll5C-196, at the principal office of such school, at 
all reasonable times, for annual inspection by a duly 
authorized representative of the State of North Carolina. 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Sec. 15-34.1-01. Compulsory attendance. 
Every parent, guardian, or other person who resides with-
in any school district, or who resides upon any government 
base or installation without any school district, and has 
control over any educable child of an age of seven years to 
sixteen years who does not fall under the provisions of 
sections 15-34.1-02 or 15-34.1-03, shall send or take such 
child to a public school each year during the entire time 
such school is in session. 
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Sec. 15-34.1-03. Compulsory attendance--Exceptions. 
The parent, guardian, or other person having control of 
a child required to attend school ~Y the provisions of this 
chapter shall be excused by the school board from causing 
the child to attend school whenever it shall be shown to the 
satisfaction of the board, subject to appeal as provided 
·by law, that one of the following reasons exists: 
l. That the child is in attendance for the same length 
of time at a parochial or private school approved 
by the county superintendent of schools and the 
superintendent of public instruction. No such school 
shall be approved unless the teachers therein are 
legally certificated in the state of North Dakota 
in accordance with section 15-41-25 and chapter 15-36, 
the subjects offered are in accordance with sections 
15-38-07, 15-41-06, and 15-41-24, and such school 
is in compliance with all municipal and state health, 
fire, and safety laws ... 
OHIO 
Sec. 3321.04. Compulsory attendance. 
Every parent of any child of compulsory school age who 
is not employed under an age and schooling certificate must 
send such child to a school or a special education program 
that conforms to the minimum standards prescribed by the 
state board of education, for the full time the school or 
program attended is in session, which shall not be for less 
than thirty-two weeks per school year. Such attendance must 
begin within the first week of the school term or program 
or within one week of the date on which the child begins to 
reside in the district or within one week after his with-
drawal from employment. 
For the purpose of operating a school or program on a 
trimester plan, "full time the school attended is in session," 
as used in this section means the two trimesters to which 
the child is assigned by the board of education. For the 
purpose of operating a school or program on a quarterly plan, 
"full time the school attended is in session," as used in 
this section, means the three quarters to which the child 
is assigned by the board of education. For the purpose of' 
operating a school or program on a pentamester plan, "full 
time the school is in session," as used in this section, 
means the four pentamesters to which the child is assigned 
by the board of education. 
Excuses from future attendance at or past absence from 
school or a special education program may be granted for the 
causes, by the authorities, and under the following 
conditions: 
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(A) The superintendent of schools of the city, exempted 
village, or county school district in which the child resides 
may excuse him from attendance for any part of the remainder 
of the current school year upon satisfactory showing of 
either of the following facts: 
(l) That his bodily or mental condition does not permit 
his attendance at school or a special education program 
during such period; this fact is certified in writing by a 
licensed physician or, in the case of a mental condition, 
by a licensed physician, a licensed psychologist, licensed 
school psychologist or a certificated school psychologist; 
and provision is made for appropriate instruction of the 
child, in accordance with Chapter 3323. of the Revised Code; 
(2) That he is being instructed at home by a person 
qualified to teach the branches in which instruction is re-
quired, and such additional branches, as the advancement and 
needs of the child may, in the opinion of such superintendent, 
require. In each such case the issuing superintendent shall 
file in his office, with a copy of the excuse, papers showing 
how the inability of the child to attend school or a special 
education program or the qualifications of the person in-
structing the child at home were determined. All such excuses 
shall become void and subject to recall upon the removal of 
the disability of the child or the cessation of proper home 
instruction; and thereupon the child or his parents may be 
proceeded against after due notice whether such excuse be 
recalled or not ... 
OKLAHOMA 
Title 70, Sec. 10-105. Neglect or refusal to compel child 
to attend school. 
A. It shall be unlawful for a parent, guardian, custo-
dian or other person having control of a child who is over 
the age of seven (7) years and under the age of eighteen 
{18) years, and who has not finished four (4) years of high 
school work, to neglect or refuse to cause or compel such 
child to attend and comply with the rules of some public, 
private or other school, unless other means of edu0ation are 
provided for the full term the schools of the district are 
in session; and it shall be unlawful for any child who is 
over the age of sixteen (16) years and under the age of 
eighteen (18) years, and who has not finished four (4) years 
of high school work, to neglect or refuse +o attend and com-
ply with the rules of some public, private or other school, 
or receive an education by other means for the full term the 
schools of the district are in session ... 
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OREGON 
Sec. 339.010. School attendance required; age limits. 
Except as provided in ORS 339.030, all children between 
the ages of 7 and 18 years who have not completed the 12th 
grade are required to attend regularly a public full-time 
school of the school district in which the child resides. 
Sec. 339.020. Duty to send children to school. 
Except as provided in ORS 339.030, every person having 
control of any child between the ages of 7 and 18 years who 
has not completed the 12th grade is required to send such 
child to and maintain such child in regular attendance at 
a public full-time school during the entire school term. 
Sec. 339.030. Exemptions from compulsory school attendance. 
In the following cases, children shall not be required 
to attend public full-time schools: 
(l) Children between the ages of 16 and 18 years who 
are lawfully employed full time, who are lawfully employed 
part time and in school part time, who are attending a com-
munity college, or are engaged in activities equivalent to 
the preceding. 
(2) Children being taught in a private or parochial 
school in the courses of study usually taught in grades 1 
through 12 in the public schools and in attendance for a 
period equivalent to that required of children attending 
public schools. 
(3) Children proving to the satisfaction of the district 
school board that they have acquired equivalent knowledge 
to that acquired in the courses of study taught in grades 
1 through 12 in the public schools. 
(4) Upon determination pursuant to criteria of the State 
Board of Education that a child is suffering from physical 
or mental illness or disease of such severity as to make his 
presence in a school facility or his travel to and from such 
facility impossible or dangerous to his health or the health 
of others, the public schools shall provide the child either 
horne, hospital, institutional or other regularly scheduled 
and suitable instruction meeting standards of the State Board 
of Education unless such child is receiving suitable in-
struction in a state or regional facility or institution. 
(5) Children between the ages of 7 and 10 years whose 
parents live more than one and one-half miles, and children 
over 10 years of age whose parents live more than three 
miles, by the nearest traveled road, from some public school 
and for whom the school district does not provide 
transportation over the distances specified in this sub-
section. 
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(6) Children being taught for a period equivalent to 
that required of children attending public schools by a 
parent or private teacher the courses of study usually taught 
in grades 1 through 12 in the public school. 
(a) Before the children are taught by a parent or pri-
vate teacher, the parent or teacher must receive written 
permission from the executive officer of the resident school 
district. The permission shall not extend beyond the end 
of the school year in which permission is granted. If per-
mission is not granted, the person having legal custody of 
the children may appeal the decision to the school board 
of the resident district. 
(b) Children being taught by a parent or private teacher 
must be examined in the work covered. Such examinations 
shall be prepared by the State Board of Education and pro-
vided to school districts upon request. If the executive 
officer of the administrative office determines after exami-
nation that the children are not being taught properly, he 
shall order the person having control of the children to send 
them to school for the remainder of the school year ... 
PENNSYLVANIA 
Section 13-1327. Compulsory school attendance 
Every child of compulsory school age having a legal resi-
dence in this Commonwealth, as provided in this article, 
and every migratory child of compulsory school age, is re-
quired to attend a day school in which the subjects and ac-
tivities prescribed by the standards of the State Board of 
Education are taught in the English language. In lieu of 
such school attendance, any child fifteen years of age with 
the approval of the district superintendent and the approval 
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and any child 
sixteen years of age with the approval of the district 
superintendent of schools, may enroll as a day student in 
a private trade school or in a private business school licensed 
by the Department of Public Instruction, or in a trade or 
business school, or department operated by a local school 
district or districts. Such modified program offered in a 
public school must meet the standards prescribed by the State 
Board of Education or the State Board for Vocational Educa-
tion. Every parent, guardian, or other person having control 
or charge of any child or children of compulsory school age 
is required to send such child or children to a day school 
in which the subjects and activities prescribed by the 
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standard of the State Board of Education are taught in the 
English language. Such parent, guardian, or other person 
having control or charge of any child or children, fifteen 
or sixteen years of age, in accordance with the provisions 
of this act, may send such child or children to a private 
trade school or private business school licensed by the 
Department of Public Instruction, or to a trade or business 
school, or department operated by a local school district or 
districts. Such modified program offered in a public school 
must meet the standards prescribed by the State Board of 
Education or the State Board for Vocational Education. Such 
child or children shall attend such school continuously 
through the entire term, during which the public schools in 
their respective districts shall be in session, or in cases 
of children of migrant laborers during the time the schools 
are in session in the districts in which such children are 
temporarily domiciled. The financial responsibility for 
the education of such children of migrant laborers shall re-
main with the school district in which such children of mi-
grant laborers are temporarily domiciled; except in the case 
of special schools or classes conducted by an intermediate 
unit and approved by the Department of Public Instruction 
or conducted by the Department of Public Instruction. The 
certificate of any principal or teacher of a private school, 
or of any institution for the education of children, in 
which the subjects and activities prescribed by the standards 
of the State Board of Education are taught in the English 
language, setting forth that the work of said school is in 
compliance with the provisions of this act, shall be suf-
ficient and satisfactory evidence thereof. Regular daily 
instruction in the English language, for the time herein 
required, by a properly qualified private tutor, shall be 
considered as complying with the provisions of this section, 
if such instruction is satisfactory to the proper district 
superintendent of schools. 
RHODE ISLAND 
Sec. 16-19-1. Attendance required--Excuses for nonattendance. 
Every child who has completed seven (7) years of life 
and has not completed sixteen (16) years of life shall regu-
larly attend some public day school during all the days and 
hours that the public schools are in session in the city or 
town wherein the educational facilities are approved by the 
school committee of the city or town wherein the child re-
sides; and every person having under his control a child as 
~bove described in this section shall cause such child tn 
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attend school as required by the above stated prov1s1ons of 
this section, and for every neglect of such duty the person 
having control of such child shall be fined not exceeding 
twenty dollars ($20.00); provided, that if the person so 
charged shall prove or shall present a certificate made by 
or under the direction of the school committee of the city 
or town wherein he resides, setting forth that the child has 
attended for the required period of time a private day school 
or received instruction approved by the school committee of 
the city or town where said private school was located or 
where said private instruction was given; or that the phys-. 
ical or mental condition of the child was such as to render 
his attendance at school inexpedient or impracticable; or 
that the child was excluded from school by virtue of some 
general law or regulation--then such attendance shall not 
be obligatory nor shall such penalty be incurred; but nothing 
in this section shall be construed to allow the absence or 
irregular attendance of any child who is enrolled as a mem-
ber of any school, or of any child sent to school by the 
person having control of such child. 
Sec. 16-19-2. Approval of private schools -- Requirements 
Review. 
For the purposes of this chapter the school committee 
shall approve a private school or private instruction only 
when it complies with the following requirements, namely: 
That the period of attendance of the pupils in such school 
or on such private instruction is substantially equal to that 
required by law in public schools; that registers are kept 
and returned to thE' school comrni t tee, the superintendent of 
schools, truant officers and the department of education 
in relation to the attendance of pupils, are made the same 
as by the public schools; that reading, writing, geography, 
arithmetic, the history of the United States, the history 
of Rhode Island, and the principles of American government 
shall be taught in the English language substantially to the 
same extent as such subjects are required to be taught in 
the public schools, and that the teaching of the English 
language and of other subjects indicated herein shall be 
thorough and efficient; provided, however, that nothing 
herein contained shall be construed or operate to deny the 
right to teach in such private schools or on such private 
instructions any of said subjects or any other subject in 
any other language in addition to the teaching in English 
as prescribed herein; provided, further, that any interested 
person resident in any city or town aggrieved by the action 
of the school committee of such city or town either in 
approving or refusing to approve such private school or 
such private instruction, may appeal therefrom to the depart-
ment of education. The department of education, after notice 
to the parties interested of the time and place of hearing, 
shall examine and decide the same without cost to the parties. 
The decision of the board of regents for education shall be 
final. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
Sec. 59-65-10. Responsibility of parent or guardian. 
All parents or guardians shall cause their children or 
wards who are in the age group of seven to sixteen years, 
inclusive, to regularly att~nd a public or private school 
of this State which has been approved by the State Board of 
Education or a member school of the South Carolina Inde-
pendent Schools' Association or some similar organization, 
or a parochial or denominational school, or other programs 
which have been approved by the State Board of Education. 
Sec. 59-65-40. Instruction at place other than school. 
Instruction during the school term at a place other than 
a school may be substituted for school attendance; provided, 
such instruction is approved by the State Board of Education 
as substantially equivalent to instruction given to children 
of like ages in the public or private schools where such 
children reside. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
Sec. 13-27-1. Responsibility of person controlling child--
Ages of compulsory attendance--Entire school 
term. 
Every person having under his control a child of the age 
of seven years and not exceeding the age of sixteen years, 
shall annually cause such child to regularly attend some 
public or nonpublic elementary school for the entire term 
during which the public school in the district in which such 
person resides, or the school to which such child is assigned 
to attend, is in session, until the child shall have com-
pleted the first eight grades, or shall have reached the age 
of sixteen years, unless excused as hereinafter provided. 
Any child under age seven enrolled in any elementary 
school shall be subject to the compulsory attendance statutes 
of this state. 
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Sec. 13-27-3. Child excused if provided competent instruction 
--Application--Restrictions--Testing--Visitation. 
A child shall be excused from school attendance, pursuant 
to Sec. 13-27-2, because the child is otherwise provided 
with competent alternative instruction for an equivalent 
period of time, as in the public schools, in the basic skills 
of language arts and mathematics. The parent or guardian 
of the child shall identify in the application the place where 
the child shall be instructed and the individual or indi-
viduals who will instruct the child. The individuals are 
not required to be certified but the state superintendent 
of elementary and secondary education may investigate and 
determine if the instruction is being provided by a competent 
person. Failure to provide instruction by a competent person 
shall be grounds for the school board, upon thirty days 
notice, to revoke the excuse from school attendance. No 
individual may instruct more tt1an twenty-two children. All 
instructions shall be given so as to lead to a mastery of 
the English language. The child shall annually take a na-
tionally standardized achievement test of the basic skills. 
The test shall be the same test designated to be used in the 
public school district where the child is instructed and may 
be monitored by a designee from the local school district 
where the child is instructed. The test shall be provided 
by the school district where the child is instructed. The 
superintendent of elementary and secondary education or his 
designee may visit any alternative education program at 
reasonable tim8s during the school year. 
TENNESSEE 
Sec. 49-6-3001. School age. 
(a) The public schools shall be free to all persons 
above the age of six (6) years, or who will become six (6) 
years of age on or before September 30th, residing within 
the state. 
(b)(l) Any child residing within the state who is six 
(6) years of age of who will become six (6) years of age on 
or before September 30th may enter at the beginning of the 
term the public school designated by the local board of 
education having appropriate jurisdiction; provided, he 
enters within thirty (30) days after the opening day of the 
term. 
(2} Any child who will not become six (6) years of 
age until after December 31st shall not enter school during 
that school year, provided, however, that school systems 
having semiannual promotions may admit at the beginning of 
any semester children who will become six (6) years of age 
within sixty (60) days following the opening of the semester. 
(3) Where a pupil meets the requirements of the state 
board of education for transfer and/or admission purposes, 
as determined by the state commissioner of education, such 
pupil may be admitted by a local board of education, notwith-
standing any other provision or act to the contrary. 
(c)(l) Every parent, guardian or other person residing 
within the state of Tennessee, having control or charge of 
any child or children between the ages of seven (7) and 
sixteen (16) years, both inclusive, shall cause such child 
or children to attend public or private day school, and in 
event of failure to do so, shall be subject to the penalties 
hereinafter provided. 
Sec. 49-50-801. Church-related schools. 
(a) As used in this section, unless the context other-
wise requires, 11 church-related school 11 means a school 
operated by denominational, parochial or other bonafide 
church organizations, which are required to meet the stan-
dards of accreditation or membership of the Tennessee 
Association of Christian Schools, the Tennessee Association 
of Independent Schools, the Southern Association of Colleges 
and Schools, or the Tennessee Association of Non-Public 
Academic Schools. 
(b) The state board of education and local boards of 
education are prohibited from regulating the selection of 
faculty or textbooks or the establishment of a curriculum 
in church-related schools. 
(c) The state board of education and local boards of 
education shall not prohibit or impede the transfer of a 
student from a church-related school to a public school of 
this state. Local boards may, however, place students trans-
ferring from a church-related school to a public school in 
a grade level based upon the student's performance on a test 
administered by the board for that purpose. In local school 
systems where the local board of education requires tests 
for students transferring to that system from another public 
school system, the same test shall be administered to stu-
dents transferring to such system from church-related schools. 
Provided, however, church-related schools shall be conducted 
for the same length of term as public schools. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as 
prohibiting church-related schools from voluntarily seeking 
approval by the state board of education, nor prohibiting 
the state board of education from extending such approval 
when it is voluntarily sought. 
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TEXAS 
Sec. 21.032. Compulsory Attendance. 
Unless specifically exempted by Section 21.033 of this 
code or under other laws, every child in the state who is 
as much as seven years of age, or who is less than seven 
years of age and has previously been enrolled in first grade, 
and not more than 17 years of age shall be required to attend 
the public schools in the district of his residence or in 
some other district to which he may be transferred as pro-
vided or authorized by law a minimum of 165 days of the 
regular school term of the district in which the child resides 
or to which he has been transferred ... 
Sec. 21.033. ExempLions. 
(a) The following classes of children are exempt from 
the requirements of compulsory attendance: 
(l) any child in attendance upon a private or parochial 
school which shall include in its course a study of good 
citizenship ... 
UTAH 
Sec. 53-24-1. Minimum time--Exceptions, excuses and 
exemptions. 
Every parent, guardian or other person having control of any 
minor between six and eighteen years of age shall be re-
quired to send such minor to a public or regularly established 
private school during the regularly established school year 
of the district in which he resides; provided: 
a. That any minor over the age of sixteen years, who 
has completed the eighth grade or whose services are required 
for the support of a mother or invalid father may be legally 
excused to enter employment, but if such minor is so excused, 
the parent, guardian or other person shall be required to 
send such minor to a part-time school or class at least one 
hundred forty-four hours per year. 
b. That in each year the parent, guardian or other per-
son having control of any such minor may be excused by the 
board of education of the district from sending such minor. 
to a public, regularly established private or part-time 
school or class for any of the following reasons: 
(1) That such minor has already completed the work 
of a senior high school. 
(2) That such minor is taught at home in the branches 
prescribed by law for the same length of time as children 
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are required by law to be taught in the district schools; 
provided, that a minor legally excused to enter employment 
may be excused from attending a part-time school or class 
for the reason that such minor is taught at home the re-
quired number of hours ... 
VERMONT 
Sec. 1121. Attendance by children of school age required 
A person having the control of a child between the ages 
of seven and sixteen years shall cause the child to attend 
an approved public school or an approved or reporting pri-
vate school for the full number of days for which that school 
is held, unless: 
(l) the child is mentally or physically unable so to 
attend; or 
(2) is being furnished with an approved program of hon~ 
instruction; or 
(3) has completed the tenth grade; or 
(4) is excused by the superintendent or a majority of 
the school directors as provided in this chapter. 
VIRGINIA 
Sec. 22.1-254. Ages of children required to attend. 
Every parent, guardian, or other person in the Common-
wealth having control or charge of any child who will have 
reached the fifth birthday on or before October 31 of the 
1980-1981 school year and September 30 of any school year 
thereafter and who has not passed the seventeenth birthday 
shall, during the period of each year the public schools 
are in session and for the same number of days and hours 
per day as the public schools, send such child to a public 
school or to a private, denominational or parochial school 
or have such child taught by a tutor or teacher of qualifi-
cations prescribed by the Board of Education and approved 
by the division superintendent or provide for home instruc-
tion of such child as described in Sec. 22.1-254.1. 
Instruction in the home of a child or children by the 
parent, guardian or other person having control or charge 
of such child or children shall not be classified or defined 
as a private, denominational or parochial school. 
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Sec. 22.1-254.1. Declaration of policy; requirements for 
home instruction of children. 
A. When the requirements of this section have been 
satisfied, instruction of children by their parents 
in their home is an acceptable alternative form of education 
under the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Any parent 
of any child who will have reached the fifth birthday on or 
before September 30 of any school year and who has not passed 
the seventeenth birthday may elect to provide home instruc-
tion in lieu of school attendance if he (i) holds a bacca-
laureate degree in any subject from an accredited institution 
of higher education; or (ii) is a teacher of qualifications 
prescribed by the Board of Education; or (iii) has enrolled 
the child or children in a correspondence course approved 
by the Board of Education; or (iv) provides a program of 
study or curriculum which, in the judgment of the division 
superintendent, includes the standards of learning objec-
tives adopted by the Board of Education for language arts 
and mathematics and provides evidence that the parent is 
able to provide an adequate education for the child. 
B. Any parent who elects to provide home instruction 
in lieu of school attendance shall annually notify the divi-
sion superintendent in August of his intention to so instruct 
the child and provide a description of the curriculum to be 
followed for the coming year and evidence of having met one 
of the criteria for providing home instruction as required 
by paragraph A of this section. The division superintendent 
shall notify the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the 
persons approved to provide home instruction. 
C. The parent who elects to provide home instruction 
shall provide the division superintendent by August 1 
following the school year in which the child has received 
home instruction with either (i) evidence that the child has 
attained a composite score above the fortieth percentile on 
a battery of achievement tests which have been approved by 
the Board of Education for use in the public schools or (ii) 
an evaluation or assessment which, in the judgment of the 
division superintendent, indicates that the child is achieving 
an adequate level of educational growth and progress. 
In the event that evidence of progress as required in 
this paragraph is not provided by the parent, home instruc-
tion shall cease and the parent shall make other arrange-
ments for the education of the child which comply 
with Sec. 22.1-254 of the Code of Virginia. 
D. For purposes of this section, "parent" means the 
biological parent or adoptive parent, guardian or other 
person having control or charge of a child. 
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Nothing in this section shall prohibit a pupil and his 
parents from obtaining an excuse from school ~ttendance by 
reason of bona fine religious training or belief pursuant 
to Sec. 22.1-257 of this Code. 
E. Any party aggrieved by a decision of the division 
superintendent may appeal his decision within thirty days 
to an·independent hear·ing officer. The independent hearing 
officer shall be chosen from the list maintained by the 
Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court for hearing appeals 
of the placements of handicapped children. The costs of the 
hearing shall be borne by the party appealing. 
WASHINGTON 
Sec. 28A.27.010. Attendance mandatory--Age--Persons having 
custody shall cause child to attend 
public school unless excused--Excused 
temporary absences 
All parents, guardians and the persons in this state 
having custody of any child eight years of age and under 
fifteen years of age shall cause such child to attend the 
public school of the district in which the child resides for 
the full time when such school may be in session or to attend 
a private school for the same time unless the school district 
superintendent of the district in which the child resides 
shall have excused such child from attendance because the 
child is physi~ally or mentally unable to attend school, is 
attending a residential school operated by the department 
of social and health services, or has been excused upon the 
request of his or her parents, guardians, or persons in this 
state having custody of any such child, for purposes agreed 
upon by the school authorities and the parent, guardian or 
custodian: Provided, That such excused absences shall not 
be permitted if deemed to cause a serious adverse effect 
upon the student's educational progress: Provided further, 
That students excused for such temporary absences may be 
claimed as full time equivalent students to the extent they 
would otherwise have been so claimed for the purposes of 
RCW 28A.4l.l30 and 2BA.4l.l40, as now or hereafter amended, 
and shall not affect school district compliance with the 
provisions of RCW 28A.58.-754, as now or hereafter amended. 
All parents, guardians and other persons in this state 
having custody of any child fifteen years of age and under 
eighteen years of age shall cause such child to attend the 
public school of the district in which the child resides for 
the full time when such school may be in session or to at-
tend a private school for the same time excepting when the 
-school district superintendent determines that such child 
is physically or mentally unable to attend school or has 
already attained a reasonable proficiency in the branches 
required by law to be taught in the first nine grades of the 
public schools of this state, or the child has been tempo-
rarily excused in accordance with this section, or the child 
is regularly and lawfully engaged in a useful or remunerative 
occupation, or the child is attending a residential school 
operated by the department of social and health services, 
or the child has already met graduation requirements in 
accordance with state board of education rules and regula-
tions, or the child has received a certificate of educational 
competence under rules and regulations established by the 
state board of education under RCW 28A.04.135. 
An approved private and/or parochial school for the 
purposes of this section shall be one approved under regula-
tions established by the state board of education pursuant 
to RCW 28A.04.120 as now or hereafter amended. 
WEST VIRGINIA 
Sec. 18-8-1. Commencement and termination of compulsory 
school attendance; exemptions. 
Compulsory school attendance shall begin with the seventh 
birthday and continue to the sixteenth birthday. 
Exemption from the foregoing requirements of compulsory 
public school attendance shall be made on behalf of any child 
for the following causes or conditions, each such cause or 
condition being subject to confirmation by the attendance 
authority of the county: 
Exemption A. Instruction in a private, parochial or 
other approved school.--Such instruction shall be in a school 
approved by the county board of education and for a time 
equal to the school term of the county for the year. In 
all such schools it shall be the duty of the principal or 
other person in control, upon the request of the county 
superintendent of schools, to furnish to the county board 
of education such information and records as may be required 
with respect to attendance, instruction and progress of 
pupils enrolled between the ages of seven and sixteen years. 
Exemption B. Instruction in home or other approved 
place.--Such instruction shall be in the home of such child 
or children or at some other place approved by the county 
board of education and for a time equal to the school term 
of the county. The instruction in such cases shall be con-
ducted by a person or persons who, in the judgment of the 
county ~uperintendent and county board of education, are 
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qualified to give instruction in subjects required to be 
taught in the free elementary schools of the State. It shall 
be the duty of the person or persons giving the instruction, 
upon request of the county superintendent, to furnish to the 
county board of education, such information and records as 
may be required from time to time with respect to attendance, 
instruction and progress of pupils enrolled between the 
ages of seven and sixteen years receiving such 
instruction ... 
Exemption K. Alternative private, parochial, church or 
religious school instruction.--In lieu of the provisions of 
Exemption A hereinabove, exemption shall be made for any child 
attending any private school, parochial school, church school, 
school operated by a religious order, or other nonpublic 
school which elects to comply with the provisions of article 
twenty-eight [Sec. 18-18-1 et seq.], chapter eighteen of the 
Code of West Virginia. 
The completion of the eighth grade shall not exempt any 
child under sixteen years of age from the compulsory atten-
dance provision of this article: Provided, that there is 
a public high school or other public school of advanced 
grades or a school bus providing free transportation to any 
such school the route of which is within two miles of the 
child's home by the shortest practicable route or path as 
hereinbefore specified under Exemption D of this section. 
WISCONSIN 
Sec. 118.15. Compulsory school attendance 
(l)(a) Except as provided under pars. (b) and (c), un-
less the child is excused under sub. (3) or (4) or has grad-
uated from high school," any person having under control a 
chjld who is between the ages of 6 and 18 years shall cause 
the child to attend school regularly during the full period 
and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or 
private school in which the child should be enrolled is in 
session until the end of the school term, quarter or semester 
of the school year in which the child becomes 18 years of 
age ..• 
(b) Upon the child's request of the school board and 
with the written approval of the child's parent or guardian, 
any child who is 16 years of age or over may attend, in lieu 
of high school or on a part-time basis, a vocational, tech-
nical and adult education school. Where such a request is 
made and approved by the school board, the district board 
of the vocational, technical and adult education district 
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in which the child resides must admit the child and must 
enter into the contract specified in sub. (2). Every dis-
trict board must offer day class programs satisfactory to 
meet the requirements of this paragraph and sub. (2) as a 
condition to the receipt of any state aid. 
(c) Upon the child's request and with the written ap-
proval of the child's parent or guardian, any child who is 
16 years of age or over shall be excused by the school board 
from school attendance. A child who is excused from school 
attendance under this paragraph shall be informed by the 
school board of the availability of programs within the voca-
tional, technical and adult education system and of the 
child's right to be readmitted to school upon request. The 
school board may specify when the child will be excused or 
readmitted after being excused from school attendance. 
(d) Any child's parent or guardian, or the child if the 
parent or guardian is notified, may request the school board 
to provide the child with program or curriculum modifications, 
including but not limited to: 
1. Modifications within the child's current academic 
program. 
2. A school work training or work study program. 
3. Enrollment in any alternative public school or pro-
gram located in the school district in which the child 
resides. 
4. Enrollment in any nonsectarian private school or 
program, located in the school district in which the child 
resides, which complies with the requirements of 42 USC 
2000d. Enrollment of a child under this subdivision shall 
be pursuant to a contractual agreement which provides for 
the payment of the child's tuition by the school district. 
Instruction during the required period elsewhere than 
at school may be substituted for school attendance. Such 
instruction must be approved by the state superintendent as 
substantially equivalent to instruction given to children 
of like ages in the public or private schools where such 
children reside ... 
WYOMING 
Sec. 21-4-102. When attendance required; exemptions. 
(a) Every parent, guardian or other person having 
control or charge of any child who is a resident of this 
293 
state and whose seventh birthday falls on or before 
September 15 of any year and who has not yet attained his 
sixteenth birthday or completed the eighth grade shall be 
required to send such child to, and such child shall be re-
quired to attend, a public or private school each year, 
during the entire time that the public schools shall be in 
session in the district in which the pupil resides ... 
